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INTRODUCTION
The current international trade regime is flawed, unjust, and in need of redress.
It largely ignores concerns for global economic justice, and fails those most in need of a
strategy to help them move out of extreme poverty; it exacerbates inequalities, both
between states on the world stage and within individual countries, and it creates a
competitive pressure on producers to use the differing legal standards and enforcement
between countries to externalize important environmental, social, human rights and
cultural costs that harm others now, or in the future.
There are two models, which have generally been presented as ideal alternatives
to the present system. The first of these is a move towards eliminating all barriers to
free trade in a self-regulating free-market approach to trade. This is a model that has
had a strong influence on international trade policy over the past thirty years, and has
shaped many features of the current system. The other main model has a strong statecentric focus that favors unilateral protectionism as a tool to advance individual state
interest, and develop or protect domestic industry. This model has been a strong
influence on trade policy since the development of the modern state.
Both these models, while having their strengths, fall short of addressing the
important concerns of global justice. What is needed is a model that focuses on
regulating and facilitating international trade in the best interests of all participants.
1
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The model I propose is one that is influenced by John Rawls’ conception of social
justice, the idea that achieving a just society is dependent on ensuring the institutions
and basic social structures of a society are based on embedded principles of justice.
Rawls argues that a fair background framework for a society, permits individuals to
pursue their own ends as they see fit, under conditions that in most cases, support
maintenance of a just society.
This proposal is intended as the basis of a new, more just approach to
international trade, and it is intended as a proposal that could be implemented in global
society as it actually exists. The project takes a cosmopolitan approach to obligations of
justice, in that it accepts that obligations of justice extend between all members of
global society, but it is not necessarily part of a larger project of global justice, and thus
the principles are limited to those that are relevant specifically to international trade.
The project will be based around principles of justice, but although influenced by Rawls’
conception of justice, Rawls’ principles are not adopted directly.
Rawls suggests principles for justice in international society, in The Law of
Peoples. There justice is seen to be very different in international society than is his
conception in A Theory of Justice for a single self-contained society. In A Theory of
Justice Rawls carefully outlines his conceptions of the economic institutions that would
be required in society to support his principles of justice. In The Law of Peoples Rawls
claims that a fair background framework for trade would need to be worked out using
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the concept of the original position with the veil of

ignorance,1

but, unlike A Theory of

Justice, he does not work out what it would look like. Rawls argues that his liberty
principle and difference principle do not make sense in the context of international
society, he argues against a cosmopolitan conception of the obligations of justice in
international society, and his principles of justice, which he calls the “Law of Peoples,”
are arguably a much thinner and less comprehensive conception.
There are several important commentators on global justice who critique Rawls’
conception of global justice in The Law of Peoples, but claim that his principles of justice
stated in A Theory of Justice, which he developed for a single, mostly self-sufficient
society (really a single country or state), ought to be applied to global society. The
principles of justice in international trade defended here should be considered, in a
sense, to be similar to criteria that Rawls uses in constructing his economic institutional
order in A Theory of Justice, in that they are meant to apply to a society committed to
justice for all its members, but they are created in response to the need for criteria, for a
fair background framework for international trade, which, Rawls argues, would emerge
from the 2nd original position, in The Law of Peoples.
I will propose a model of trade that would be structured according to principles
of justice in international trade. These principles would focus on addressing the key
justice critiques of the current international trade system. The principles are these:

1

See Chapter 1 for detail.
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1)

Reduction of extreme poverty and satisfaction of basic needs for all people
should be the most important goal of international trade regulation, in a world
where resources exist to do this.

2)

Trade regulation ought to work towards limiting and reducing harmful inequality
at all levels (both between states and within populations).

3)

Trade regulations should ensure that negative externalities of trade are
compensated for fairly. The poorer countries or the poor within countries should
not bear a disproportionate share of the negative consequences of international
trade.
A more just conception of international trade would be one that respected the

interests of all those with a stake in its regulation and facilitation. Although I will argue
that international trade needs to be an active part of ending the most extreme global
poverty and limiting inequalities that lead to injustice, I will also defend the idea that to
do this, trade policy needs to move beyond the rigid ideological positions that have
often tended to dominate trade theory. There is likely no simple solution for all
situations; instead a just conception of international trade would be based on principles
that would guide decision making and policy relative to the particular issues and
concerns of particular situations.
The principles of just international trade that I propose are not proposed with
the assumption that they are part of a larger ideal-world system (perhaps noncapitalist). I assume a world order that is substantially similar to the current situation.

5

The important condition that this proposal does assume, however, is a disposition
towards achieving justice in relations of international trade.
Narrative Description of Chapters
Chapter One
The first chapter looks at how Rawls derives his principles of justice in A Theory
of Justice, and his argument for how they ought to apply to the economic institutions of
a just society. Then I examine Rawls’ argument in The Law of Peoples for his principles of
justice in international society and also for his process of deriving them. I look at Rawls
consideration of international trade in The Law of Peoples, and consider the fair
background framework he suggests would be chosen in the 2 nd original position to
support it. I point out relevant differences between the two positions, which apply to a
proposal for a just international trade regime.
I also consider my proposed principles of justice in trade in relation to Rawls’
principles of justice, and discussion of economic institutions in society in both A Theory
of Justice, and The Law of Peoples. This chapter finishes with an examination of the
positions of both Charles Beitz and Iris Marion Young, who support the argument that
Rawls’ restriction of strong obligations of justice to the boundaries of states is arbitrary
and would facilitate injustice at the international level.
Chapter Two
Chapter Two explores Peter Singer’s utilitarian critique of the current
international trade regime, including the particular critiques that directly relate to my

6

proposed principles of justice in international trade. I also consider his argument for
cosmopolitan obligations of global justice, and his critical discussion of positions which
consider that citizens of the same states have obligations to each other which take
precedence over obligations to others in the global society. The treatment of Singer’s
position finishes by outlining his criticisms of Rawls’ position in The Law of Peoples in
relation to his positions on justice in A Theory of Justice, particularly as they relate to
trade.
I then examine Thomas Pogge’s argument for global justice based human rights. I
outline his argument that the current world order is responsible for causing much of the
suffering and death that directly results from extreme poverty, and explain several of his
arguments for how and why. Thomas Pogge has made extensive arguments for why
Rawls conception of justice in The Law of Peoples is flawed and for how it is illogical
from the perspective of the positions Rawls supports in A Theory of Justice, and
throughout his body of work on justice, I examine some of those arguments which are
most relevant to international trade. Finally chapter two finishes with a presentation of
Pogge’s proposal to end extreme poverty, which is particularly relevant to international
trade.
Chapter Three
Chapter Three examines the two main economic models for international trade,
the free trade model, and the protectionist model. It covers briefly the historical roots of
both models, and examines their theoretical basis, outlining Adam Smith’s theory of
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absolute advantage and David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. In this
chapter, I present the positions of economists who argue in favor of each of the models
(free trade model and protectionist model). I also present critiques of both models,
made by economists. These include Milton Friedman and Jagdish Bhagwati, supporting
the free trade model, and William Gomory, Andre Gunder Frank, Ha Joon Chang, Joseph
Stiglitz and Herman Daly with critiques of it. By the end of the chapter it should be clear
that both of the traditional models have strengths and weaknesses, and that neither
model is completely satisfactory alone.
Chapter Four
In Chapter Four I evaluate several proposals for reforming the international trade
regime that do not embrace free trade as a trump concern; most are from economists,
but they all take fairly strong normative positions on how international trade should be
structured. Proposals considered are those of Ian Fletcher, Joseph Stiglitz, David
Schweickart, and Herman Daly. Each of the proposals has important strengths, which
contribute to my own proposal, but none of the proposals, considered individually,
meets all the criteria of the three principles of justice in international trade.
Chapter Five
In Chapter Five I present my own proposal for an alternative system of
international trade based on the three principles of justice. I explain the principles and
why each is of value for trade in global society, and the basic concerns for each. I
introduce the idea of a reformed institution for international trade (Global Trade

8

Organization) and outline the main concerns of each of the branches of the institution,
and how it will act to address them. I then consider how decision making in the
institution will be structured, and how members of international society will be
represented in it. Finally, I consider how some parts of the proposal, implemented
alone, could be quite effective at improving the fairness of the current international
trade regime, even if it is not possible to immediately move forward with the entire
reform.
Is There A Value In Theorizing About International Trade?
An important question to consider before wading too far into the problem of
international trade, is whether or not, there is any point to a philosopher’s working
through the problems of international trade? This question seems to be handled best if
it is broken down into two distinct parts. The first part is, whether there is any point in
theorizing about justice in international trade at all, given that almost all countries
approach international trade at least partially as “international relations realists”, and
that it is a fairly common claim (particularly among economists) that economics is not an
area where justice applies, but is simply governed by scientific rules. The second part of
the question is, whether or not, there are actual philosophical problems to address in
international trade.
The first part of the question is concerned with the problem of whether the de
facto “realist” orientation of much current trade policy makes it pointless to discuss
trade theory in relation to justice. The Realist position is based on a belief that each
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actor (in this case normally states) in international relations will act completely in their
own interest, without concern for the interests of other states, as far as it is in their
power to do so. This conception of international interaction can be considered to arise
from the basic belief that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game. (A
zero-sum game is best understood as a situation analogous to a pie of fixed size, where
the only part of the situation that is variable is how big a slice each player will get. There
is basically no value in “cooperation,” unless it allows you, with your allies, to garner a
larger share of pie.)
There are several reasons why justice should be part of the conversation, the
first being that even if it is a zero-sum game, we ought to divide up what is available so
that all parties will get a fair share, especially in a world where distribution, not total
resources available, is why millions die from the effects of poverty. Realism is an unjust
way to approach trade, and simply because people are approaching it that way doesn’t
make it right.
The second reason is that we know that international relations are not always
zero-sum games; in fact in many situations, it is clearly and demonstrably a positive-sum
game, where cooperation between actors ends up being beneficial to all. (A positivesum game is a situation where cooperation between actors in the game actually
increases the sum available to be distributed. Cooperating to work on the pie yields a
bigger pie for distribution than the sum of pies that individuals could bake alone.)
Economists that support free trade all argue that international trade is not a zero sum

10

game. So, like Rawls’ explanation in A Theory of Justice that a starting point for
considering his theory is the requirement of a desire to live in a just nation, I will assume
as a starting point, an orientation to international trade that we desire to live in a just
world.
The second part of the question of whether or not there is value for a
philosopher to work through the problems of international trade, is whether or not
there is actually a philosophical question of substance involved. There are several
reasons why this is quite clearly the case. The first reason is the fact that there is
arguably a strong connection between international trade and other problems of global
justice that philosophers have commonly addressed, such as the problem of global
poverty, and concerns about the environment, human rights, and the distribution of
resources in the world. These concerns are all issues where claims about justice are
being made, the assumption being that a philosopher has the tools to “clear away the
brush” around these problems, so that what is at stake are made clear. It is also true
that issues of political economy have historically been addressed by philosophers, with
moral philosophers being generally well equipped to address the normative aspects of
questions of political economy.
I feel there is considerable value in focussing on normative issues in international
trade, as it is an area that is often considered as a sideline to other problems in global
justice commonly addressed by philosophers. International trade has not itself been the
focus of much specific attention from philosophers. It has however been a subject of

11

considerable commentary from economists, much of it at least implicitly normative. I
feel that balancing the issues of justice involved with theories of international trade is a
philosophical problem worth addressing. In my argument, I will expand and support the
defense of issues of justice in international trade, as a valid area for philosophical
inquiry.
Justice Concerns in International Trade
The current international trade regime is unjust in several ways. I will argue that
these injustices fall into three basic categories. The three categories include the failure
of international trade to function up to its potential as a tool in ending the problem of
extreme poverty, the problems of international trade contributing to inequality both
within societies and in the international context between states, and the third major
category which is the problem of negative externalities in market exchanges.
The concern that the current system of international trade fails to reach its full
potential as a tool in the struggle to end the problem of extreme poverty is a particularly
important charge of injustice, for poverty is one of the major causes of human suffering
and premature death. It receives much less news coverage than more dramatic events,
but it causes some 18 million premature human deaths annually2, its toll dwarfing that
of war and human conflict. What makes it in some ways even more terrible is that it
would be reasonably easy to end the worst poverty. The resources are available to

2

Andreas Føllesdal and Thomas Pogge, Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights and Social
Institutions (Springer, 2005), 139.
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ensure that everyone has more than enough to satisfy basic necessities. The issue is that
the current system fails the most impoverished, because it is not particularly focussed
on reaching them.
I will argue that the problems of inequality in international trade should be
separated from the problem of extreme poverty, for the pragmatic reason that some
commentators insist that poverty is a problem, but inequality is not, making it worth
addressing the issues separately. I will argue that inequality could still be an important
issue, even in situations where the most extreme poverty is not. Inequality, as a justice
issue in the current regime of international trade, emerges as a problem in several ways,
all strongly related, because they stem from the connection between economic
inequality and political power. The problem shows up both within states, and as a
concern in world order between states. In the situation of inequality between states it is
a problem which forms a self-reinforcing cycle, with wealthy states using their power in
negotiating and bargaining, to set up both the organizing institutions and ground rules
governing trade in their favor, and also using that same wealth and power to achieve
terms of trade that are highly favorable to them. It is self- reinforcing because, in
ensuring that the ground rules and terms of trade favor them, wealthy and powerful
states tend to reap the greatest benefit from trade relations, which allows them to
further enhance their positions of advantage, controlling the agenda for future terms of
trade.
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These inequalities sustained, or even increased by the current trade regime, spill
out far beyond the realm of trade and affect the abilities of poorer and weaker states, to
ensure resources are available for fulfilment of basic needs of citizens, and present their
interests effectively in world forums. This situation, can often lead to a situation where
it is nearly impossible to address the other two categories of issue, extreme poverty and
externalities.
International trade may also contribute to inequalities that exist within
countries. In developing countries it may take the form of wealth from trade based
economic development, mostly benefiting an elite group, who mediate the trade
relationship. This scenario also occurs in wealthy countries, where wealth from trade
activities tends to benefit an elite group who control large amounts of financial capital.
The problem being in both cases, that wealth generally equals power in dictatorial
societies, and often, also in societies understood to be reasonably democratic, so those
elites benefiting from particular trade arrangements, predictably use the power that
wealth has brought, to influence governance, and ensure their interests are protected
and promoted.
The problem of negative externalities in the current international trade system,
seems to cover the widest range of issues, some of which are controversial. An
externality, in general, is any third-party effect of a market transaction between two
individuals. Some are positive. Some are negative. If a set of transactions has significant
positive externalities, a case can be made for the public provision of the commodity or
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service, since the free market will yield a less-than-optimal supply. (To support creation
of an environment that supports economic development, society as a whole, will often
shoulder some of the costs of developing infrastructure of which business can take
advantage. For example, reliance on private enterprise to construct a road network will
result in a less-than-optimal situation, since a private company would have to set up a
costly system to ensure that only paying customers could use the network.)
Negative externalities are particularly problematic costs inflicted on thirdparties. Environmental costs are an immediate concern, but there are certainly other
sorts of costs, including social or human rights costs (such as the lost opportunities to
receive education, experienced by children forced by family economic circumstance into
child labor,) and even cultural costs, which can often be more difficult to define.
There are two reasons why externalities are such a problem in international
trade. First, because a free market system is competitive, based on the cost at which a
good or service can be supplied to the market, there is a strong competitive pressure to
lower costs of production. If a supplier of a good or service, can somehow avoid paying
some of the production costs, they will increase their ability to compete successfully in
the market. Thus, there is a very strong incentive to externalize as many costs as
possible. Secondly, international trade, by definition, involves supplying to international
markets, markets that are not confined by national borders. In wealthy developed
countries there are usually laws, which are reasonably effective at limiting the ability of
suppliers of goods, to compete by externalizing harmful costs onto others. But
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international law has not, for the most part, developed a realistic capacity to limit the
externalizing of harmful costs. Because of this, at least two problematic situations arise.
One, there is the concern that, in an international market, there may be an incentive in
less developed countries, without well-developed legal protective regulation, for
suppliers to compete by offloading harmful costs on others. This creates a situation
where the demand for products at competitive prices, in wealthy developed countries,
ends up causing harm in other countries, without protective regulation. The second is
that there is the pressure on industries in countries with developed legal regulation, to
relocate operations to countries where the externalizing of the costs they incur, is still
permitted. This may even be to the extent of creating situations, where very wealthy
corporations are able to influence the regulatory law, in developing countries that
desperately need economic development.

CHAPTER ONE
JUSTICE CONCERNS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
John Rawls: A Theory of Justice
John Rawls, a professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, transformed the
field of political and social philosophy when, in 1971, he published A Theory of Justice. A
Theory of Justice (ATOJ) brought social justice as a philosophical issue into the
philosophical mainstream and legitimized distributive justice as an area to be studied
and debated by political philosophers. It is hard to consider most issues of justice
philosophically without some reference to Rawls’ work.
Rawls suggests that his goal in producing ATOJ is to provide an alternative
theoretical approach to justice for social institutions and societies from Utilitarianism.1
Thomas Pogge, in his biography of Rawls, explains that it is possible to think of Rawls’
work in ATOJ as an effort to demonstrate that, a worthwhile collective human life is
possible and that, because it is possible, we can find motivation to work for positive
change and recognize value in the life we live in the world, as it is currently.
By modeling a realistic utopia as a final moral goal for our collective life, political
philosophy can provide an inspiration that can banish the dangers of resignation
and cynicism and can enhance the value of our lives even today.2

1

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999), xi-xii.

2

Pogge, Thomas. John Rawls His Life and Theory of Justice (New York: Oxford, 2005), 27.
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While this seems like a big claim for a book on political philosophy many have people
found ATOJ to be a strong influence either in a decision to study political philosophy or
as a motivation to look more closely at questions of social justice.
The basic argument of ATOJ is quite simple, but it has several key elements,
which Rawls spends considerable effort elaborating. Rawls first suggests, “justice is the
first virtue of social institutions,”3 and explains that, social institutions are a social
structure occurring within societies. His definition of a society and the function of
principles of justice within it are a strong basis for understanding the foundation of
social justice:
[A]society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in their
relationships to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and
who for the most part act in accordance with them. Suppose further that these
rules specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those
taking part in it. Then although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage, it is typically marked by conflict as well as by an identity of interests.
There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better
life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts.
There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the
greater benefits of their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their
own ends they each prefer a larger share to a lesser share. A set of principles is
required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine
this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper
distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice: they
provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society
and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of
social cooperation.4

3

Rawls, A Theory, 3.

4

Rawls, A Theory, 4.
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The idea that Rawls puts forth in this section is that, the very foundation of social
justice is the conception that, a society exists because in the aggregate, the benefit of
coming together as a society is enormous in comparison to many individuals living in
social isolation. The benefits however are not distributed equally, and realistically no
individual can be said to have the alternative of opting out of society. Even escaping to
the wilderness will not free one of the effects of society. Since society in the aggregate,
produces huge benefits which are not distributed equally, it seems only reasonable, that
we as a society ensure there is concern for fairness in how the benefits, and burdens of
society are shared. (Imagine how useful Bill Gates’ or Carlos Slim’s skills would be,
foraging on their own in the forest. Every tremendously successful individual in our
society owes their success to the environment and structure of society as well as to their
own efforts.)
Rawls’ definition of a society is important, both the idea that it is “more or less
self-sufficient” and the idea that members of the society recognize certain rules as
binding and for the most part act in accordance with them. The “more or less selfsufficient” part is interesting, in that, Rawls explicitly states that his theory of justice is
not to be applied to international society or global society. In ATOJ he suggests different
principles and process might apply to a society of nations,5 and in The Law of Peoples
(TLOP) he takes the position that justice applied to global society has an entirely
different character, and he abandons his basic ethical focus in ATOJ on liberal ethical

5

Rawls, A Theory, 331-333.
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individualism in his discussion of a law of

peoples.6

The “more or less self-sufficient”

part becomes extremely problematic if Rawls is aiming his theory at the society of the
United States because it is hard to argue that it fulfills the requirement for selfsufficiency, whereas countries that have turned their backs on global society and global
economic interdependence, seem to be furthest from Rawls’ vision of a just society.
Rawls suggests that what justice really applies to is social institutions; of which
he has a fairly specific definition:
Now by an institution I shall understand a public system of rules which defines
offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and
the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as
forbidden: and they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when
violations occur. As examples of institutions, or more generally social practices,
we may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems
of property.7
Thomas Pogge, when commenting on Rawls’ definition of institutions suggests it
is a somewhat particular way of understanding social institutions.8 It differs from the
way in which social institutions, such as the particular schools or banks of a society, are

6

Rawls’ discussion of “the law of nations” in ATOJ is brief (pp. 331-333)--and done in the context of the
question of civil disobedience--but it would seem to be possible, in the the Original Position for the Law of
Nations that the representatives, who are, he explains, individuals, but who do not know their position
even in their own societies, would choose something very different from a society of sovereign states with
weak obligations to one another. Since the majority of people in the majority of societies are poor, and a
very important minority are highly impoverished (40% approximately live under the $2/Day PPP poverty
line), it seems highly likely that given the opportunity to choose principles of justice, and given the
moderately high possibility that they would end up very impoverished, the representatives at the 2 nd
Original Position negotiations would choose some type of global difference principal. The idea that the
negotiators would all gamble that they would end up in the top 10 or 15% wealth and income wise of
global society and be allowed to keep their unequally large share seems out of step with what Rawls
suggests is rational for the representatives at the first Original Position. (More on this below.)
7

Rawls, A Theory, 47-48.

8

Pogge, John Rawls, 28.
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generally conceived. Rawls seems to be getting at the function of these institutions
rather than particular instances. He is looking at the roles and effects of institutions in
society and the ways they actually shape the society, and the lives of its members. It
seems likely that he does this, because he does not want to presuppose a particular set
of institutions, given that his theory may apply to a property owning democracy or a
liberal socialist regime.9 The care Rawls takes with his discussion of institutions is worth
considering in relation to principles of justice in International Trade, for effective
institutions are crucial in turning principles of justice into just practices in society.10
Liberalism
In ATOJ Rawls considers liberalism, the political understanding that society
should be structured in such a way as to maximize individual freedom for all its
members, as the ideal starting place for a just society. Rawls takes the position that
being free to shape one’s own life in the way that one sees fit, to take advantage of
opportunities to which the individual feels most attracted, and pursue whichever ends
one values, with as little limitation as possible, is a very high value. He has been
criticized on this point, with the suggestion this is a cultural value, which is not universal.
It seems hard from within,11 to see why it would not be considered valuable or
desirable.

9

Rawls, A Theory, xv.

10

11

This is Rawls’ position, but also the argument that I will support throughout the dissertation.

I mean from within a socialized vision of what is valuable, possessed by someone raised in North
American society.
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Utilitarianism
A large part of Rawls’ purpose in ATOJ is to provide an alternative theory of
justice to utilitarianism that can be applied to the institutions that shape a society.
Rawls explains that while utilitarianism has had since the beginning of the 19 th century,
some very strong thinkers supporting it, there is something basically wrong with the
conception, which Rawls (and many others) considers basic to utilitarianism: that it is
ethically acceptable or correct to sacrifice the interests of a minority in order to create
an aggregate benefit to the group as a whole. Rawls finds it perfectly acceptable for an
individual to govern herself in such a way, sacrificing in some interests, for what one
considers a larger overall benefit, but thinks it is a completely unacceptable manner, in
which, to govern a society. It doesn’t seem acceptable to Rawls, that the life chances of
some, should be sacrificed for a benefit, that will only accrue to others.
Rawls explains his alternative to utilitarianism comes from the contractarian
tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant.12 A contractarian understanding of justice in
society is based on the idea of a hypothetical (usually) pre-society (a state of nature)
where all individuals are interacting in an anarchic system, in which there are no
effective formal organizations to regulate the interactions between individuals. The
conception of this state of nature was a variable. Hobbes described it as the “war of all
against all.” Locke considered that much of the time it would be in the interest of
individuals to more or less respect one another’s rights, but that the individual alone
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had difficult recourse when it was not the case. All of them felt that at a certain point
the aggregate of individuals would find it in their interest to come together and agree to
a structure of governance; basically agree to a set of social institutions and formal
understandings of how they would operate. Rawls considers that understanding society
as a group of individuals, that have made a contract to abide by specific rules and social
structures was the best way to conceptualize his theory of justice. From there he set out
to explain what the particular principles of justice would be that form the basis of a just
society.
Rawls’ Principles of Justice
Rawls also utilizes the State of Nature approach of the contractarian tradition in
how he justifies the choice of the principles of justice he believes ought to be chosen as
the organizing principles of a just society. His state of nature is hypothetical and, in a
sense, takes the form of a thought experiment. Rawls calls his state of nature “The
Original Position.” The main feature of the “Original Position” is that those who we
imagine as selecting the principles of justice that will govern the society, are doing it
blind; in the sense that they do not know anything about their society or their position
within it. They are also blind to their own interests within the society, Rawls places the
persons who will select the principles of justice in a hypothetical situation where they
do not know what specific personal interests and attributes they will have, whether they
will be able bodied and strong or disabled and at the mercy of others, whether they will
be intelligent and a quick learner or someone who is less intelligent and struggles with
intellectual tasks. The persons imagined in the original position, do not know if they will
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come from a strong family background prepared for success, or whether they come
from a broken home, without many good examples to socialize youth into successful
choices, there is no knowledge of whether the negotiator will be a religious believer or
an atheist, or from a particular cultural background or race. Obviously as noted it is
hypothetical. Rawls named the situation in which the persons in the Original Position
knew nothing of their own characteristics, or that of their society as “The Veil of
Ignorance.”
Rawls argued that in the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance free from
the influence of personal interest, the negotiators would choose out of rational selfinterest principles of justice on which to found their society, giving them the best
chance at access to a fair share of the goods and opportunities available in their society,
regardless of what characteristics they might possess as a person, ensuring whatever
their position within the society turned out to be, they would still have a fair share of
the benefits of living in the society and not be burdened with an unfair share of the
costs.
Rawls claims that in the end the principles that would be agreed to would be
something like the following:
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle
Social and Economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just
savings principle, and
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(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under the conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.13
He states and restates these two principals several times, as he develops his
argument in order to construct what he feels is a solid case, so that when the situation is
considered thoroughly, these principles would be the rational choice, upon which to
organize the institutions of a just society.
The first principle, known as the Liberty Principle, is a fairly straightforward
expression of the basic idea of liberalism; each individual should be permitted freedom,
to act as they see fit, in their own interests, as far as they can do so, without interfering
with the right to liberty of others. Most commentators accept this principle, expressed
this way, without much argument. In Rawls’ principle, he is particularly clear about the
concept of equal liberty, and is very firm in giving equal liberty priority, in his scheme of
principles. This makes it different than many understandings, and he explains that, he
does not necessarily include a right to hold all types of property, nor a freedom of
contract. It is explicitly different from what Rawls terms “Laissez Faire” conceptions of
basic rights.14 It seems likely, or at least plausible, he does this to keep options open,
regarding the actual structure of economic system a just society could organize around.
The second principle is known as the Difference Principle. The Difference
Principle, is the principal that is a more radical claim for justice, than is generally
accepted in wealthy developed democracies. Rawls starts out stating this principle as,
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Social and Economic inequalities are to be arranged so they are both reasonably
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and attached to positions and offices open to
all. 15 His concern about this first statement, is based on the concern that, while
everyone would include the least well off, it would be more clear to make it explicit that
any inequality would need to be focussed on improving the situation of those who
would end up being least well off, in the resulting deviation from absolute equality.
Rawls explains that, it might be the case that effective entrepreneurs, might, in
some economic organizations of society, create a situation where everyone would be
better off, and it also could be the case, that they will, because of the need for incentive,
end up with a larger than equal share of the economic benefits of society. However
Rawls takes the position that, if there is inequality, according to the Difference Principle,
the test of whether it could be considered just, would be, if it benefitted most, those
who received the least share in the resulting unequal distribution. Rawls discusses the
concern for efficiency in the economy in relation to the Difference Principle, using the
concept of Pareto Optimality. He takes the position that, economic actions or differing
distributions could be acceptable, if they increased efficiency, and led to those who
received the least share getting the greatest benefit from the inequality.16
The Just Savings Principle is included in the final statement of the Difference
Principle, because it calls for intergenerational justice, and limits the common human
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propensity to discount future costs. It requires a distribution of economic benefits to be
sustainable in the long term, and requires the current generation to manage resources
in such a way, that they will not make future generations less well off. It is one of quite a
few examples of Rawls’ understanding and engagement with both classical and neoclassical economics, and alternative economics, focussed on sustainable practices in
managing economies. The Just Savings Principle, or something like it, supported by
effective institutions, would be an effective basis for beginning to address currently
intractable problems, such as climate change.
The Difference Principle contains the caveat, that any social or economic
inequalities be attached to positions that are open to all. Rawls makes it very clear, that
this is not in place to solely, promote a meritocratic focus on efficiency. He suggests, it
may be possible to have situations in which some people are effectively barred from
some offices, which actually makes it more likely that the most talented persons will
hold the office. This could end up benefitting everyone with some increase in efficiency,
however in the interests of justice, the offices should remain open to all, because there
is a kind of good which inheres to the role and duties of these offices, which must not be
categorically denied to any member of a just society.
It is also worth considering, especially in the context of principles of just trade in
global society, that Rawls argues that, one of the reasons he supports a contractarian
approach to justice in a society, is because he feels that a utilitarian approach to justice,
can be understood as being maximization of satisfaction of particular desires. Rawls is
committed to a liberal understanding of the importance of the individual being free to

27

pursue their own interests, or their own conception of the good, and therefore is
looking for an approach that separates what is right, from particular understandings of
the good. He argues that a deontological theory does this. Rawls explains, he
understands deontological theories, as those that, do not specify any particular good
independent of the right. He is careful to point out, that he believes that all reasonable
ethical theories must in a sense be consequentialist, as it would be irrational not to take
consequences into account.17 This is of particular value in a global context because
although some states are moderately culturally homogenous, (although not really the
US,) global society requires a theory of justice that does not specify the individual good.
How the Principles Apply
Rawls makes the Liberty Principle prior to the Difference Principle, because,
although he is concerned for ensuring a level of aggregate social welfare, in the sense of
ensuring that the needs of all members of the society are satisfied to a level that allows
the society to function effectively, he is also concerned about the problem he sees with
utilitarian understandings of justice in society, where it is acceptable that the interests
or rights of individuals, could trumped, in situations where this was strongly beneficial
to the majority.18 By making the Liberty Principle prior, Rawls is ensuring that rights of
individuals will not be sacrificed to increase the general material lifestyle of the society.
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The principles are conceived of as applying to institutions of society, rather than
being specifically applied to individuals, and are not meant to designate what any one
particular person ought to receive, but rather, provide a formal structure for justice in
the society.
[T]he essential point is that despite the individualistic features of justice as
fairness, the two principles of justice are not contingent on existing desires or
present social conditions. Thus we are able to derive a conception of a just basic
structure, and an ideal of the person compatible with it, that can serve as a
standard for appraising institutions[.]19
Rawls understands the parts of the social structure of a society that apply to
securing basic liberties, and the parts that apply to social and economic inequalities as
separate. He deals with the principles serially, first discussing what would be required in
the sense of institutions to support the Liberty Principle, then discussing the institutions
necessary to support the Difference Principle.
Institutions and the Liberty Principle
Rawls sees the Liberty Principle as leading to a list of basic liberties, that are
considered valuable, and considers that a society organized under the requirements of
the Liberty Principle will take the form of a constitutional democracy. The constitution
would combine the list of basic liberties, with a format for the structures and roles or
positions necessary to support them. A democracy would be the reasonable choice, to
permit individuals to pursue to the greatest extent possible, their own conceptions of

19

Rawls, A Theory, 232.

29

the good. requiring it to be a constitutional democracy, would ensure that, no
individual’s basic rights would sacrificed, in pursuit of the interests of the majority.
Institutions and the Difference Principle
The institutions that Rawls outlines as necessary to support the Difference
Principle, are more directly relevant to understanding Rawls’ principles of justice in
relation to trade, and are in some ways more controversial than his conception of
constitutional democracy. He notes that, his principles of justice can be understood to
be a part of a doctrine of political economy.20 Rawls very explicitly, explains that, his
principles of justice can apply across a spectrum of economic systems, from one where
the means of production is almost exclusively privately owned, to one where the means
of production is owned, or controlled, almost exclusively, by the society in general.
Rawls considers several important ideas in relation to the creation of institutions
to support the principles of justice. He suggests that, the structure and dynamics of
social interaction, fostered by the economic organization of a society, shapes the
understanding of what is of value in a society.21 He explains that, economic thinkers
from a wide variety of perspectives have accepted this. He argues that, because of this,
the design of the economic institutions of a society must operate in such a way that they
foster respect for and engagement with the principles of justice. Rawls suggests
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economic efficiency ought not to be a complete trump on the design of the institutions,
which must also address political and ethical concerns in the society.22
Rawls goes to the trouble, of laying out the plan, of the actual regulative
institutions for the economy of a society, organized according to his principles of justice.
He suggests four main branches for the economic institutions of a just society: the
allocation branch, the stabilization branch, the transfer branch and the distribution
branch.23
Rawls points out that, the principles of justice relate, to an important extent, to
the provision of public goods; that is, goods, services or conditions that require the
pooling of the resources of society to achieve. The concern about public goods for a
society is that once they have been put in place they benefit everyone regardless of
whether or not they have contributed to them. This concern is known as the free rider
effect and is a considerable problem in political economy because it can be very difficult
to get citizens who are willing to pay for the provision of a public good to do so until
they are sure arrangements are in place to ensure that others will not be able to shirk
their responsibility. Rawls explains that the institutions will need coercive power to
ensure there is confidence within the society that members will not be made worse off
by contributing to provision of public goods that others make use of without paying
for.24
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The allocation branch is focussed on maintaining fair and competitive market
conditions, working to avoid over-concentration of market power and to address
“obvious departures from efficiency caused by the failure of prices to measure
accurately social benefits and costs” (market externalities).25 In general it would be an
institution with a largely microeconomic focus, although it would also be addressing
macroeconomic issues in the case of strategic legislation and policy. It is role is to
minimize negative externalities.
This is another area where Rawls expresses concern about the ability of the
institutions to have sufficient coercive power
[O]f course, there are the striking cases of public harms, as when industries sully
and erode the natural environment. These costs are not normally reckoned with
by the market, so that the commodities produced are sold at much less than
their marginal social costs. There is a divergence between private and social
accounting that the market fails to register. One essential task of law and
government is to institute the necessary corrections.26
It is interesting how concerned Rawls is about this situation, which has been a
strong concern in thinking about environmental issues and the economy. At the time
Rawls was formulating his theory of justice, it was an emerging issue, it has now become
a standard justice issue in economics and is considered particularly problematic in
international trade. In this role it is extremely non-controversial, even very orthodox
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classical liberal thinkers in economics agree it is unjust to permit the externalization of
costs or harmful effects onto persons who are not voluntary participants in a
transaction. Internationally the World Trade Organization (WTO) is responsible to some
extent for mediating disputes between sovereign states that arise in this area but, as
will be discussed, later it has weaknesses in both administrative structure and effective
coercive power making it fall short as an economic institution supporting justice in
global society.
The other role of the allocation branch is to restrict over-concentrations of
market power, which distort the function of markets. By this Rawls means the operation
of monopolies, partial or effective monopolies, and cartels. In a sense this is, again, a
fairly orthodox role. Many countries have or have had legislation which attempts to
address this situation (with variable success), because these types of market conditions
are perceived in general as being in the interest of the producer who holds the
monopoly, but in general against the interests of other actors in the economy and those
generally of society. There are situations where monopolies are considered useful to
society, including natural monopolies and in the development of new industries where
there are very important returns to scale, and Rawls is aware of these (at least of
natural monopolies). Any scheme of national emissions trading to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, would likely fall under the purview of the allocation branch.
The stabilization branch has the macroeconomic focus of working towards full
employment. Rawls says this should be understood as employment opportunity and
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choice.27

He also suggests this would include ensuring “the deployment of finance was

supported by strong effective demand.”28 The concept of full employment as a goal of
an economic system is worth discussing. Particularly since the second half of the 20th
century, there has been a belief that full employment in a country’s economy, while a
nice idea in the sense that no one must suffer the indignity of being unable to find
employment when they want it, is not entirely desirable. This is because it is conceived
full employment would tend to lead to high inflation in an economy because of the
upward pressure placed on wages by competition between employers to secure
relatively scarce employees. It is easy to understand why Rawls takes the position he
does, as he is strongly committed to principles of justice which do not permit the
sacrifice of the interests of a minority of individuals to serve even the greater good of
society. Maintaining a pool of reserve labor for which as a group (individuals may move
in and out of it) there will never be satisfactory employment, in order to serve the end
of economic efficiency, can never be acceptable to Rawls who explicitly commits to
fairness over efficiency in the economy.29
The other goal of strong effective demand is very closely related to employment.
Here it seems Rawls is referencing the concern for the level of wages in the economy or
possibly more accurately the ratio of returns to labor from production. This position
likely reflects a belief in the importance of effective demand in flattening out the down-
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sides of business cycles or even economic recessions, which are normally not seen as
positive from either a social or economic perspective.30 The way in which Keynesian
demand side policies made a comeback during the 2007/8 economic crisis, after years of
a supply side focus, lends a certain renewed validation to the inclusion. Joseph Stiglitz,
ex–Chief Whitehouse Economist and past Chief Economist of the World Bank, makes an
argument, which is discussed later on, that an important factor in the 2007–2008 global
crisis was the shrinking share of returns to labor from production in wages and the
resulting complications of effective demand. In many contemporary states there are
economic institutions which fulfil some of the roles Rawls is envisioning for this branch.
Central banks manipulate interest rates and therefore the cost of using capital in order
to affect relations of economic growth to levels of employment in a variety of ways,
sometimes not entirely successfully. Most states also have programs supported by
government that work to train and encourage workers to enter fields which suit the
opportunities of the current economy and goals for future economic development.
Internationally it could be argued the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary
Fund) act in this way to some extent, although their policies have in general shifted
away from the demand side economic thinking that characterized their creation at the
Bretton Woods conferences of 1944, to be more in line with a supply side consensus
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which has largely come to fore since Rawls’ publication of ATOJ (their goals now
certainly are not full employment nor ensuring effective demand31).
The transfer branch is designed to ensure the needs of the society are being
effectively met using the product of the economy; its job is to ensure a certain level of
well-being for all members. In a sense the focus of the transfer branch is
microeconomic.
[G]overnment guarantees a social minimum either by family allowances and
special payment for sickness and employment, or more systematically by such
devices as a graded income supplement (a so-called negative income tax).32
The transfer branch according to Rawls has the job of making sure the incomes
of all members of the society are sufficient to meet needs, but it is different than the
stabilization branch in this sense. While the stabilization branch focuses on ensuring
employment and arranging wages from work to put enough money in the hands of
enough of the population to support a vibrant economy, the transfer branch focuses on
redistributing the product of the economy to ensure that no member of the society is
allowed to fall below an agreed upon threshold which permits them to be active
participants in the society and allows them freedom of opportunity to shift their
position in society. All wealthy developed countries have institutions with this function,
only the level of support provided to members of the society through redistribution is,
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in general,

contested.33

For Rawls this would be decided by the function of the

difference principal and calculations of what level would most benefit the least well off
when the overall economy is taken into account. At the international level there is really
no equivalent to Rawls’ transfer branch. The United Nations (UN), starting with a
General Assembly Resolution in 1970, has attempted to have wealthy developed
countries transfer 0.7% of their GDP to a fund for financing development in poor
developing countries. Most wealthy developed countries have made commitments to
do so, but none of the G8 countries have actually carried through on their
commitment.34 The UN lacks the coercive power that Rawls suggests is necessary to
ensure confidence in the compliance of others required of an institution which is
involved in the provision of public goods.
The fourth branch is the distribution branch, which is focused on the long term
concern of distribution of wealth and preventing the development of large entrenched
inequalities which Rawls argues consistently are obstacles to effective equal political
liberty and equality of opportunity.35 He claims it is possible to distinguish between two
major areas in which this branch operates. The first of these is a scheme of inheritance
taxes and progressive taxes on income, and in some cases limits on property rights.
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The purpose of these levies and regulations is not to raise revenue (release
resources to the government) but gradually and continually to correct the
distributions of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to
the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.36
The second area of responsibility for the distribution branch is the creation and
management of a taxation regime that will raise the revenue that is required for
operation of the system of institutions and their policies that have been created to
support the principals of justice.
Social resources must be released to the government so that it can provide for
the public goods and make transfer payments necessary to satisfy the difference
principle. This problem belongs to the distribution branch since the burden of
taxation is to be justly shared and it aims at establishing just arrangements. 37
Rawls suggests a proportional tax on expenditures or income, is likely the best
method, of raising the revenue required to support the institutions required by the
principles of justice because it maintains an incentive to be productive, although he is
careful to mention this is in ideal theory and wouldn’t make even steeply progressive
taxes unjust in non-ideal institutions.
Rawls summarizes the discussion of the distribution tax by making clear that
inheritance taxes, progressive taxes on income and definitions of private property rights
are specifically focussed on supporting the Liberty principle through restricting the
growth of economic inequality to below the point where it would jeopardize political
equality. On the other hand the proportional tax on expenditure or income is put in
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place to ensure sufficient resources to support the institutions which uphold the
Difference Principle.
Taxes of the second sort proposed by Rawls, those used to support public goods
and public institutions of a society are commonplace in most states. How the costs are
divided among members of society and the extent of provision of public goods as well as
the particular institutions that ought to be public rather than private is often contested,
but despite the existence of libertarian arguments condemning any form of taxation, the
role of states in levying taxes to support agreed upon public goods is non-controversial.
However, the first function of Rawls’ proposed distribution branch, forms of taxation
specifically aimed at reducing concentrations of wealth in society are for the most part
politically unacceptable in most wealthy developed countries. Inheritance taxes exist
and to some extent have the role of reducing the concentrations of wealth passed
between generations, but they do not achieve this goal to any great extent, and it is
unlikely that there will be a discussion of how to make them more effective in this
respect in the near future, especially because of the power of the interests of
concentrated wealth in the political system. Internationally there are really no
institutions which have the function of Rawls’ distributive branch. In some senses this is
really so much worse for political equality and justice in global society. Public
institutions which exist at the level of international society are International
Government Organizations (IGOs) of which the United Nations (UN), the WTO, the IMF
and the World Bank Group are important examples. They are all institutions that were
founded with the conception they would provide public goods in global society. They all
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suffer in one way or another from the problem that there is no effective analog to the
second part of Rawls’ distribution branch. The IMF and World Bank are directed by the
states which make the greatest contributions to them, and therefore fairly consistently
operate in ways that have been categorized as being in the national interest of the
wealthy developed states that fund them rather than the poorer developing states that
in general make use of the services they provide. The UN is also funded by states based
proportionally on their wealth, and faces criticism from its biggest contributors (with
and without reason) when its organs that are not administrated according to
proportional contribution fail to act in the national interest of the largest
contributors.38This weakens the UN, and also is less well administrated in some cases, as
wealthy powerful states dismiss it rather than work within it.
Just Savings Principle
Rawls is concerned about justice between generations, and he addresses it with
what he calls the Just Savings Principle. Rawls suggests that in some ways obligations of
justice to future persons are difficult in a contractarian understanding of ethics because
there is no possibility of reciprocity between generations. It is a problem in
contemporary society as our legal conception of the rights of individuals functions for
the most part on the ability of individuals to make a rights claim in defense of their
interests, or at very least be capable of presenting one’s interests. In the case of future
generations it is obvious that they will not be able to express those interests. Historically
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in our society while important attention has often been paid to securing for the long
term the institutions that support political liberties as they have been achieved, at least
in effective constitutional democracies, there has been considerably less attention
focussed on the concern for the economic wellbeing of, and availability of resources for
future generations. This may be because in general the material lifestyle has improved
markedly for each generation for the last 250 years or so, and it may have been
contributed to by a single minded focus on economic growth and expansion of
economies during that same period. It is difficult to ascertain with certainty the cause.
Rawls approaches the concern for justice between generations using his
conception of the original position with the veil of ignorance. He suggests that even
though the persons in the Original Position would be contemporaries generationally,
they would have to negotiate a principle such that, they wish all earlier generations,
would have followed it.39 They would in effect be obliged to extend the Difference
Principle to include the advantage of the least well off through subsequent generations.
Rawls considers that this would likely shift the social minimum in order to ensure
sufficient savings and capital of various forms to support at least that minimum for the
next generation.
[P]ersons in different generations have duties and obligations to one another
just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is
bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define
justice between persons at different moments in time.40
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Rawls doesn’t consider specifically the use of resources in his Just Savings
Principle, or mention at all the concern for environmental degradation imposed on
future generations in his discussion of the obligations of justice between generations.
This however has become a larger issue since the publication of ATOJ and Rawls engages
with it in his later work The Law of People (TLOP). It seems significant and relevant that
he considers the topic of the obligations of justice between generations in a society in
the context of the institutions a just society would need to develop.
In ATOJ it is clear that Rawls is strongly committed to the idea that fair/just
background conditions are necessary for a fair / just economic system. Rawls in no way
leaves the design of the institutions which control the background fairness of the society
up to the vagaries of individual negotiation, but rather suggests the basic parameters of
the institutions and explains that in actual conduct their effectiveness would be
appraised according to how well they support his principals of justice.
The Law of Peoples and Justice in International Trade
In The Law of Peoples (TLOP) Rawls tries to develop a plausible, theoretical
conception of how a global society made up of cooperating societies that all ensured
basic human rights for all of their citizens could be possible. This concept develops from
the discussion of the law of nations briefly outlined in ATOJ.41 He uses the concept of
the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance to consider principles for the Law of
Peoples, but he will use it differently than he uses it in the domestic society context of
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ATOJ . The use of the Original Position is different in two ways that are worth
considering. The representatives who specify the principles of justice, in the case of
TLOP are representatives of peoples (which Rawls uses as his main actors in the society
of peoples) rather than individuals. It is worth noting as well, that in TLOP, individuals
have only a very minimal role, as the subjects of human rights. The second way in which
the Original Position as conceived in TLOP is very different than ATOJ, is that while
within the original position in ATOJ the parties select from among a variety of possible
principles, in TLOP Rawls chooses 8 principles that are traditional in international law
and takes the position that the role of the parties in the second original position is to
accept them.42
Rawls continues to consider that justice in society is achieved by ensuring a
framework of just institutions and policies. He structures interactions in society so that
they are for, the most part, consistent with justice and ensuring that they will remain so
in the long term.
Two main ideas motivate the Law of Peoples. One is that the great evils of
human history unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of
liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass
murder—follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness.
The other main idea, obviously connected with the first, is that, once the gravest
forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent)
social policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these
great evils will eventually disappear.43
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He also suggests that they will develop principles behind cooperative associations/institutions needed
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Rawls suggests many of the causes of injustice in world society require equal
political participation, religious freedom, political freedom, freedom of conscience and
equal justice for women to be resolved. It seems somewhat contradictory though that,
when he actually specifies the set of basic human rights that is supported in the law of
peoples, it falls far short of this.44
Rawls explains in TLOP, he is working out a conception of the foreign policy of a
reasonably just, liberal people, such as that he outlines principles for in A Theory of
Justice (or the conceptions he suggests in Political Liberalism). The principles are those
that, the liberal society, will use to conduct its foreign policy, but are not being proposed
with the idea they are actually being adopted by all peoples in a just international
society. They are the rules a society like those he has previously proposed, (such as in
ATOJ) could adopt in order to conduct itself justly, in the actual, not particularly just,
world order, as it exists. He explains that, when he considers the point of view of
peoples, who are not organized as reasonably just liberal societies, he is only doing so in
order that, we can assure ourselves as liberal peoples, that that the principles would be
acceptable from a decent non-liberal point of view.45
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Rawls, The Law, 9. His position on human rights is below, in the section on decent societies. He takes a
very minimal position on human rights because he is considering it as a basis for intervention in other
countries’ domestic affairs. I consider it problematic that he acknowledges that a fairly strong set of
human rights is required to address many issues that he considers important, (he calls them “great evils”)
but he seems to be willing to sacrifice these in order to minimize obligations to individuals in the
international order. I think it is a major sacrifice.
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Rawls outlines five categories of societies, which he calls peoples, that he will
work with in his Law of Peoples. He starts with the liberal peoples who he uses to derive
the set of principles he will use. The second category of societies he calls decent
hierarchical peoples, which he describes as having a decent consultation hierarchy.46 He
includes liberal and decent hierarchical peoples in what he describes as “well-ordered
peoples.” He also names, outlaw states, and burdened societies (societies burdened
with unfavorable conditions). The fifth category of society is described as benevolent
absolutisms, which Rawls says, honor human rights but members do not participate in
political decisions.
He begins with the social contract conception, of a constitutionally democratic
society, and extends this conception with the introduction of a second Original Position,
at what he describes as a second level. In this second Original Position, the
representatives of liberal peoples make an agreement with other liberal peoples. A
second, separate agreement is made with non-liberal decent peoples. He explains the
agreements are hypothetical, and non-historical, and are entered into by peoples who
are equal, and are positioned equally in the Original Position, behind a Veil of Ignorance.
Rawls describes his position as being derived from the process suggested by Kant in
Perpetual Peace. Rawls explains that, it is Kant who suggests that establishing a just and
effective civil constitution, is not easily possible without first ensuring that international
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society will also be governed by

law.47

It is important to keep in mind, that when Rawls

discusses the principles agreed to by persons in the original position, he is always
considering this as a tool for thinking about what a just policy would look like, not an
actual negotiated agreement.
Rawls describes several conditions that, he argues, make his conception of a Law
of Peoples a realistic utopia. First he explains that it is realistic, in that, it views peoples
as they are, and a society of peoples, as it might be, the 2nd original position allows it to
do this. He claims it is also realistic in the sense that it is workable, and can be applied to
ongoing cooperative political arrangements. He describes his conception of the Law of
Peoples as utopian, in the sense that it uses political ideals, principles and concepts to
specify right and just political and social arrangements for the society of peoples.48
Why Peoples (Not States)?
Rawls explains he chooses the term “peoples” to describe the actors in the
society of peoples, because states do not fit all the criteria he considers important for
peoples. Rawls explains there are three basic features that define liberal peoples: a
reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental
interests, citizens united by “common sympathies,”49 and a moral nature. He describes
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these as having, in order, an institutional nature, a cultural nature, and the moral
nature, coming from a commitment to a political conception of right and justice.50
Rawls suggests the “common sympathies” can be problematic. He is aware that,
many possible societies united under a single government, will not share language,
history or a common understanding of the political meaning of that history. He feels this
is necessary as a starting place, and that we will be able to work out political principles
to deal with the hard cases. He explains, it is possible in a reasonably just polity, to
satisfy the reasonable, cultural interests of diverse ethnic backgrounds. Rawls sees that
he has created a conflict but doesn’t feel that it is crucial to his position.51
The moral character criteria is important, Rawls explains it means that peoples
offer fair terms of cooperation to one another, in the same sense as he has detailed for
domestic societies. People will offer fair terms of cooperation and honor them, when
they are assured that other peoples will do so as well.
It is also important to note that Rawls chooses peoples rather than states
because he will not accept all the traditional terms of state sovereignty. He wants to
challenge the right to go to war in pursuit of the self-interested, political ends of the
state. He very explicitly wants to restrict the states internal sovereignty, meaning he will
not accept, a state’s right to do as it wills with its own people. Government powers are
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to be limited, to those acceptable under a reasonable law of peoples. One of the ways in
which they are to be limited, is to be defined by human rights. Rawls notes, he is aware
of the difficulties in interpreting rights in various situations, but he says “their general
meaning and tendency is clear enough.”52
Rawls then explains that the difference between states and peoples, is mostly a
function of the relationship between the rational, and reasonable in a state’s actions. He
suggests, if the conception of a state is that of being mostly governed by the rational
ability to maximize its interests, based on the power to do so, then peoples are very
unlike states. Rawls explains that, liberal peoples limit their interests by what is
reasonable (in the sense of being negotiable with others in an environment of fairness)
and act in accord, with an acceptance of the Law of Peoples. Rawls opens the door, to
the way in which the concept of state sovereignty can be limited by justice, and makes
clear that, the Law of Peoples is a liberal, rather than a realist conception of
international relations. He doesn’t want to debate the historical legitimacy of the realist
position, as its tenets don’t make sense in a conception of just global society.
In the end, Rawls chooses the concept of peoples, to be the actor in his society
of peoples, for very strong reasons. It is clear he is not taking a fully cosmopolitan
position on global society, but also apparent, that he is going to limit, or rework some of
the traditional understandings of state sovereignty. It seems particularly important that,
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some of the basis for the legitimacy of the actions of peoples, in the society of peoples,
derives from their participation in a Law of Peoples.
Two Original Positions
In TLOP, Rawls uses the concept of the Original Position, with the Veil of
ignorance, three times. The first original position is the original position of ATOJ, where
representative are members of a single society selecting the organizing principles of
justice for their society. They choose the same liberal principles, chosen in ATOJ (or
interpretations discussed in Political Liberalism).53
There are five essential features of Rawls’ original position:
1. Models the parties as representing citizens fairly
2. Models the parties as rational
3. Models the parties as selecting from among available principles of justice those
that apply to the appropriate structure, in this case basic structure.
4. Models parties as making the selections for appropriate reasons
5. As selecting reasons related to the fundamental interests of citizens as
reasonable and rational.54
Rawls suggests the original position possesses these five features because
behind the veil of ignorance, parties must be rational in order to ensure that their
interests are maximized as much as possible, and the situation makes them all equal, as
they do not know their specific interests, and so must negotiate rationally for principles
that would be fair regardless of the position they end up in. The veil of ignorance
assures that the principles chosen will be chosen for appropriate reasons, because the
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parties have no knowledge of their own interests to bias them. Rawls explains that,
putting citizen’s comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignorance ensures that the
political principles will be those that support reasonable pluralism in the society.
In order to find principles of justice that will apply in the society of peoples,
Rawls uses concept of a 2nd Original Position. Again, it is a model of representation of
fair conditions, this time though, the parties are representatives of liberal peoples, who
will specify The Law of Peoples. Rawls notes that, both the parties as representatives,
and the peoples they represent, are represented fairly as equals. It is important that the
peoples do not know where they fit in the society of peoples (except that they are
liberal). And it seems the representatives also do not know where they will fit in within
the domestic society. They are behind the veil of ignorance, as far as territory,
population, and relative power of the people they represent. They know that conditions
are sufficiently favorable among their people to support constitutional democracy, but
they do not know the extent of their natural resources, or level of development.
He explains that, the 2nd Original Position functions in exactly the same way as
the first original position, in that it suggests terms we would actually accept as fair, for
specifying the basic terms of cooperation between us and other liberal peoples. It
satisfies the same 5 essential features as the 1st original position. He explains that in the
1st original position the veil of ignorance hid the citizens comprehensive conception of
the good, whereas in the 2nd the representatives know they represent liberal peoples,
but the comprehensive conception of the good is still absent, because the political
constitution of a liberal people, must not have a comprehensive conception of the good.
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Rawls explains that, what comes out of this is a respect and recognition for each other
as peoples, but not necessarily that they will not accept inequalities of certain kinds, in
the institutions of the society of peoples. Rawls gives the example of the United Nations,
ideally conceived, as an institution where it could be reasonable to accept a certain level
of inequality. He explains that these inequalities parallel the inequalities accepted in
their own societies. In the third criteria of the 1st Original Position, Rawls has the parties
“selecting from among available principles of justice,”55 whereas in the 2nd Original
Position, Rawls explains that the parties simply reflect on the advantages of the
positions he has selected from traditional understanding of international law. 56 Rawls
has the representatives in the 2nd Original Position accept a series of eight principles, as
the basis of the Law of Peoples:
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are
to be respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for
reasons other than self-defense.
6. Peoples are to honor human rights.
55
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Rawls, The Law, 41. Rawls discussion of the difference in the actual process of selection of principles between 1st
and 2nd Original Positions:
A large part of the argument in the original position in the domestic case concerns selecting among the
various formulations of the two principles of justice (when the view adopted is liberal), and between liberal
principles and alternatives as the classical, or the average, principle of utilitarianism, and various forms of
rational intuitionism and moral perfectionism. By contrast, the only alternatives for the parties to pick from
in the second-level original position are formulations of the Law of Peoples.
Thus, in the argument in the original position at the second level I consider the merits of only the
eight principles of the Law of Peoples listed in §4.1. These familiar and largely traditional principles I take
from the history and usages of international law and practice. The parties are not given a menu of
alternative principles and ideals from which to select, as they are in Political Liberalism, or in A Theory of
Justice. Rather, the representatives of well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these
principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives
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7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social
regime.57
Rawls takes the position that, in the 2nd Original Position the parties (conceived
as representatives of liberal peoples) will decide to found three specific organizations.
Rawls calls these “cooperative organizations,” he likely calls them this to ensure that he
is not calling for the creation of a world government, but realistically they are social
structures, created to regulate the behaviour of peoples in the society of peoples. He
specifically states that, the guidelines for creating them are formulated behind the veil
of ignorance, to ensure fairness. He suggests one of the institutions would be analogous
to the United Nations, but because of the concern to avoid both the traditional
understandings of sovereignty, and traditions of realist state politics inherent in the
terms states, and nations, he calls it the Confederation of Peoples. The other two
institutions,58 he explains are analogous to the GATT,59 and the World Bank. He clearly
and specifically at this point, explains that the trade organization would be “framed to
ensure fair trade,”60 so it is interesting that in the following paragraph, he defaults to
free trade as the assumption.
In the working of organizations and loose confederations of peoples, inequalities
are designed to serve the many ends that peoples share. In this case the larger
57
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and smaller peoples will be ready to make larger and smaller contributions and
to accept proportionately larger and smaller returns.61
This is a very different conception of how economic institutions will operate than
that which Rawls argued for in ATOJ. In ATOJ, Rawls proposed institutions which limited
the growth of inequality within society, and even worked to ensure that equality (or the
limits to inequality) would be secured over the long term. In the 2nd Original Position
model, it seems that institutions will be, very much, like the status quo in international
society, where wealthy powerful countries run most of the economic institutions,
arranging policies to benefit themselves, and maintain their positions of power.62 It is
possible Rawls takes this position, because it is the status quo in the current
international institutional order, but it is an area where TLOP seems to contradict his
earlier positions, (such as discussed above in ATOJ) where he structures the institutions
of society to limit this type of compounding inequality, because he fears its detrimental
effects on political equality.63 He is still concerned about political equality in TLOP.
The 3rd Original Position
Rawls suggests once a Law of Peoples has been decided upon for liberal peoples,
a third Original Position will be used to consider, whether the same principles chosen in
the 2nd Original Position for relations between liberal peoples, can apply to relations
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with decent peoples. In the

2nd

Original position, he did not include decent hierarchical

peoples, even though he makes room for them in his scheme of well-ordered peoples.
His explanation is that, he needed to first derive the principles of the Law of Peoples,
then to consider under what conditions, and to what extent non-liberal peoples, would
be tolerated by liberal peoples.64 Rawls left all non-liberal societies out of the 2nd
Original Position, as he felt there was a concern that, since non-liberal societies do not
support liberal conceptions of justice for their people, they would not be acceptable in
the society of peoples, and could be subject to various forms of sanction, with the goal
of forcing them towards liberalism. Rawls decides that, it would be respectful, and more
productive than alienating the peoples, to include them in the Society of Peoples if
possible. He explains that it would be possible to include a non-liberal society, if that
society conforms to standards of decency in the way it treats its members, and they
could be considered to be likely to support the principles of the Law of Peoples, which
were spelled out in the 2nd Original Position.65 He then considers the characteristics of a
decent society that ought to be tolerated by liberal peoples.
Decent peoples as defined by Rawls are non-liberal peoples, in the sense that
they do not have a society founded on principles of effective political equality for all
members, or they lack a commitment to organizing society, in such a way, as to ensure
each individual member is free to pursue their own individual conception of the good as
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Note: Rawls explains this when he is formulating the 2nd Original Position, discusses the principles, then
goes back to work out what decent people might look like.
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they see fit, within a context of all others having similar liberty. Simplifying, they are
societies which are organized around a particular comprehensive conception of the
good. This comprehensive conception could be religious or secular, Rawls gives the
example of hypothetical Islamic Kazanistan, but it seems likely that some forms of
communist societies could fit this category, at least ideally. Rawls calls them “decent
hierarchical peoples”66 because he describes them as having a “decent consultation
hierarchy,”67 by which he means that the society is governed by rule of law, dissent is
permitted, and rulers give respectful reply to dissent, addressing issues of rule of law
expressed in it.68 He explains that he considers that, there might be other types of
decent peoples, who would not fit the hierarchical label. In general, Rawls uses the term
decent peoples to indicate both decent and decent hierarchical peoples.
Rawls discusses several other criteria that would make a non-liberal society a
decent society: The first is that the society is not aggressive in the society of peoples, it
respects the political and social order of other peoples, and does not advance its
interests through coercion or force. The second set of criteria is more complex. A decent
hierarchical people, must have a system of law, which is focussed on the common good
of the society, and which secures basic human rights for all members of the society.
Interestingly Rawls requires that it includes a conception of formal equality, that like
cases be treated equally. He also requires that, a decent hierarchical people’s system of
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law, be based on the conception, meaning that, all of the society’s members are
considered persons capable of understanding, and complying with, moral duties, and
duties of justice in the society. He does not however, ask for legal equality. Rawls also
requires that for a society to be considered decent, the judges and public officials of that
society, must sincerely believe, that the system of law is in the interests of the common
good.69
Rawls explains that representatives of decent peoples can be reasonably
represented in the 3rd Original Position as equal parties, even though their societies may
not be internally egalitarian, because they can be understood to desire equal standing in
a society of peoples. He explains that, the representatives of the decent peoples are
decent and rational (as opposed to reasonable and rational70), and that decent peoples
would accept the Law of Peoples adopted by their representatives as fair terms of
political cooperation between peoples. Recall that Rawls uses the term reasonable, in
the sense of being open to persuasion by the reasons of others, according to a
conception of justice. He explains, “I think of decency as a normative idea of the same
kind as reasonableness, though weaker (that is, it covers less than reasonableness
does).“71
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Human Rights in The Law of Peoples
For Rawls in TLOP, human rights are very minimal, much less extensive than the
set of human rights established by the UN UDHR72, and even more minimal than those
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,73 (which contains a
considerably less ambitious, stringent and extensive understanding of human rights
than the UN UDHR). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at a
minimum, bans discrimination in the allocation, of the political rights it does offer, on
the basis of religion, race or gender. Rawls does not do this, and explicitly allows
discrimination, concerning political and civil liberties, based on gender and religion.74
Rawls explains that, human rights in the Law of Peoples, are not the same set of rights
that persons hold in “a reasonable constitutional democratic regime.”75
Human rights in the Law of Peoples, by contrast, express a special class of urgent
rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty)
of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.76
Rawls argues for this very restricted sense of human rights, as they are related to
his conception of justified reasons for intervening in a society’s domestic affairs, and
engaging in war. He calls them a necessary, but not sufficient, standard for the decency
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of political and social

institutions.77

And he explains that, fulfilling this minimal

conception of human rights, is sufficient to exclude justified intervention by other
peoples, in the form of diplomatic and economic sanctions or military force.
Rawls explains, the criteria for the basic conception of human rights is based on,
the minimal lowest common threshold of rights, accepted by all liberal and decent
peoples, and that, these peoples will not tolerate outlaw states, which allow, or cause
situations falling below the minimal rights criteria. He suggests that human rights, in the
limited form he conceives of them, are separate in a sense from political institutions, in
that rather than emanating from a particular institution, they are a standard which
particular institutions must meet, to be admissible to good standing, in a reasonably just
society of peoples.78 However, Rawls says they are binding on all societies, and outlaw
states which violate them, are subject to condemnation, and in very serious cases,
forceful sanctions.79
Why Peoples, Not Individuals, in a Second Original Position?
Rawls explains that taking up a cosmopolitan position, where all individuals in
global society were considered to possess the “two moral powers,”80 a capacity for a
sense of justice, and a capacity for a conception of the good, as the basis of political
equality in comprehensive liberalism as described by Kant, Mill or in his own Political
Liberalism, and starting from a global original position, which considers, all persons to
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have equal basic rights and liberties, would be problematic, and inappropriate in TLOP,
where his goal is to elaborate a just foreign policy for a liberal society.
The key point to consider in this, is that Rawls is not actually arguing for the
structure of a just society of peoples, but rather what a just foreign policy would be for a
liberal society, in light of, something like, the actual structure of world society. The point
is somewhat complex, in that he is using the tool of a society of peoples, to consider
what would be reasonable for a liberal society to expect of other independent societies.
This takes into consideration, what is considered just, but is also, framed within the
idea, that a liberal society could not expect other societies to give up their
independence lightly, for conceptions of justice they did not necessarily share. Once he
is confident about standards that would be agreed to by societies a liberal society would
respect, he can also decide what cannot be tolerated as well. The approach can be
confusing, because much of the time Rawls seems to be suggesting the basis for realistic
utopian society of peoples, when he is actually using the society of peoples as a thought
experiment, or mental tool to think about formulating a reasonably just foreign policy
for a single society. The difference is subtle, because he does posit what he considers, a
just basis for the Law of Peoples, but he is doing it in a context that rules out some
possibilities in considering global justice. Within the parameters he has set out, there is,
in a sense, less reason to consider that, many people in the world would choose to do
something other than the status quo.81
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Rawls Conception of Trade in The Law of Peoples.
Rawls does not discuss international trade extensively in TLOP, which is
unfortunate, since it is a powerful concern in any conception of a global society. He
claims there will be standards for trade, but does not specify anything about them other
than to suggest he believes a free trade model is in everyone’s long term advantage,
and that a fair background framework is necessary but gives no principles or even
suggestions as to what this might look like.
Consider fair trade: suppose that liberal peoples assume that, when suitably
regulated by a fair background framework, a free competitive trading scheme is
to everyone’s mutual advantage, at least in the longer run. A further assumption
is that the larger nations with wealthier economies will not try to monopolize the
market, or aspire to form a cartel, or act as an oligopoly. With these
assumptions, and knowing as before that the veil of ignorance holds, so that no
people knows whether its economy is large or small, standards can be specified,
followed, and enforced.) Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified
distributive effects between peoples, these would have to be corrected and
taken into account by the duty of assistance[.]82
Although it is limited, this passage seems to contain some of the most important
ideas in TLOP, at least in regard to constructing something like, a Rawlsian approach to
international trade. What is important here seems to be, that the principles which
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http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview) it seems quite likely that any attempt to model
an original position for an actual Law of Peoples would have to consider that many representatives would
refuse to consider principles similar to the status quo, knowing that it would doom more than half of
them to continuing to live in conditions of poverty and tyranny.
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establish the background framework for justice as fairness in international trade, are to
be worked out in the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance.
Rawls does not go into detail on what would constitute a fair background
framework for international trade, but it seems sensible to extrapolate a reasonable
conception that Rawls might have agreed with. Rawls has said categorically, he does not
feel the Difference Principle he develops in ATOJ, can reasonably be applied in a global
context, so it is clear he would not consider it to arise in the context of international
trade.
It in ATOJ, Rawls considers it problematic to specifically commit to a particular
economic model, suggesting the exact details of the institutions would shift depending
upon the economic model the society was operating on, but that in general, there
would be a need for effective economic institutions to maintain basic fairness in the
economy, that would apply regardless of whether, the economy was largely based on a
free market model, or a model where most of the productive property was publicly
owned, whereas in the TLOP, he is prepared to claim that a free trade model would be
in everyone`s interest, in the long term. I find that interesting, and a bit contradictory,
since in ATOJ, he is very clear that sacrificing a few, for the good of the majority is
wrong, and that it is important to balance, ensuring a decent social minimum for
everybody in the present, with ensuring the same in the future. He considers both to be
quite important.83 When he says free trade is, “to everyone`s mutual advantage at least
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in the longer

run,”84

it seems somewhat problematic. It is not consistent with his earlier

positions on free exchange and free market economics, and very few people that
support international free trade, consider that it is to everyone’s advantage. Most
supporters consider that the aggregate advantage is so great, that it justifies the costs
for those who will not benefit.
In ATOJ Rawls is clear that economic efficiency ought not, always be the highest
goal in managing an economy, and that social concerns should also have bearing.
Keynes, who Rawls quotes,85in his discussion of acceptable inequality in an economic
system, was quite concerned that supporters of free market economic models often
failed to take into account the concept and possible extent of frictional unemployment
in their argument for economic efficiency.86
It seems reasonable to suppose that, in the selection of a background framework
for fairness in international trade, in the Original Position behind the Veil of Ignorance, a
principle, that international trade be in the interests, as much as reasonably possible, of
reducing absolute poverty in global society would be selected.87Trade practices which
tended to increase absolute poverty would be strictly unacceptable, and trade with
peoples that were so impoverished as to fall under the obligations of the duty of
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assistance would be required to ensure that they resulted in a positive effect on the
level of impoverishment. This principle seems in accordance with Rawls’ position, that a
duty to assist impoverished others in global society, requires a clear cut off point, and
also with his belief that free trade would be in everyone’s long term interest.
Another principle that seems to be necessary for the conception of a fair
background framework is that trade, in general, needs to take into account inequalities
between the participants. The terms of trade would need to be arranged in such a way,
as to work towards decreasing the inequalities to the greatest extent possible, while still
maintaining terms of trade beneficial to both. Terms of trade or trade agreements that
increased inequalities between parties would be, except in exceptional circumstances,
unacceptable.
While this may appear to be derived from the Difference Principle, it is actually
based on Rawls’ discussion of trade in TLOP. Rawls explains that inequality in itself is not
a problem, so long as each society has sufficient resources to provide its members with
enough to support a well-organized society. The problem is, that Rawls expects the
regulation of fairness in trade will be managed by cooperative agreements, and
negotiation between peoples. In TLOP he argues the fair background will ensure wealthy
powerful societies will not use their power to shift market conditions and terms of trade
to their advantage, but Rawls also consistently makes the case that extremes of
inequality impact effective political participation, and make democratic political
systems, democratic in name only. It seems likely, that in order to preserve free and fair
trade, the representatives in the Original Position, not knowing their society’s actual
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wealth and position, will opt for a principle of fairness in trade that helps to preserve
the long term fairness of trade for all societies. Suggesting this principle may seem
problematic when it is clear Rawls does not believe peoples in the Original Position
would choose the Difference Principle, but it actually makes sense in relation to his
consistent position on inequality in political systems; that beyond a certain point they
make effective participation in a democratic system highly problematic. As he suggests
when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain limit, “... political liberty likewise tends to
lose its value, and representative government to become such in name only.”88
I suggest, a principle would be chosen that outlined the concern that, trade
would not be acceptable, when it placed unacceptable negative costs on those who
were not consenting participants in the exchange. This would include social and
environmental costs for others in global society, and would also include costs imposed
on future members of global society. In this case the principal seems reasonable for
negotiators in the Original Position, as they would have no knowledge of their societies
wealth and power to effectively redress wrongs in international situations, but they
would know they were negotiating principles to apply in international society, where it
would be difficult to seek redress in courts, making it important to have the principle of
avoiding harm to others enshrined in the background structure of fair trade.
It is definitely possible Rawls would have suggested other principles, but these seem
to support the concern for a fair background structure in international economics. An
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important difference however, is the role of institutions in international economics,
compared with Rawls’ discussion of the role of institutions in a just society. Rawls relies
on institutions to realize procedural justice in society, where the social structures are
arranged in such a way as to guide the actions and interactions of members of the
society in line with the principles of justice.
Without an appropriate scheme of these background institutions the outcome of
the distributive process will not be just. Background fairness is lacking.89
Rawls suggests that this is necessary for the institutions to structure the society
in line with the principles of justice as its members will have differing ends and
conceptions of the good. He explains that a society where all members had the same
ends and conceptions of the good would not need effective institutions but it would also
be in a sense beyond justice. 90 The Society of Peoples cannot be expected to be beyond
justice in this respect, and is highly likely to need effective institutions in order to
structure the activities of its members in line with justice (any conception of justice).
[T]he idea of justice as fairness is to use the notion of pure procedural justice to
handle the contingencies of particular situations. The social system is to be
designed so that the resulting distribution is just however things turn out. To
achieve this end it is necessary to set the social and economic process within the
surroundings of suitable political and legal institutions.91
Rawls conception of “cooperative organizations” as the institutional structure which
supports a system of fair and free trade, appears to conflict with his position that,
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inequalities of participation in supporting these institutions, and inequality of benefits
received from them would be acceptable in the 2nd Original Position. If Rawls believes a
fair background framework for trade is important (as he claims it is), it will, according to
his own explanation of justice as fairness, require institutions that create a fair
procedural structure for international economic processes and agreements. An
institution with a structure similar to the current IMF and World Bank, will not achieve
this, as is apparent from the extensive criticism they receive concerning their activities. 92
Rawls’ concern to protect a conception of the special value of “peoples” or state
societies ruled by a sovereign government, ends up contradicting his position on the
importance of institutions in a just society. While defending his conception of basic
social structure as the subject of justice, he takes the position that without effective
institutions structuring interactions, it will not be possible to sustain the conditions that
permit self-interested actors to negotiate free agreements that are reasonably just or
fair.
[S]uppose we begin with the initially attractive idea that society should develop
over time in accordance with free agreements fairly arrived at and fully honored.
Straightway we need an account of when agreements are free and the social
circumstances under which they are reached are fair. In addition, while these
conditions
may be fair at an earlier time, the accumulated results of many
separate ostensibly fair agreements, together with social and historical
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contingencies, are likely as time passes to alter institutions and opportunities so
that the conditions for free and fair agreements no longer hold.93
It is a serious concern for Rawls’ position, that a fair set of background principals
for trade, combined with the cooperation of members of international society, will
ensure a mostly free and fair international trade regime. To remain consistent, he must
either consider his background framework for fair trade, to amount to a basic structure
of global society created in support of principles of justice for trade, or consider that
international trade would not be consistently free and fair at all, under his scheme of a
society of peoples. If he adopts this second position, then his whole scheme of justice in
TLOP ends up being invalidated, if unjust international trade regimes and international
economic institutions are proven to violate basic human rights.
I think Rawls is making a mistake, relevant to fair international trade, in making the
representatives in the Original Position, as described in TLOP, representatives of
Peoples, instead of actual individuals. The concern is, that he ends up creating a
situation where principles for fair international trade, would be chosen by a single
representative of the entire society. A single representative, knowing they would likely
be in the majority, could agree to principles that would permit the interests of a
minority of members of society, in having access to a decent social minimum, to be
sacrificed to a perceived utilitarian greater good of the society, or even to the benefit of
a hierarchical elite. He is very opposed to sacrificing the individual for economic
efficiency in ATOJ, and it is hard to accept that he is willing to abandon this concern. It is
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also a problem understanding how, a hierarchical society could be justly represented in
the original position by a single individual.
Many commentators have argued the WTO, and trade agreements in general, tend
to reflect negotiations, which end up producing more benefit for those in positions of
power.94 The problem with this is that, Rawls’ approach in TLOP is highly unlikely to
address and provide solutions for the problems, which exist in international trade, or
work towards international trade becoming the poverty fighting tool it could be, if its
potential was put to use effectively.
Thomas Pogge takes the position that, Rawls’ vision of global economic order in
TLOP, is remarkably similar to the conditions which, exist in the current international
economic order, where wealthy powerful states use their advantages in information and
bargaining power, to negotiate agreements, which while freely agreed to, in the end
consolidate and amplify international inequalities.95
On the other hand, David Reidy feels that, Rawls principle of commitment to free
and fair trade is actually much richer and powerful than it seems at first. He explains:
Rawls clearly states that well-ordered peoples are to refrain from monopolizing
markets, forming cartels, acting as oligopolies or otherwise frustrating free and
fair international or global trade and economic relations.96
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Reidy takes the position that, Rawls’ limited position on trade, nevertheless sets
out the important basic conditions for just international trade. He explains that Rawls’
description of the fairness rule being worked out behind the veil of ignorance, in the 2 nd
Original Position, should allow Rawls to assume the agreements are fair. This is a
problematic claim, as the activities of monopolizing markets and acting as oligopolies
are entirely consistent with the free trade model for international trade, (which Rawls
specifies). This is actually how enterprises function in free market economies. No large
corporations ever enter a market, without the idea that they are going to have some
strategic advantage of information, technology or supply that will help them avoid
competing in a cutthroat race to the bottom on prices. The free trade model simply
stops countries from creating a barrier to foreign competition. True, free trade would
limit a very powerful country’s legal ability to create conditions where a business had a
legal international monopoly on a specific type of business, but this is really not what
occurs in international trade, (it is more consistent with mercantilism HBC or East India
Company or the like). The free trade model is entirely consistent with oligopoly, which is
very common in the current international trade regime. It would actually be very
difficult to limit oligopoly, without actual intervention in markets, either domestically, or
internationally. Claiming that, a free trade model for international trade is related to
preventing the formation of oligopolies, doesn’t make sense.
Although Reidy supports Rawls’ conception of international justice in TLOP, he
ends up taking the position that, there are some concerns with how Rawls approaches
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international trade. He suggests that although Rawls does not discuss it, the possibility
of fair trade with what Rawls calls “Burdened Societies” is very problematic.
Burdened societies are not able to sustain a well-ordered domestic legal and
political order on their own. Property rights and the rule of law are thus unlikely
to be secure in burdened societies, rendering problematic informational
transparency and thus the genuine voluntariness of trade and the presumption
of mutual advantage in trade with or between them. Further, trade with or
between burdened societies will likely often involve duress on one or both sides
as well as radically unequal bargaining positions, since so many burdened
societies are desperately poor.97
Reidy explains trade with burdened societies, in general, would fall under the
“Duty of Assistance,” rather than be considered part of free and fair trade agreements,
considered by Rawls under international trade. Reidy considers the concern that, even
between what Rawls describes as “Well ordered Peoples,” there can definitely be
situations where inequalities in wealth and power in a transaction, can lead to injustice
in trade. He makes the claim that, “Rawls’s position is simply that mutually
advantageous trade between well-ordered peoples is presumptively just, and that
international economic justice requires no more than the long-term preservation of
such trade relations.”98
Although Reidy admits injustices can occur, he asserts that, in spite of this, Rawls
really does not need to articulate a more elaborate position on trade, and Rawls
presumption that a background agreement to support mutually beneficial free and fair
trade is a reasonable way to address the issue.
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Here a charitable reading of Rawls’s position would allow that while great
economic or material inequalities between well-ordered peoples are not per se
objectionable, and while the well-orderedness of trading partners is sufficient,
despite great economic or material inequalities, to generate a presumption that
trade relations are voluntary and thus mutually advantageous, such inequalities
may nevertheless prove objectionable in particular transactions. There is nothing
inconsistent in this position. It is perfectly consistent to hold that very great
inequalities between peoples (a) do not matter in themselves as a matter of
global economic justice (assuming that the global social/economic minimum at
which the duty of assistance is aimed is universally realized), (b) do not
constitute in themselves a reason to reject the presumption of voluntariness and
mutual advantage in trade relations between well-ordered peoples, yet (c) may
still matter a great deal as a matter of transactional justice between particular
parties in particular contexts for particular reasons.99
In some of his other work Rawls himself critiques the position he takes in TLOP
on the idea that fair trade in international society is achievable without institutions
similar to those he feels necessary to support economic fairness in ATOJ. In Political
Liberalism Rawls clearly takes the position that the type of methodology for regulating
trade he is promoting in TLOP, as a just way of maintain background fairness in trade,
will over time lead to a deterioration of the conditions of background justice and the
promotion of the oligopolistic market power and skewed distribution of the benefits
accruing to trade he suggests that he wants to avoid even in TLOP.
[S]uppose we begin with the initially attractive idea that social circumstances
and people's relationships to one another should develop over time in
accordance with free agreements fairly arrived at and fully honored.
Straightaway we need an account of when agreements are free and the social
circumstances under which they are reached are fair. In addition, while these
conditions may be fair at an earlier time, the accumulated results of many
separate and ostensibly fair agreements, together with social trends and
historical contingencies, are likely in the course of time to alter citizens'
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relationships and opportunities so that the conditions for free and fair
agreements no longer hold.100
[T}he tendency... for background justice to be eroded even when individuals act
fairly: the overall result of separate and independent transactions is away from
and not toward background justice. We might say: in this case the invisible hand
guides things in the wrong direction and favors an oligopolistic configuration of
accumulations that succeeds in maintaining unjustified inequalities and
restrictions on fair opportunity.101
Rawls also suggests in his work on economic institutions in ATOJ that in order for
the economic system and market exchange not to follow a tendency to produce unjust
inequalities particular institutions would need to be constructed in order to counteract
these forces of inequality.102
The Law of Peoples and Principles of Just International Trade
Careful reading of TLOP and consideration of what various commentators have
made of it, allows a discussion of how to relate Rawls’ conception of justice in
international society, to the principals I have considered as a basis of a just international
trade regime. I make the claim above that, if Rawls had actually worked out the
principles of a fair background structure of international trade in the 2 nd Original
Position, the principals would be quite similar to those I propose.103 I will develop my
argument for them in relation to positions Rawls takes in TLOP.
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Commentators have said quite a bit, both positive and negative, about Rawls’
“duty of assistance” in TLOP. There seem to be both weaknesses and strengths to his
approach, and it is a topic worth discussing in relation to international trade. In this
section I will discuss how Rawls’ conception of justice in international society, fits with
the principals I suggest for a just international trade regime, and I will attempt to explain
how the “duty of assistance” fits into the discussion.
The first principle I suggest for a just international trade regime, is that
international trade should be regulated in such a way, as to be as effective as possible,
at reducing absolute poverty in the world. Most of the people who support increasing
international trade (as opposed to those who support creating barriers to it) claim that,
it produces economic growth, in the sense of more effectively turning available
resources into goods and services that people need. It makes sense that, if we can use
international trade to reduce the number of people suffering from extreme poverty, we
ought to do so. Obviously, this needs to be well thought out, as trade must benefit all
participants to be practical, but it seems if there is an economic benefit produced by
trade, some of it should go to improving the lot of the worst off.
From the point of view of ATOJ, there is little doubt Rawls would have supported
this within his conception of justice, however his conception of justice for international
society, is not nearly as clear on this point. This is where the “duty of assistance” comes
into play in TLOP. It is listed in the statement of principles of the Law of Peoples as
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“Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.”104
The duty of assistance is a general principle that, “well ordered” societies have
an obligation to assist “burdened” societies, in becoming well ordered societies. The
assistance could mean a variety of things according to Rawls, including some assistance
in developing just institutions, but he is concerned about stepping over the bounds of
respect between peoples.105 Rawls notes that, the duty of assistance may require some
extent of redistribution, (in the form of development aid, from wealthy peoples to poor
peoples), in order to support the development of basic institutions and social structures
that are needed for a well ordered society, but he also says the duty of assistance has a
cut-off point, at the level at which a society is able to support the institutions and social
structures of a well ordered society. Rawls is very clear about the cut-off point, and
suggests that poverty or wealth beyond a basic level, has little to do with whether a
society should be considered well ordered or not.106 On this interpretation, Rawls would
likely be in favor of a principle of trade, focussed on alleviating severe absolute poverty.
However Rawls is also very clear, it is not the responsibility of well ordered societies to
compensate burdened or disordered societies for the results of their own poor
decisions, either currently or historically.
I believe that the causes of wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their
political culture and in the religious, philosophical and moral traditions that
104
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support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in
the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by
their political virtues.107
Rawls takes the position that, a large part of the economic success or failure of a
society is based on domestic social and political structures and attitudes, and that, other
societies ought not to be forced to give up the benefits accruing to them through their
own industriousness and positive political culture, to support societies which have
chosen different less successful paths. Basically Rawls’ position is that countries in
serious poverty or experiencing serious economic problems generally have brought it
upon themselves through the structure and character of the society. This seems very
much like what Thomas Pogge calls “explanatory nationalism,” in World Poverty and
Human Rights, which he describes as a strategy used to justify ignoring the impact of
serious poverty in other countries. Pogge specifically addresses this claim made in
Rawls’ TLOP, and he describes Rawls’ position as the “Purely Domestic Poverty
Thesis.”108 Rawls also takes the position that, although national borders might be
considered to be of arbitrary historical origin, this does not take away from their
importance in contemporary international society, where they take on a crucial role of
denoting which resources and land belong to which states. Rawls explains, this makes
resources explicitly, the property of one state, and assigns responsibility for its use,
protection, and maintenance to that state. Rawls makes a tragedy of the commons
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argument that, if it were not for the role of borders in assigning resources as assets to
particular peoples, the resource assets would deteriorate.109 It also ensures clear
responsibility for the consequences, when mismanagement occurs.
Rawls would likely disagree with solutions to make trade work to reduce
poverty, that are like Stiglitz’s market openness principle, 110 which suggests an effective
way to make trade work in the interests of developing countries, would be to have all
countries open their markets, generally, to countries with GDPs smaller than their own.
Rawls might consider this too open ended, for his duty of assistance in TLOP, as it has no
cut-off point. It is also likely, that in light of his concern, that well-ordered societies
ought not be forced to pay for the mistakes of burdened societies, and his concern for
the promotion of good institutions and policies, rather than redistribution, that he
would want to make a principle such as Stiglitz’s, contingent on adoption of particular
policies and institutional structures. Rawls might accept that trade ought to be
regulated to benefit countries generally in serious need, but likely he would not want to
accept this as a general principle, as it conflicts with his belief, that societies are in
general responsible for their own situation, and his desire to avoid imposing on wellordered societies, the general duty, to make up for the bad decisions of burdened
societies. He could probably reconcile a cut-off point in the duty of assistance, with a
principle of justice in trade focussed on reduction of severe poverty.
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The second principle I propose, is that international trade would be just only
when it either worked actively to limit inequality, both between states and within
countries, or at very least, was conducted in such a way as to avoid increasing
inequality. On this issue Rawls comments:
Equality among Peoples. There are two views about this. One holds that equality
is just, or a good in itself. The Law of Peoples on the other hand, holds that
inequalities are not always unjust, and that when they are, it is because of their
unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, and on relations
among peoples and between their members.111
Rawls notes three reasons why one might be concerned about inequality. One is
a concern for alleviating the sufferings of the poor. But Rawls maintains here that
equality is not important, that, what matters are consequences. If all members have
sufficient resources to participate effectively in the society, there is no need to be
concerned about inequality. Rawls explains that in the society of peoples, the duty of
assistance only applies until a society is capable of forming liberal or decent governing
institutions, and after that point there is no need to be concerned about inequality.
The second reason, regards feelings of inferiority or stigmatization, the poor may
feel in relation to other members of society. Rawls suggests that, here it is important to
avoid conventions that establish ranks or social deference based on wealth within a
domestic society, but within the society of peoples, this is not a good reason to focus on
inequalities, since feeling of inferiority and stigmatization derive overwhelmingly from
comparisons with one’s compatriots, not with those of other societies.
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The final reason concerns fairness in political processes. Rawls is concerned that,
inequality may affect the ability to effectively participate in political processes. He
argues that public financing of elections is useful in addressing this, but also that
equality of opportunity in a domestic economy, must be more than simple legal
equality. And also that fairness in educational opportunities, and consideration of
background situations is needed. In the society of peoples, Rawls suggests that fairness
is built into the peoples being represented equally in the second original position,
behind the veil of ignorance.112 “Basic fairness among peoples is given by their being
represented equally in the second original position with its veil of ignorance.”113
In TLOP Rawls accepts that inequalities can lead to issues of justice, but his
concern is much greater in ATOJ. In TLOP Rawls addresses this in two ways. First he says
that to a large extent basic fairness is settled, because it would be covered in the second
original position, and second, he takes the position that inequality is not particularly
important for fairness, at the level of international society, because to some extent
inequalities support the different ends that societies might have. In the first case, the
claim that the second original position takes care of most of the concerns for inequality,
seems inconsistent with his position in ATOJ, where equality emerges as an important
guiding principle of justice, and Rawls explicitly explains how a society would need to
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design institutions that continually functioned to support

it.114

In relation to the second

claim, that inequalities reflect the different ends of societies, he seems to ignore quite a
lot of evidence that inequality reinforces inequality, in the politics of negotiating the
relations between states in international society.
Rawls may have good reasons for not pushing for economic distributive equality
at the international level. It is fair to argue that, Rawls is aware of arguments from the
point of view of sustainable environmental practice, that bringing the global population
up to a level of material lifestyle similar to developed western countries, would be an
environmental disaster, and likely is not even possible.115 If this is his argument though,
rather than just throwing out equality, an argument could be made that, it would be
more reasonable to outline a scheme where sustainable development could be part of a
just conception of international society.
Rawls’ position that inequality is only important when it impacts fairness, seems
to be a very reasonable position in many ways. However, it is not clear Rawls proves the
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inequalities in international society he accepts, will not lead, as many others claim, to
considerable unfairness and unjust conditions in international society.116
It is clear Rawls would not, in general, consider that a principal for regulation of
international trade ought to concern itself with intra-state inequalities, or inequalities
within the societies that make up the larger society of peoples. Rawls makes it quite
clear that, his conception of justice within TLOP is for justice between societies, and that
it would not take individuals into consideration, in the international context.
The third principle I suggested for a just international trade regime, is that trade
ought to be regulated in such a way, that the ability to compete unfairly in trade
through negative externalities is limited, that is, to restrict as effectively as possible, the
ability of producers to use differing international standards and enforcement, to avoid
paying, or to download social, environmental and economic costs of the production
process, on those not party to the transaction. Although Rawls addresses this concern
directly in ATOJ, and suggests a specific institution would need to be created to address
it, in TLOP Rawls addresses this concern much less directly, than the first two principles,
on which he makes considerable applicable commentary. Negative externalities are an
important source of injustice in international trade, because international law and
international institutions, as they stand, are not sufficient to address them. They are a
problem, because of fragmented nature of regulation, and control of labor laws,
environmental degradation, and pollution controls, as well as variations in property,

116

In this paper see below: Singer, Pogge, Stiglitz.

80

contract and tax law between countries. Treaties address these issues, and function to
some extent, but a restructured international institutional approach, of some kind, is
probably necessary to address them.
Rawls is aware of both environmental issues, and issues around international
institutions, but it seems like there is not enough in TLOP, to interpret Rawls’ position on
this. He specifically explains there is a responsibility to future generations not to deplete
required resources or cause harmful environmental degradation, however he does not
address the concern directly in the TLOP. 117
In many cases, social costs of negative externalities might be considered by
Rawls, to fall outside the purview of the law of peoples, in the sense that, it is not
concerned with the internal domestic structure of societies beyond basic obligations of
human rights. This would mean that, domestic social conditions would not be relevant
to international trade concerns; very similar in a way to the product versus process
distinction has been applied within the WTO.118 This could be a particular problem, in
the relation between well-ordered states and burdened states, or other states without
well ordered, or decent, domestic arrangements. The Law of Peoples covering
interaction in the society of peoples, really doesn’t cover trade interactions with
societies that fall outside of the society of peoples. David Reidy, who generally defends
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Rawls’ position on international justice, suggests that under Rawls’ conception trade
relations with and between burdened societies would be a concern.119
Reidy claims that trade relations between well-ordered societies and burdened
societies would be something well-ordered societies would be obligated to address in a
fair way because the duty of assistance would apply, but TLOP rejects nearly all ethical
individualism. The domestic order beyond human rights is beyond the realm of the Law
of Peoples, so many types of negative externalities occurring within domestic societies,
would not seem to create obligations under the Law of Peoples (although some would
as human rights concerns). In general there is a duty of non- intervention.120 It would
have been interesting to ask the question to Rawls, who notes that, certain types of
institutions would need to be developed to support human rights, as well as to support
treaties and agreements, but is non-specific about them in TLOP.
Rawls suggests that, fair background structures for trade would be developed in
the Original position in TLOP, and it is reasonable to consider that with the extent of
concern for the subject in ATOJ, a concern for restricting negative externalities in
international trade would be part of that fair background structure.
His focus on group or collective rights of peoples, and complete dismissal of
ethical individualism in TLOP, creates a situation where, from Rawls perspective, it
would seem many of the concerns for justice in international trade that are most
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discussed in normative literature on trade and globalization, would be concerns which
apply only within domestic societies. Rawls dismissal of ethical individualism in the
context of justice in international relations, puts him in a very different category than
both Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer.
The differences between, the position that Rawls takes on justice, in his
influential ATOJ and the position he takes in TLOP, are extensive, and the reaction of
many who are familiar with both, suggests, there are enough problems with the
differences to make TLOP unsatisfactory in many ways. This makes it worthwhile to
consider, what can be drawn from ATOJ in relation to justice in international trade, even
though Rawls explained that, ATOJ was meant to apply only within a domestic society.
In ATOJ Rawls has a strong focus on equality; both of the basic principles he
defends are based upon it. In ATOJ equality is not simply valued for itself. Rawls argues
there, that equality is important, because it promotes a society where everyone has the
opportunity to pursue their conception of what is valuable in human life, to the fullest
extent of their potential. Basically, the idea that, equality supports fairness in a society,
and that in a situation where we don’t know everybody’s individual conception of the
good, fairness and the ability to pursue ones ends, are a reasonable approach to a just
society.
In ATOJ Rawls seems to be defending a conception of justice that would be
compatible with both the unrestricted free trade model for international trade, as well
as protectionist models of trade, in this regard his main concern would be, that trade
was regulated by institutions, which function to support principles of justice in society.
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There doesn’t seem to be an obvious argument for why the reasoning behind the
conception of justice, and how it applies to economic institutions in ATOJ, would not
also apply to international society, particularly as we see, that in many ways, it is hard to
understand any one country, as an isolated entity, functioning independently, outside of
the economic (and social) interdependence of contemporary international society.
Rawls claims the theory from ATOJ does not apply to global society, but it is hard to see
a reasonable and convincing argument for excluding ethical individualism completely,
from a highly interdependent society where individual people carry on relations, and
create obligations across international boundaries, outside of the structure of the nation
state. It is a tough argument, that the only way individuals have moral standing in global
society, is as citizens of states, and it is hard to see how Rawls can argue in one case that
the accident of your social position at birth should, in a just society, have no bearing on
your chances for success in life, and then take the position that, individuals have no
moral standing in international society. Although Rawls didn’t agree, it seems that much
of the work done by Rawls in ATOJ, around the role that institutions need to take on in a
just economic system, can be applied quite reasonably to international trade.
Charles Beitz and Iris Young: Building from Rawls
Charles Beitz: A Critique of Traditional Models of Obligations of Justice in
International Relations
Charles Beitz wrote Political Theory and International Relations as a proposal for
a normative approach to political theory in international relations. Beitz supports the
conception that the principles of justice, and much of their application in developing
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institutions that structure society, in a way that supports just interactions between its
members, which were developed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, reasonably, ought to
be applied to global society. In Political Theory and International Relations, he argues for
this, suggesting many aspects of global society to which it would apply. I think there are
several lines of argument specifically worth considering, in relation to the question of
whether or not principles from ATOJ, can be appropriately applied to international
trade.
Beitz lays out two of the traditional positions for understanding the role of
justice and morality in international relations. The first of these, moral skepticism, is the
position that international relations is an area where justice or morality, as such, doesn’t
really hold. This position, associated with international relations realism, has been an
influential position historically, and continues to have a strong influence on the foreign
policy of many states in the 21st century. An important feature of the realist position of
moral skepticism, is the conception that global society is analogous to a Hobbesian state
of nature. In the analogy, states are considered analogous to the individual persons in
the Hobbesian state of nature, each possessing unlimited liberty, to act in their own
interest to the extent of their capability to do so; the sovereignty of states being
analogous to individual freedom. Hobbes described this position as “The war of all
against all”, in which concerns of morality or justice are irrelevant entirely.121 Moral
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Skeptics see justice and morality, as irrelevant to international relations, because of the
anarchic nature of global society.
Beitz explains that the second position is based on modern natural law theory,
and holds that morality and justice are appropriate in international relations, but it is a
moral system where states are considered to be, both the agents and subjects of
morality, and the obligations of justice are held to be much weaker than those that exist
within states. Beitz calls this position a “Morality of States” conception of international
affairs, which understands global society as anarchic, but still recognizes an obligation to
respect the basic rights of others, although the obligation is weakened considerably by
the nature of the society. This is a form of international relations liberalism; Beitz
describes Rawls’ position in international relations as social liberalism.
Beitz argues for an alternative to both of these, one that would see the
obligations of justice and conception of morality at the level of global society, as being
similar to what Rawls argues in favor of in ATOJ. His argument for this alternative is
based on a rejection of the arguments for both realist moral skepticism, and more
importantly, the morality of states, in global society.
He begins his argument with realist moral skepticism, although some of the
arguments also apply to morality of states. Beitz claims that the analogy of global
society as a Hobbesian state of nature, where each state can be conceived as a person
with an unlimited liberty to act in their own interest, is wrong in several senses. 122
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Firstly, states are not the only actors in global society. A wide variety of actors including,
IGOS (International Government Organizations), INGOS (International Non-Government
Organizations), transnational corporations, and even individuals, all interact in global
society. Secondly the power or strength of actors in global society is radically unequal,
unlike the Hobbesian state, where none can dominate the rest effectively. The states in
international society are also unlike Hobbesian individuals, in the sense that, in many
ways, they are not self-sufficient, but are in fact, highly interdependent economically,
and for security. Beitz also makes the claim that in the Hobbesian state of nature,
individuals are not able to rely on reciprocal cooperation, as there is no authority to
ensure compliance, but in global society, states regularly and reliably cooperate in
shared projects, and that, non-compliance is the exception, rather than the norm.
Beitz explains that in Hobbes’ state of nature individual persons are, in a sense,
subject to natural law, but because reciprocal enforcement does not exist, the only
natural law that individuals are bound to follow, is not to do anything that would
jeopardize their ability to preserve their own life. This is understood as, a right of states
(in realist conceptions of international relations,) to act in national self-interest, or
national survival. Beitz considers this understanding flawed, as even the survival, of a
state, is a categorically different thing than survival of individual persons. His position is
that, the cultural or economic interests of a state, ought to have a different moral
weight for the leaders of states, than the lives of persons. In situations where the
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leaders must act to protect the lives of individuals, different moral principles are
involved, than situations where national economic or cultural interest, is at stake.123
Beitz then, wants to address the morality of states position, that there are
obligations of justice, that exist at the level of global society but, because of the
different nature of global society, the principles of justice that apply would be thinner
and weaker, than that of a state unified under a constitution. He explains that, this is the
position Rawls holds, and that, he wants to use some of the arguments Rawls gives to
support justice within a society, to illustrate the problems of drawing a categorical
distinction, between societies within a state and global society. He points out, that
Rawls assumes for the sake of his theory, that states are mostly self-contained. Justice
governs the relations within states, because states are conceived as a cooperative
venture, where members consent to participate in order to benefit from the
cooperation. Principles of justice regulate the cooperative venture, so the distributions
of the benefits of cooperation are shared fairly. Beitz says, this assumption of selfsufficiency is problematic for Rawls’ position, in the sense that, if states interacted in
cooperative enterprise, by definition, justice would be appropriate in governing the
distribution of the benefits of the cooperation. Beitz makes the claim that in many ways
Rawls’ description of states as being mostly self-sufficient, seems not to fit well the
actual situation of international relations, and that if we take Rawls’ argument about

123

Beitz, Political Theory, 55.

88

how obligations of justice are created in society seriously, we need to reconsider the
limits of justice.124
Beitz argues that, there is a high level of economic interdependence in global
society, and that, it is tending to increase over time. He argues that, international
economic cooperation, and interdependence, create aggregate benefits, in the same
manner that Rawls uses to support his argument for principles of justice in ATOJ, but in
the absence of social structures and institutions which promote fairness, the results can
be unjust.
The main features of contemporary economic interdependence relevant to
questions of justice are the results of the growth of international investment and
trade. Capital surpluses are not confined to reinvestment in the societies where
they are produced, but instead are reinvested wherever conditions promise the
highest yield without unacceptable risks.125
There are several reasons for thinking that interdependence widens the income
gap between rich and poor countries even though it produces absolute gains for
almost all of them. Because states have different factor endowments and varying
access to technology, even “free” trade can lead to increasing international
distributive inequalities (and, on some views, to absolute as relative declines in
the well-being of the poorest classes) in the absence of continuing transfers to
those least advantaged by international trade.126
Beitz notes, there is still considerable controversy, about exactly how the
benefits and costs of international economic interdependence are divided, but he claims
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that it is beyond dispute, that there are both benefits and costs, and therefore the social
cooperation that creates them entails an obligation for justice in their distribution, in
the same way as those support Rawls’ argument accept obligations justice in a domestic
society. He goes on to suggest that a “just” domestic society, that ignored possible
obligations to less well-off peoples, could in some senses, justify ignoring obligations to
less well-off peoples, in order to create a more just domestic society, if they were
economically self-sufficient, but if some part of their wealth resulted from a relationship
with that less well-off society, principles of justice that are limited to a domestic society,
fail to make sense, and could even be considered exploitative.
International interdependence involves a complex and substantial pattern of
social interaction, which produces benefits and burdens that would not exist if
national economies were autarkic. In view of these considerations, Rawls’s
passing concern for the law of nations seems to miss the point of international
justice altogether. In an interdependent world confining principles of social
justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others
may benefit from living in “just” regimes.127
Beitz considers that, there is no basic difference in the social cooperation,
between the domestic society within a state and global society, that would reasonably
justify ignoring the obligations of justice, created by economic interdependence,
between states. He quotes from ATOJ128 to support his contention that, Rawls argues
for, the establishment of institutions to support justice in a society, and makes the claim
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that, there is an obligation for individuals, to work towards establishing institutions to
support justice, in societies where they don’t exist.
Beitz takes the position that, the method and principles of ATOJ, make sense in
considering justice in global society. He suggests an expansion of the Original Position,
rather than a second one as Rawls outlines in TLOP. He considers that, this would readily
be accomplished by extending the Veil of Ignorance, to include ignorance of citizenship
or nationality, in an interdependent society.129 Beitz feels that, a global difference
principle would make sense, as a result of the deliberations in this situation. Individual
persons in the Original Position, would be aware that, there would be winners and
losers in global economic interactions, and would want to be sure, that if they ended up
among the least advantaged, which in global society is a fairly high proportion, their
lives would be as good as possible. He suggests many of the advantages and
disadvantages of wealth and economic success in global society, can be understood to
be arbitrary.130 (This is very different than Rawls’ position that most of the success and
failure in international society is a result of a society’s good or bad choices.)
The parties would view the distribution of natural resources much as Rawls says
the parties to the domestic original-position deliberations view the distribution
of natural talents. In that context he says that natural endowments are, “neither
just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that men are born into society at any particular
position. These are simply natural facts. What is just or unjust is the way that
institutions deal with these facts.131
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Beitz suggests the argument for a “global difference principle,” ought not to be
based so much on the extent of interaction, as instead, above a threshold where it
becomes an important economic factor, it should be based on the non-voluntary nature
of the economic integration. In this sense, a situation is implied, where a particular
trade relationship is conducted on unfavorable terms, which create economic hardship
for one of the participants, but the alternative of not participating is worse. Thomas
Pogge supports this point in World Poverty and Human Rights,132 when he suggests
defenses of the WTO based on the argument that developing countries are better off
with it than they would be without, are problematic because, for while this may be true
prima facie, developing countries could have been much better off, with a different
WTO regime. Another way of thinking about this sense of involuntariness is to consider
the states that have turned their backs on international economic integration. It is hard
to argue that autarky has been a great choice, for countries suggested by Beitz such as
Cambodia or Albania or others such as North Korea.133
A strength of Beitz’s argument is that he is not arguing any particular existing
distribution is unjust, but that the cooperative social activity of international trade, is
the type of cooperative activity in human society, that ought to be subject to principles
of justice.
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Beitz then critiques the morality of states position, that in global considerations
of justice, the state is both the only appropriate agent, and the only appropriate subject
of normative concerns. He considers that, it doesn’t make sense to take states, as the
basis of a global difference principle, for it is highly unlikely, that the entire population
of a state will be identical with the particular persons receiving the most benefit, or
suffering the highest costs of an economic relationship. This is easily noted in actual
practice, as in many cases international trade, or international capital flows benefit
some members of a society immensely, while negatively impacting other sections. The
situation appears to hold, more or less, equally true, for both wealthy developed
countries, and poorer developing countries.
It is important to be clear who are the subjects of a global difference principle,
especially because it has been questioned whether such a principle should apply
to states rather than persons. It seems obvious that an international difference
principal applies to persons in the sense that it is the globally least advantaged
representative person (or group of persons) whose advantage is to be
maximized....[T]here is no a priori reason to think that the membership of this
group will be coextensive with that of any existing state.134
Beitz explains that, a global difference principle would not, necessarily, require
transfers from rich to poor countries; although some sort of inter-country redistribution
would be likely, there would also need to be a focus on intra-state inequalities, and
redistribution. Beitz explains that, any international obligation of states would be
derivative of obligations acquired by persons participating in global society.135
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In the afterword to the 1999 edition of Political Theory and International
Relations, Beitz explains that he understands the argument that there is a particular
value in the ability of a self-governing community of persons, to live under institutions
they create, in a society structured according to the values they embrace. This is an
argument that Rawls accepts in TLPO, when he is defending his position, that justice in
global society, must necessarily reject the individual focus of the conception of justice in
ATOJ, and consider Peoples to be relevant focus of justice in global society. Beitz
discusses Michael Walzer’s communitarian opposition to the violation of sovereignty,
involved in any interference with the domestic order of a society. He critiques the
position taken by Walzer, that benevolent intervention in the domestic affairs of a
political community in the interests of addressing a perceived injustice in the society
may be wrong or unjust, in cases where it ignores a consensus of members of that
community, that the institutions and political structure, are a fit with the values and
traditions of the society. Beitz accepts that there are cases where this is a concern, and
that political communities that are organized justly, according to an actual consensus of
their citizens, would have a very strong right to non-interference in their domestic
affairs. However, he explains the actual number of situations, where there was a
reasonable case for intervention, in a political community with a population in
consensus that, its institutions were just, would be extremely small.136 For purposes of
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justice in global society, it would likely make more sense to recognize, and work with
exceptions, than to abandon the individual completely, as an agent or subject of justice.
Beitz suggests that, if needed, some sort of redistribution in international
society, could be achieved fairly reasonably, through eliminating tariffs, and non-tariff
barriers to trade for poor-country products, as well as creating a system of special
drawing rights from the IMF for very impoverished countries. He feels these would be
more effective mechanisms of redistribution, than relying on direct transfers between
states.137 Almost all arguments in favor of free trade, are based on the idea that trade
produces a net benefit over not engaging in trade, be it through comparative advantage,
absolute advantage or simply the relative efficiency of market mechanisms. If
international trade is a positive sum game, which all its supporters (excepting the
mercantilists) make the case that it is, then it would seem to be reasonable to argue
that the net gains ought to be divided, at least somewhat fairly, between the
participants. On the other hand, if trade, or particular types of trade, are in fact zero
sum games, where some of the participants use various types of power, to induce the
others to participate in a scheme which simply redistributes the inputs, in a way that
favors themselves, then a just institution of trade, would attempt to eliminate this sort
of activity.
It is important to bear in mind that, Beitz is not taking the position, that the state
is irrelevant to justice, but rather the scope of the state is smaller than the scope of
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human social cooperative projects, which make individuals who are involved in them
better or worse off, and generate obligations of justice. The state continues to be of
importance, but is no longer the trump interest in international relations.
Iris Young and a Social Connection Model
Iris Young makes a case for a model of justice in global society that, she argues,
responds to difficulties she perceives, in both the utilitarian model, and what she calls a
contractarian model, for justice in global society. She explains that Rawls’ conception of
justice in global society, that he develops in TLOP, is an example of the contractarian
model, but she also discusses David Miller, who also has a conception of justice in global
society, that is similar to Rawls, in the sense of differentiating between the obligations
of justice within a state ,and those of global society.138 She uses Singer (discussed in the
next chapter) and Peter Unger, as her examples of Utilitarian models.
Young’s position on justice in global society, is what she describes as, a “social
connection model of responsibility,” where moral obligations stem from shared
involvement in social processes.
The social connection model of responsibility says that all agents who contribute
by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice have
responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices.139
Young begins by briefly examining the contractarian and utilitarian models, and
explaining their basic features. She explains that, both David Miller and John Rawls
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consider that, the scope of obligations of justice is based on membership in a political
community. Young explains that, Miller particularly (but Rawls also to a large extent)
understands obligations of justice, to come from living together under a common
constitution. She understands Miller, as recognizing the obligation to create institutions
to support conceptions of justice, as only occurring within a nation state under those
conditions.
As I understand the logic of this position, it holds that obligations of justice
presuppose the existence of shared political institutions. It is incoherent to say
that relations between people are unjust or just on this interpretation, in the
absence of shared institutions for adjudicating such claims or regulating their
relations. Some more or less stringent obligations obtain between persons
across political jurisdictions because they are human but they are not obligations
of justice.140
This would mean that, although some normative obligations would exist for how
we treat each other in global society, they would be categorically different from those
that someone like Rawls conceives in ATOJ.
She then looks at the utilitarian position. Young explains that, she understands
that the contractarian position, stands in opposition to the cosmopolitan / utilitarian
position. For cosmopolitan utilitarians, no particular relationship, can change the
obligations of justice that exist for all moral agents. The scope of the obligations for
utilitarians is universal, and comprised of an obligation to limit all suffering. Young
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explains, in this conception, political membership is really only relevant instrumentally,
in the logistics of how the obligations can be met.141
Young feels that, both of these conceptions of justice have some important
problems. She feels the criticisms often made of the utilitarian position, that, its
obligations are too demanding, have some validity, and this is compounded by the fact
that, the obligations do not seem to differentiate between those that you interact with,
and may be involved in affecting their background conditions of justice, and those that
you have no interaction with.142
[A]gainst the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position , I believe some account must be
give of the nature of social relationships that ground claims that people have
obligations to one another. It is not enough to say that people are human.143
Young explains that she also agrees with the critiques of the contractarian
position, that the conception that obligations of justice are limited in scope to members
of a political community (because obligations of justice can only be derived from
membership in a political community,) is too arbitrary, and doesn’t effectively address
the reality of contemporary global interactions.
Political Communities have evolved in contingent and arbitrary ways more
connected with power than moral right. People often stand in dense
relationships with others prior to, apart from, or outside political communities.
These relationships may be such that their actions affect one another in ways
that tend to produce conflict. Or they could cooperate with numbers of others in
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ongoing practises and institutions that meet some shared objectives. In such
social relations we expect fair terms of conflict resolution and cooperation.”144
Young suggests a problem with the view that the existence of the nation-state
creates the obligations of justice, is that, the social connection creates the moral basis
for the political institution, rather than the opposite.145
A social contract theory like that of John Locke argues the need and desire for
political institutions arises because socially connected persons with multiple and
sometimes conflicting institutional commitments recognize that their
relationships are liable to conflict and inequalities of power that can lead to
mistrust, violence, exploitation and domination. The moral status of political
institutions arises from the obligations of justice generated by social connection,
as some of the instruments through which these obligations can be
discharged.146
Young claims that, the position Rawls and Miller hold on the relation between
political institutions and moral obligation, is misconceived. Miller feels it is the
agreement to create the institutions that creates obligations of justice.147 Young on the
other hand, argues it is, the fact that, people already have a dense web of obligations to
each other that, motivates the formation of political institutions in order to manage the
social obligations effectively. This is fairly interesting to argue from Locke. It is hard to
say if it would be best to understand Locke, as considering that there is only a very thin

144

Young, Global Challenges, 161-2.

145

Young, Global Challenges, 162. “The nation-state position however, makes prior what is posterior,
from a moral point of view. Ontologically and morally speaking, though not necessarily temporally, social
connection is prior to political institutions...”
146

147

Young, Global Challenges, 162-3.

It seems less obvious for Rawls, as he discusses the concern that justice is required by the cooperative
enterprise of society, and fair distribution of its costs and benefits. In the international sense, he sees his
theory of justice being necessitated by agreement with Kant’s suggestion that, effective international law
is a pre-requisite of a just state.

99

obligation in the state of nature, that becomes a thick and comprehensive
understanding of justice, when the individuals come together as a commonwealth, or
whether the social connections existing in the state of nature, already create a thick
conception of justice, that coming together as a commonwealth structures, and
provides a framework for fulfilling.
Young agrees with Beitz’s position that, an international society exists, even
though there is no comprehensive political constitution regulating it. Because there are
economic relations that operate across international borders, as well as, a huge variety
of institutional structures of various types, that entail social interactions that affect
people’s lives for the better of for the worse, there is, in fact an existing international
society, even though it lacks regulation by a comprehensive political structure.148 She
explains that her model of justice in global society is also shaped by Onora O’Neill’s
conception of the scope of obligations of justice, as being defined by, the extent of the
interactions that a particular moral agent has with others.
Young claims, that the best way to understand obligations of justice, is to think
of them in terms of social structures. Young explains that social structures have been
defined in many different and complex ways by different social theorists, but that, she is
going to take a fairly simple definition. She quotes Peter Blau, defining social structure
as:
[M]ultidimensional space of differentiated social positions among which the
population is distributed. The social associations of people provide both the
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criterion for distinguishing social positions and the connections among them that
make them elements of a single social structure.149
For Young, social structures can be understood as the background organization
of societies that positions persons in relation to each other, in the sense of, both status
and the links and types of linkages they have with others. The types of linkages and
statuses that people hold in social structures, largely determine the opportunities,
possible actions, and relationships (and the types of relationships) they will have with
others, within the social system.
Young says that, she takes the same position she outlines for Beitz, and O’Neill,
and also suggests for Pogge, that transnational social structures do exist, and that, these
structures can generate injustices.150 Her definition of structural injustice makes clear,
the foundation of her argument for the scope of obligations of justice in global society.
Structural Injustice exists when social processes put large categories of persons
under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of means to develop and
exercise their capacities, at the same time as they allow others to dominate or
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities.
Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the wrongful action of
an individual moral agent or the willfully repressive policies of a state. Structural
injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting in
pursuit of their particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules and
accepted norms. All the persons who participate by their actions in the ongoing
schemes of cooperation that constitute these structures are responsible for
them, in the sense that they are part of the process that causes them. They are
not responsible in the sense of having directed the process or intended its
outcomes.151
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Young explains that, structural injustice occurring in social structures results
from constraints and enabling factors, that are not simply a result of the rules or norms
enforced by the institutions, but also, and very importantly, incentive structures. These
incentive structures, according to Young, may make particular actions attractive and of
little cost to some, while at the same time, have high costs or constrain the options for
others. Because these are complex relationships, mediated through a variety of
structures and institutions, it is often not immediately or directly noticeable for those
making choices, what the results of particular actions may be for others also affected by
the system.152
Young contrasts the social connection model for justice with what she describes
as the liability model, which she explains, is a very commonly understood model for
justice, because it is the court litigation model. It is an adversarial model, and finds one
party to blame (liable) and the other party largely free of blame, in cases of injustice.
She feels that in many cases, this is not an appropriate or effective model for addressing
issues of justice in global society. Young explains that, in the case of structural injustice,
it is not enough when a particular injustice is identified, to consider the wrongs that
individual actors have contributed to the injustice. The example she uses to illustrate
this, is mean bosses, working workers to exhaustion. The bosses have a responsibility to
treat employees according to certain standards, but finding the boss to blame may not
address the larger situation that causes a boss to make the decision to treat employees
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exploitatively. More than likely, there is a background structure of conditions and
relations that contribute to the situation. Young says that, in the complex social
processes that typify global economic interactions, the responsibility for injustice may
involve actors distant, or only indirectly connected, to the process, and even those
suffering from injustice, may not be free from some involvement in the forces that
create it. An explanation of the structural social processes that encourage the injustice,
and a consideration of how all those with a stake, or influence in the processes, can act
to change the situation, may end up being a more effective solution.153 Young describes
power, privilege, interest and collective ability as the factors relevant to determining,
who needs to take action, and who will likely be able to take action; who will want to
take action, or avoid it; and how action can and needs to be collective.
After explaining the social connection model of responsibility for justice in global
society, Young addresses, two of the main positions, she understands as attempts to
justify the frontiers of states, countries, or peoples as the reasonable limits of
obligations of justice. She begins with an account, as to why, she feels the approach of
limiting justice to the borders of states is flawed.
Political actors often wish to define political jurisdictions that include some and
exclude others; when they have the power to implement their will, they claim
that those who have been made jurisdictional outsiders have no claims of justice
on the insider state or its subjects. Since the definition of jurisdictions is so often
a result of victor’s spoils or expedient resolution of conflict, it cannot be a basis
for the moral justification of the scope of obligations of justice.154
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An interesting point that Young makes in relation to the problematic nature of
defining obligations of justice by political jurisdiction, concerns the past actions of the
government of South Africa. The South African government allocated marginal
territories to various groups of designated black citizens, and then declared those
territories as independent states, with no claim on the white government, of the
country of South Africa. Almost everyone outside South Africa (and a large number
within,) considered the actions illegitimate, and grossly unjust, but as Young points out,
they are not outrageously unjust, as far as examples in the history of the formation of
states go. And under a conception of justice, that saw countries united under a
constitution, or based on national or ethnic groups, as having a special status for justice,
have been fairly reasonable.
Young gives a definition of her understanding of a nationalist understanding,
regarding the limits of justice in global society, which is very similar to the
understanding expressed by Rawls, of the limits of justice for peoples in TLOP.
Members of a nation have some moral obligations to outsiders—obligations of
hospitality, to keep agreements made, or to respect the autonomy of other
nations. However miserable and needy outsiders may be, though, and however
much insiders have for themselves, they have no obligations of redistributive
justice to those outsiders. Other nations have a moral obligation to take care of
their own. If the members of other nations fail in their obligation to take care of
their own, then we have no obligation to make up for that failure, and outsiders
have no claim of justice upon us; we may owe them obligations of charity only if
it is strictly impossible for the members of the other nations to take care of their
own.155
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Young is concerned with the problem of how to make reasonable sense of
nationalism, as a foundation for the moral basis of responsibility to others. She suggests
that it suffers from problems, both because the historical social process of formation of
national identity does not necessarily entail any particular moral status, and because, in
many states, there may be several identifiable national groups. She explains that, it can
also be the case that, there is no strong force of national identity separating a particular
state from other states.
The claim that members of national groups have obligations of justice only to
fellow nationals, however, appears to be based on contingent psychological and
historical circumstances rather than moral principle. That claim runs into the
difficult problem of multicultural societies, moreover, where a single common
national identity is weak or where national and cultural minorities are
suppressed in order to promote the unified national identities.156
Young explains that, defending nationalism as the basis for obligations of justice,
relies on the argument that, people having feelings of identification with specific others,
is a reasonable basis, on which to make judgments about your responsibilities to treat
others justly. Her claim is that obligations of justice are in fact more important generally
when people do not recognize shared identity or have a feeling of some type of cultural
or social connection. Young says, moral obligations for justice must have a more solid
foundation, than familiarity or shared cultural identity.157
Young describes those who take the nationalist approach, as having two
different positions in regard to, how to manage the obligations of justice in a
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multicultural state, partition or assimilation, and she considers neither particularly
satisfactory. The partitionist option means separating each cultural group into its own
state. This is obviously problematic, even in the fairly simple cases, but in many cases,
the groups have a long history of living in dense social connection, and also in
interspersion with one another, making it, even more, confusing and difficult to
reasonably separate them into states. The situation itself may even be the result, of
earlier historical attempts at exclusion, separation or partition.158 Assimilation also has
serious concerns for justice, as it may mean denial of the legitimacy of cultural forms,
and loss of the right to support culturally valuable institutions. It can be a position that,
supports domination of legitimate minority cultural values.
Young describes the associationist position, (which is to a large extent Rawls’
position) as being that, those living together under a common constitution have
obligations of justice to each other, based on the conception, that this creates a
framework, (the state) under which they can pursue their ends as persons and as a
society. The obligation of justice, stems from the fact that, they live together within the
framework and to some extent the society rises, or falls together. Young acknowledges,
there are very likely some obligations, that people living together in this way, have to
each other, that they do not have to outsiders, such as supporting the framework, so
that, it enables all members to flourish. However, she maintains, (similarly to Beitz)
there is really nothing in the obligations to the shared political community, that shows
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those within it have no relations with others outside it, that would not also generate
obligations of justice.159
Young works to describe how her alternative model for relations of justice in
global society could function. She explains that, economic and environmental
interactions often involve connections and effects, which are in a variety of ways,
unrestrained by international borders.
The operations of trade, finance, investment, and production are global in their
implications, and within those processes some people benefit more than others.
In this sense there exists a global society spanned by issues and obligations of
justice. In such a world as this the borders of state jurisdictions sometimes
function to allow some people wrongly to ignore the interests of others whose
lives their actions affect, simply because they lie outside those borders.160
Young claims that the situation in which many forms of social interaction, that
have important consequences for people being better or worse off in their lives, occur in
a transnational or global context, can mean in some cases that state borders allow us to
ignore, or separate ourselves from, the moral consequences of these interactions.
Again, particularly as a concern for international trade, and the ability to limit
unaccounted environmental or social costs to international economic activity, the
conception of the state as the limit of obligations of justice, makes it particularly difficult
to promote just interaction.
Perhaps even more challenging to principles of democracy and the rule of law,
the activities of some international actors, such as transnational corporations,
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sometimes escape the regulatory net of any state because they can shift
jurisdictions.161
Young claims that, although social relations of the types to which justice ought to
apply, are often global in scope, she does not mean to claim, that all persons in the
world have exactly the same obligations of justice to all others. She explains that, the
density and scope of social and economic ties are the factors that, influence the
strength of obligations of justice. She suggests that, in many situations it will be the
case, that those social and economic ties are densest within state communities.
Young also explains that, although obligations of justice extend globally, it
doesn’t mean that every individual must consider all other individuals globally, in each
of their decisions. This is because Young, in the same way as Rawls, considers that, in
many senses the obligations of justice are really obligations concerning the organization
of institutions, rather than those of individuals. This is similar to the idea Rawls argues
for, that justice in societies, should be understood as procedural.
Obligations of social justice are not primarily owed by individuals to individuals...
Instead, they concern primarily the organization of institutions. Individuals
usually cannot act alone to promote justice; they must act collectively to adjust
the terms of their relationships and rectify the unjust consequences of past and
present social structures, whether intended or not. They need authoritative
institutions through which to act collectively.162
Young feels that the scope of political institutions ought to reflect the scope of
obligations of justice. Therefore, if the scope of obligations of justice is in fact global, as
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Young argues, then the institutions ought also to be global in scope. Here Young is
aware of the concern to protect rights of distinct peoples to self-determination.
The concept of relational autonomy is put forward by Young, as a way of thinking
about how effective political institutions might exist in a global context, while still
maintaining self-determination for peoples, and regional and state based political
communities. She suggests that, the concept of relational autonomy can be used, to
move the principle of self-determination away from independence, in the sense of a lack
of obligations to others, to autonomy, in the context of interdependent relationships.163
Young suggests that, a useful way of thinking of this is as freedom conceived of
as non- domination, rather than non-interference, with interference meaning that, one
agent limits or stops another’s action, limiting or worsening their options.164 Domination
would be the situation, when one agent has the power available to interfere with
another arbitrarily, or without consideration of the interests, or concerns of those
affected. Interference would not be arbitrary, when it is designed to reduce domination,
and occurs in consultation with the interests and opinions, of the affected. Nondomination would be understood, as a situation where, social structures and institutions
are in place to ensure freedom from domination, in the sense of, the ability of others to
interfere arbitrarily with the agent’s ability to pursue their ends.165
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Young considers this a reasonable way of thinking about, how to balance
obligations of justice, that are global, with a desire for self-determination of individual
communities and societies.
On such an interpretation, self-determination for peoples means that they have
a right to their own governance institutions through which they decide on their
goals and interpret their way of life. Other people ought not to constrain,
dominate, or interfere with those decisions and interpretations for the sake of
their own ends, or according to their judgement of what way of life is best, or in
order to subordinate a people to a larger ‘national’ unit. Peoples, that is, ought
to be free from domination. Because a people stands in interdependent relations
with others, however a people cannot ignore the claims and interests of those
others when the former’s actions potentially affect the latter. In so far as
outsiders are affected by the activities of self-determining people, those others
have a legitimate claim to have their interests and needs taken into account
even though they are outside the government jurisdiction.166
Young feels that self-determination for states, in the interests of justice on
several levels, (global and regarding the rights of groups within states), ought to actually
mean non-domination. And that, states ought to have no more right to noninterference, than indigenous or ethnic groups, that desire self-determination. There is a
presumption of non-interference, but the presumption would be open to review, in
situations required to prevent harmful domination, or to enlist cooperation for projects,
which could not be achieved, other than collectively.167
Here Young takes a very similar position to Rawls’, that promoting freedom for
individuals requires effective institutions that will work to support the freedoms. Young
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takes the same position at the global level; that only effective institutions can
reasonably support non-domination in global society. Young is concerned that these
regulating institutions be inclusively democratic, in much the same way as Rawls is
concerned about ensuring that all interests can be represented in his just society.
Young sees the institutions as separate and based on function,168 and sees them
as, global, but within a federated type of system, where only specifically global issues,
would be dealt with at the global level. She explains that a very important purpose, for
the global institutions would be to create conditions that protected local autonomous
units (peoples, ethnic groups, regional communities...) from domination. These
institutions would also be able to protect both individuals and groups from harm caused
by powerful private economic actors. While under the current regime, weak or
vulnerable state actors often lack the power to protect their citizens from these types of
harm, and wealthy powerful states with the power to act, will either not have an
interest in intervening, or consider it an internal matter of the another sovereign
state.169
Young sees global institutions, in the sense of their closeness to the concerns of
individuals and communities they may be working with, as being little different than the
current state system, within which, it is very common, for local and regional interests to
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end up seeing their concerns sacrificed in the melee of national politics. She sees a
principle of subsidiarity, which is a commitment to dealing with issues at the most local
level that encompasses all those who have a stake in the particular issue, as a key issue
in effective democracy, for states and global institutions.
A global environmental regulatory decision-making body, for example, would not
need to be any more removed from ordinary citizens than many national
regulatory bodies currently are. Once we move beyond a local level, any polity is
an ‘imagined community’ whose interests and problems must be discursively
constructed as affecting everyone, because people do not experience most of
the others in the polity. I believe that this problem is no bigger for transnational
and global regulation than it is for large nation-states.170
Young is very concerned that, these institutions be required to ensure their
activities and decision making processes be transparent and public. She argues that
many of the institutions currently charged with regulating international economic
activity, including the IMF and WTO, are not transparent, and their leaders are not
accountable to the public for their decisions.171 Young explains that, there is already a
fairly well developed public sphere of global civil society, and this, along with effective
communication technology, can support effectively democratic global institutions.
Young makes the argument that, contract theory is a window into thinking about
the obligation or necessity of creating political institutions. That the necessity of
creating institutions in a society, is based on conditions under which people are
interacting, and the ways their lives are affected by their relations with others. She
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argues that a global society exists, but that it is not effectively regulated by political
institutions that ensure justice for its members. Locke’s state of nature is actually
surprisingly similar to international order, in the sense that, there is a conception of the
existence of liberties and rights in international relations, but in the current regime it is
the job of each state, to ensure enforcement of those rights.172 (In the same way as each
individual is responsible for this in Locke’s state of nature.) Hobbes posited a much less
hopeful state of nature, but in a sense his state of nature might be understood to
present the same message: social interactions that are sufficiently comprehensive to
affect people’s lives in important ways, suggest the need for effective political
institutions.
[O]ntologically and morally, though not necessarily temporally, social connection
is prior to political institutions. This is the great insight of social contract theory.
The social connections of civil society may exist without political institutions to
govern them. A society consists in connected or mutually influencing institutions
and practices through which people enact their projects and seek their
happiness, and in doing so they affect the conditions under which others act,
often profoundly. A social contract theory like that of John Locke argues that the
need and desire for political institutions arises because socially connected
persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional commitments
recognize that their relationships are liable to conflict and that inequalities of
power can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and domination. It is these
structural relationships and vulnerabilities that generate obligations of justice.
They create the need for public regulation and strong institutions to implement
such regulation, so that people can maximize their ability to act jointly and
minimize violent conflict among them.173
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CHAPTER TWO
UTILITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Peter Singer’s utilitarian position is an alternative to Rawls’ contractarian
approach to justice. In A Theory of Justice (ATOJ), Rawls specifically outlines why he
rejects a Utilitarian conception of justice for society. Interestingly, Singer’s discussion of
trade and international economic institutions avoids most of Rawls’ concerns, as he is
mainly focussed on how particular functions of the international economic order,
particularly the WTO potentially harm the worst off in global society. Singer supports a
much more stringent duty of assistance than he feels Rawls allows for in The Law of
Peoples (TLOP), but similar to Rawls, it would be focussed on those who were extremely
impoverished. Many commentators have noted that Singer’s utilitarian obligation for
individuals living in wealthy developed states makes good logical sense, but requires so
much of individuals that they reject it. Singer does definitely call for aid both from states
and from individuals, but he also has some very valuable conceptions for institutional
reform in order to create a more just international economic order.
Thomas Pogge has a human rights based position on global justice, structured to
counter some of the problems he sees with Utilitarian positions such as Singer’s which
he feels is not unreasonable, but fails to motivate action. Pogge is also building a
position that he feels defeats the positions of those like Rawls who hold that the
113
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obligations of justice between states are different in type than those within states. His
position is what Young describes as a liability model, placing blame on the citizens and
governments of wealthy developed countries, for their responsibility in causing
unnecessary death and suffering of millions of impoverished people in poor countries.
His position is that spelling out the responsibility for harm destroys the claim that
national borders are a reasonable limit for obligations of justice. He takes the position
that a global society does indeed exist, and its institutions are unjust and in need of
reform. He sees obligations as existing directly between individuals in global society, and
understands benefitting from the unjust structures of international economic
institutions as being complicit in harming the world’s worst off.
Singer: The Utilitarian Position
Peter Singer is a well-known philosopher who has been active in the area of
ethics and global justice for 40 years, since the publication of Famine, Affluence and
Morality in 1971. Singer is a Utilitarian and is his work has been very influential in
bringing some issues which were not considered subjects for debate out into public
discussion. Much of Singer’s work in global justice reflects a focus on the question of our
obligations to others who we don’t know, never encounter personally, and are citizens
of other countries. In general Singer has always held the position that ethical obligations
between persons are not limited by state boundaries.
Singer is a fairly straightforward classical Utilitarian, holding the position, that
when we address ethical issues we should evaluate the possible alternatives, and have a
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moral obligation to undertake the action which will produce the greatest good for the
greatest number (or the least suffering). When Singer addresses ethical issues, he
normally does not spend very much time worrying about how we can identify what the
greatest good or happiness is, as most of the issues he addresses concern mainly the
mitigation of suffering. The exception to some extent is his work around the ethics of
human interactions with animals, where he spends considerable effort building a case
that animal suffering is pain, which is relevantly similar or identical to human pain.1
Singer often considers life, as free from avoidable pain as possible, and not lacking in
basic necessities, to be a relevant good; the happiness or pleasure of classical
Utilitarianism. As a committed Utilitarian, Singer in general, is willing to sacrifice a
smaller loss for a great gain. He does not base his ethical thinking on rights, and
considers life a value like all others. He is willing, at least in his thought, to sacrifice life if
the possible benefit is very great. He does not consider life to have an absolute value,
but rather considers its value to be greater or lesser depending upon the quality and
quantity of pains and pleasures it is capable of experiencing.2 He has been heavily
criticized in some cases for the conclusions he has reached as a result.
Although he has often written on obligations of global justice, in One World
Singer works through concerns about globalization, and takes a particular critical focus
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on the role of international trade and the WTO in international economic

order.3

He also

weighs in on some problems with Rawls’ TLOP, both from a Utilitarian perspective and
in relation to his perspective on ATOJ. Singer, in much of his argument, focuses on his
position of an obligation for individuals in wealthy societies to act to provide aid,
through government and non-government agencies to the worst off in global society.
However, he also provides a Utilitarian take on what reforms would be necessary to
produce a more just global society and international trade regime.
In One World Singer’s topic is globalization generally, and he is concerned with
global environmental issues and international law, particularly as it relates to
humanitarian intervention as well as international economics and trade. He focuses on
the WTO and trade in one chapter but other sections of his argument are also relevant
for conceiving of how a just regime of international trade could be structured.
Singer takes the creation of the WTO to be evidence of the great extent of global
economic interdependence, in fact he describes it as a single global economy.
The increasing degree to which there is a single world economy is reflected in
the development of new forms of global governance, the most controversial of
which is has been the WTO, but the WTO is not itself the creator of the world
economy.4
While still introducing the topic of globalization, Singer discusses the issue of
trade in international capital and the effect it has on restricting the economic policy
options of national governments. He uses Thomas Friedman’s conception of the
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“Golden Straitjacket” and the Electronic

Herd5

to explain the way in which the mobility

of global capital restricts the possible economic policy options for the governments of
states. At this point Singer really doesn’t consider whether this is on the whole a
positive or negative situation. In fact, while he brings up Friedman’s idea of the Golden
Straitjacket and the Electronic Herd several times he doesn’t really include trade in
financial capital in his concerns about international trade. Singer doesn’t discuss
concerns over the free trade in financial capital to any great extent, which is a bit
unfortunate, since his presentation of the main argument in favor of the WTO is based
partially on comparative advantage, and right from the beginning of his discussion of
globalization he refers to Friedman’s electronic herd.
Singer’s discussion of international trade focuses on the WTO, its role in the
global economy and the effects its particular structure and policies have on different
segments of global society. This is well worthwhile, because he addresses many of the
important critiques of the WTO and its policies. He introduces the topic by noting that
according to the Polaris institute, the WTO is a mechanism for accelerating and
extending transfer of sovereignty from states to corporations.6
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He explains that his goal is to consider four charges that have been repeatedly
brought against the WTO by its opponents and protestors at its meetings in various sites
around the world. The four charges are:
1. That the WTO place economic considerations ahead of concerns for the
environmental, animal welfare and even human rights
2. That the WTO erodes national sovereignty
3. That it is undemocratic
4. That the WTO increases inequality; or (a stronger charge) it makes the rich richer
and leaves the world’s poorest people even worse off than they would have
been.7
Singer explains that the rationale behind the creation of the WTO and its policies is a
belief in the efficiency of free market approaches to international trade. He explains
that there is an economic theoretical foundation for the approach. Combining the
assumption that voluntary exchange must always improve the position of all parties or
they wouldn’t participate and the theories of comparative and absolute advantage in
international trade, he explains that according to well accepted theory the WTO policy
should benefit the worst off.
The belief is based on the usual rationale of the market, that if two people have
different abilities to make products that they both desire, they will do better if
they each work in the areas of production where they are most efficient (or least
inefficient) relative to the other person, and then exchange, rather than if they
both try to make the full range of products they want.
…Moreover this exchange should be particularly good for countries with
low labor costs, because they will be able to produce goods more cheaply than
countries with high labor costs. Hence we can expect the demand for labor in
these countries to rise, and once the supply of labor begins to tighten, wages
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should ride too. Thus a free market should have the effect of making the world
as a whole more prosperous, but specifically of assisting the poorest nations.8
Singer takes the position that if a focus on free trade as primary concern of the
WTO functions as it is claimed, it should benefit everyone who participates, and
particularly it should be of greatest benefit to countries where people are poor and
wages are low. Free trade should give them a competitive advantage which will
specifically help poor countries while increasing the aggregate benefit to all. As a
utilitarian, Singer has a strong interest in increasing aggregate benefit, and has often
argued that most people living in wealthy countries have an obligation to make
considerable sacrifices to assist people living in poverty in least developed countries, so
he would understand economic redistribution involving a leveling down of global wages
to assist the worst off, especially if accompanied by overall aggregate economic benefit,
as a positive development.
1st Charge:
The WTO Places Economic Considerations Ahead of Concerns for the Environmental,
Animal Welfare and Human Rights.
Singer looks at whether the charge that WTO places economic considerations
ahead of concerns for the environmental, animal welfare and even human rights is
reasonable. He argues that it is. His argument is based on an examination of decisions of
the appellate body of the WTO and GATT 1994 Article XX which concerns general
exceptions to the terms of the agreement (Singer mostly considers the section (b)
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relating to human, animal or plant life or health). He explains that while the WTO claims
that Article XX means that accusing it of valuing free trade over human rights, and
environmental and animal welfare concerns is unreasonable, the reality is that in most
cases it has done just that.9
Singer explains that how this normally occurs is through a product versus process
rule.10 This rule means that it would be legitimate to ban a particular product that can
be proven to be harmful to the environment, animal welfare or human rights, under the
condition that the product is also under the same restriction in the country doing so.
However, it would not be permissible to ban a product that was in effect the same as
one which is not banned in the country applying the ban on the basis that the imported
product is produced in a way that is against the regulations or laws of the country
banning it. Singer gives to specific examples; the banning of fur imports from countries
which allow leg hold traps to be used in trapping furs which was attempted by the
European Union, and the banning of tuna which has been caught in nets which also
capture dolphins. In both cases the Apellate Body of the WTO decided that the bans
were unfairly protectionist, and would result in sanction if maintained. The WTO argues
that discriminating on the basis that the process by which a product is produced violates
regulations of the country making the import ban, could allow countries to use
environmental, animal welfare, or other regulations to unfairly protect their own
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industries. Singer concludes that the charge that the WTO places economic
considerations ahead of concerns for the environmental, animal welfare and human
rights is a valid criticism, and a source of injustice in the current global economic order.
2nd Charge:
The WTO Erodes National Sovereignty.
Singer looks at the charge that the WTO erodes national sovereignty. The WTO
maintains that this makes little sense as signing on to the WTO agreements is voluntary
and a country can choose to leave the agreement at any time.11 Singer explains that
while in a sense the membership is voluntary, countries sign on because the economic
cost of being shut out of the main trade agreement in the world is very high. There are
tradeoffs, but being completely shut out is worse. Singer also suggests that once signed
on, it is hard to leave the WTO for poor countries particularly, because the decision
might cause disruption of developing sectors of the economy reliant on trade, but also
because of the possible flight of foreign capital.
Singer explains the loss of sovereignty using the example of the desire of South
Africa to manufacture generic versions of patented HIV/ AIDS drugs to supply its citizens
at about 1-3% of the $10,000 USD/ year cost of the patented versions. When it
suggested it would do this, South Africa was threatened by the US, that it would apply
trade sanctions to make up the prospective damages. Singer explains that the US was
backed up on this by the WTO, and only extremely negative reactions around the world
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stopped the US from taking

action.12

He explains that South Africa would be restricted in

its ability to deal with its most serious crisis because of its membership in the WTO.
Singer ends up taking the position that the WTO does erode national sovereignty
to some extent. His concern is that this can be problematic, when it lessens a country’s
ability to address health and economic development issues, or at least the options
available to do so.13
Singer’s position on this seems to be that while there are concerns with the
limitations to sovereignty, some of the concerns are more about in what ways
sovereignty is being limited. In some cases where health and development policy is
restricted in ways that harm or restrict efforts to minimize harm to poor people in less
developed countries this is extremely negative. While if the impositions on national
sovereignty caused by the trade organization were based on environmental, animal
welfare and human rights concerns, it would actually be a positive feature, if
membership was sufficiently valuable that governments would be motivated to bring
national environmental and social regulations in line with the expectations. The concern
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in this case is more if the policies and decision-making structures are fair and just, than
whether it erodes national sovereignty.
3rd Charge:
The WTO Is Undemocratic.
Singer explains that the concern for loss of sovereignty leads him on to the 3rd
charge; that the WTO is undemocratic. Singer notes that the WTO explains on its
website that far from being undemocratic, it is democratic to the greatest extent
possible, in that it does almost all of its decision—making on the basis of consensus of
its membership, meaning that all members are basically equal.14 And in fact, this is true
most decisions within the WTO are based on consensus of all members. The Apellate
Body does not operate in this way, but could not be expected to, since it is in a sense an
adversarial process between states. Singer explains the problem of this decision-making
style is that in effect it is rule by veto, with any member being able to halt a decision for
whatever reason they see fit.
Singer doesn’t spend a lot of time discussing why this is a problem at the WTO,
although he does comment that it tends to favor the status quo. He moves on to discuss
another concern, which is that much of the organizing and negotiating of the content of
agreements, goes on in back rooms between the wealthy developed countries, with
little opportunity for input from developing countries.15 Singer also touches on the
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ability of developing countries to afford effective delegations which allow real
participation in negotiation. He notes that Geneva, as one of the most expensive cities
in the world, is a very costly place for highly impoverished countries to maintain
effective delegations even if they have access to people with the training and
experience. He explains that the backroom deals, and the great imbalance in capacity at
the WTO make it undemocratic regardless of the official structure.
It’s worth considering, that the effective “rule by veto” decision-making
structure has actually had the effect of paralyzing the negotiating process. The WTO has
been stalled in negotiating any real change to agreements for a decade, because
entrenched oppositional positions over the situation of developing countries mean
nothing can proceed.16 Decision-making by consensus requires reasonableness on the
part of the decision makers to each other’s positions on all sides. In general this is not a
feature of international trade negotiations which are traditionally heavily focussed on
rational self-interest. Singer feels that the charge that the WTO is undemocratic is fairly
well supported and the situation justifies measures to reform it.17
4th Charge:
The WTO Takes from the Poor to Give to the Rich.
Singer points out that really there are two different questions: Has inequality
increased during the period of global economic liberalization? And, have the poor
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become worse off? Singer starts by looking at the situation of the worst off. He cites
commonly used World Bank figures of approximately 1.2 billion people, or about 20% of
the global human population, living on an income of $1/ day, and about 2.8 billion living
on less than $2/ day.18 Singer explains that living under the $1/day poverty line is truly a
terrible situation, where people can’t regularly access food that fills basic nutrition
requirements, safe water supplies, even basic medical care, or education.
This is absolute poverty, which has been described as a condition of life so
characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high
infant mortality and low life expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable
definition of human decency.19
Singer explains that according to the World Bank, the number of people living below the
world poverty lines has slightly risen since 1987 as a total number, but has decreased as
a portion of the world’s total population.20 Singer is of the opinion that it is a grave
problem that anyone is living under the conditions of extreme poverty. He suggests that
it is a good thing, from a utilitarian position, that a higher proportion of persons, are
living, at least minimally decent, human lives, than in the past, but on the other hand, he
is very concerned that there are still many people living in extreme poverty.
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It is easier to evaluate Singer’s position on absolute poverty after considering his
position on increasing inequality. Singer states that for a Utilitarian Inequality is not
significant in itself. It matters because of its impact on welfare.21 His concern is not the
gap between rich and poor, but people’s welfare. Singer says sometimes greater
inequality will create a decrease in overall welfare, which may be linked to slower
economic growth, and it may hamper people’s self-esteem. However, in situations
where people are struggling to meet basic needs, inequality is less of a concern. He
claims that a small increase in the wealth of someone who is extremely impoverished
may mean an important difference in welfare, and it will not matter that the neighbor
has received more.22
Singer is also interested in trying to compare how the level of inequality between
states compares with the level of inequality within states and also individually in the
world. Is inequality rising between individuals in a similar way, to the way, it is rising
between societies. He speculates that it may well be even higher when considered by
individuals or household, as poor people in wealthy societies and wealth people in
poorer societies would tend to even the difference out. He notes if you were to look at
the top quintile of individuals versus the bottom quintile of individuals globally the
inequality might be even more pronounced.23
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Singer also looks at other indicators of quality of life in order to evaluate the
situation. He suggests that life expectancy and nutrition are likely also good indicators of
whether the situation of the worst off has been made better or worse. Singer quotes UN
figures that show life expectancy increasing in developing countries, and the number of
those suffering from malnutrition decreasing since the 1960s. He also notes the UN
human development index has been slowly but steadily increasing for least developed
countries since 1963.24
In the end, Singer decides that it is very difficult to ascertain whether the fourth
charge is true. Singer explains that it is obvious from statistics that economic inequality
is increasing between wealthy and poor societies, particularly at the extremes of wealth
and poverty. He takes the position though, that in some senses economic inequality may
be less important than whether the poor are actually worse off, and it is difficult to
discern whether the poor are actually made worse off by the WTO than they would be
without, and while the number of persons living in extreme poverty has stayed fairly
consistent, the proportion of the world population living in that condition has
diminished considerably.
Room for Improvement
One of the areas where Singer definitely feels the international economic order
could function better is in the control of negative externalities, unaccounted negative

sufficient to judge overall directions. Accessed July 2, 2014 at:
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3rd

party effects of all types including, environmental, social, and animal welfare.

25

He

claims that the current international trade regime facilitated by the approach of the
WTO, has created, what he describes as a ‘tragedy of the commons’ effect in the global
environment.26 He explains within states (at least “well governed”27 states) government
regulation for the most part creates a situation where producers are made accountable
for either assuring they do not incur, or paying for the remediation of, most
environmental (and social) costs.
In international trade generally, many individual countries are not particularly
interested in stopping their producers from externalizing costs which will not be directly
paid by their own citizens. Even worse, it is not uncommon for the ruling elites of some
countries to be unconcerned about negative externalities that affect less favored or less
powerful sectors of their own population. Singer quotes Herman Daly in the claim that
in a trade regime where there is little focus on these issues, much of global production
shifts to societies where little attention is paid to accounting for these costs, and in the
long term this will be very negative for efficiency of the global economy.28
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Singer feels that in the interests of a fairer and more just trade regime, the WTO
needs to be reformed in favor of ensuring the reduction of the ability of producers to
profit from differing environmental, social and animal welfare regulation between
countries. Rather than actively trying to block countries attempting to restricting these
types of harms, the WTO either needs to take on the work of ensuring regulation is in
place to limit them, or work closely with another organization created for the task.
Singer suggests there is some difference of opinion on this between rich and poor
countries, with poor countries being concerned they will be held accountable to
standards set by wealthy developed countries that make it difficult for them to
compete.29
Singer also explicitly supports Pogge’s position on the problems of both the
International Resource Privilege and the International Borrowing Privilege. He considers
that a process of recognition of legitimate governance and effective democratic
governance, would be an important part of creating a more just trade regime. 30 He
explains there is some work going on in this area and he contrasts the Summit of the
Americas agreement on democracy, and the European Union,31 with the WTO. He
suggests these types of agreements put strong pressure on governments to meet
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standards for democratic legitimacy and human rights, whereas the WTO tends to erode
this pressure with a focus on free markets at almost any cost.
Singer brings up Article 36 of the GATT 1994 agreement, which sets out, that the
partners in the agreement agree that positive measures are required to ensure less
developed members can share in the benefits of international trade in a manner that
reflects their need for economic development.32 It is his opinion that WTO needs to be
refocused on fulfilling this part of its mandate, rather than being strictly focussed on
market liberalization. Singer says currently the words sound nice, but have no effect on
policy.
Global Justice Requires a New Understanding of Sovereignty.
Singer reaches the conclusion, to a large extent as a result of his consideration of
the tradition and practice of international law in relation to humanitarian intervention,
but also after considering many of the problems of negative externalities and problems
with the democratic structure of international institutions, in particular the WTO, that
global justice in a highly interdependent world will require rethinking our traditional
thinking concerning the sovereignty of states. He sees a strong need for a shift in the
understanding of national sovereignty from non-intervention to an understanding of a
duty to protect regardless of state boundaries.33
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Singer considers a variety of arguments, that he claims, have been used to create
a separation between the moral obligations that are owed between individuals who are
citizens of the same state and a lesser, weaker obligation across national borders. After
looking at the arguments, he fails to find a valid conception of why states have a special
status that global society would not. He defines the arguments he finds most relevant,
then suggests why he finds that they do not compel him to change his position.
Compatriots as extended kin: Singer suggests this that this is to a certain extent
Walzer’s argument, that members of a state are in some way almost like family, you
have a different obligation to them because we recognize the relationship as an
important part of our society.34Singer rejects this as being similar to feeling you have an
obligation on the basis of race. He suggests it is in some ways the same sort of thing as
the “White Australia” policy on immigration.
Community of Reciprocity: Singer explains that this position entails citizens
having special obligations to one another, because they are involved in a collective
enterprise for the common good, living according to specific standards and making
sacrifices to benefit one another. Singer doesn’t mention it, but the collective action of a
group of people to govern themselves in the interests of the group is also Walzer’s
argument. There is some strength in this argument. Singer addresses this in a way that
seems quite effective. He argues that, membership in the community of reciprocity is
arbitrary; people are born into it, and do nothing to deserve or not deserve
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membership. Some members do very little to support these obligations, or even actively
subvert them. He explains that when we consider the wealthy developed countries,
there are huge numbers of outsiders that arbitrarily were born outside the community,
but would do almost anything to become a member. Many of them would be at least
equal to the actual members in their reciprocal contribution and sacrifice to the
community if included. Singer suggests there is no good reason why in light of the
arbitrary nature of membership, that something special is owed to members, and not to
those excluded.35
The Efficiency of Nations: Singer also examines the argument that the state has a
particular value because it is an efficient way of complying with our obligations to
others. He explains that the argument is that the state has the virtue of being able to
provide the structures that facilitate just relations in a society. There is definitely some
truth to this position, a just society requires the social structures be set up in a way that
we can satisfy the obligations to each other that come out of enjoying the benefits of
living in a society. Singer points out that if that was as far as it went, it would make
sense but the problem is that the allocation of resources between states is such that
some will completely lack the ability to discharge these obligations, so it may work for
some people, but it is extremely inefficient from a global perspective.
While it may, other things being equal, be more efficient for states to look after
their own citizens, this is not the case if wealth is so unequally distributed that a
typical affluent couple in one country spends more on going to the theater than
many in other countries have to live on for a full year. In these circumstances,
35
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the argument from efficiency, understood in terms of gaining the maximum
efficiency from each available dollar, far from being a defense of duties toward
our compatriots, provides grounds for holding that any such duties are
overwhelmed by the much greater good that we can do abroad. 36
The Imagined Community: Singer suggests that the imagined community adds
something to the reciprocity argument. He explains that he gets this understanding from
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined political communities” conception of nationalism. 37The
conception is that even though the citizens do not for the most part know each other
they feel a bond between them resulting from sharing and upholding common
institutions and values (The values suggested by Singer are the values of political
liberalism, but they could feasibly be other values.) Singer suggests that the argument is
valuable as a description of the rise of nationalism in modern states, but is descriptive
rather than normatively prescriptive. He sees no reason why it would not apply in a very
similar way to an imagined global community, with appropriate institutions and values.
Singer’s comment is that imagining ourselves as part of a national community is fine
when it means broadening our perspective to include others, but it is less attractive if it
narrows our conceptions.38
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Singer and The Law of Peoples
Singer refers to A Theory of Justice as the most influential work written on justice
in 20th Century America, but he sees serious problems with Rawls’ TLOP. Interestingly,
one of the things that strikes Singer as problematic in TLOP is that they don’t even get
the chance to consider classical utilitarianism as a principle in the Original Position,
whereas in ATOJ it was one of the theories on the table. Singer suggests that choosing
classical utilitarianism could be a possibility in the Original Position, in a way in which is
not in the current state of international relations, where it is not even close to being on
the table for leaders of wealthy developed countries. His point makes some sense. If it’s
on the table for the 1st Original Position, it would seem to be a principle that might be
considered for the 2nd.
Singer also critiques the position on redistribution that Rawls takes in TLOP. He
argues that Rawls objection to redistribution in TLOP is based on an argument that most
of the differences in economic success in societies, are based on decisions made by the
societies internally, and that this is exactly the same objection used within societies to
deny redistribution to assist the less economically successful members.39Singer
considers this highly flawed thinking, for someone who was so concerned about
addressing this situation in ATOJ.
Singer supports the “duty of assistance,” but is concerned about the focus of the
assistance on changing the culture and political institutions of burdened societies, so
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that they may reorganize and become liberal or decent societies. His concern is that the
duty of assistance does not make addressing the poverty and suffering of individual
people a clear concern. He explains that, Rawls may have meant for a very strong focus
on relieving severe poverty to be part of the duty of assistance, but it is not clearly
spelled out as such.40He claims that the issue of a billion people living in extreme, life
threatening, poverty, and what the citizens of wealthy developed countries ought to do
about it, seems to completely escape Rawls attention in TLOP.
Singer: On the Institutions of a Just Trade Regime
Singer takes the position that global institutions are a key to a more ethical
future in global society. He feels that we are almost inevitably looking towards an era of
a coming world community. He explains that there is considerable resistance to this on
several fronts. He suggests that there is self-interested resistance on the part of wealthy
developed states that don’t wish to compromise their privileged position. However he
also suggests there are larger concerns that a full world government would be at best an
unmanageable bureaucracy and at worst an unchallengeable tyranny.41
Singer suggests the approach that might be preferable is reform of the current
international institutions to make them more focused on justice in global society. He
gives the example of the discussion between the ILO and the WTO about the
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development of global labor

standards.42

Singer sees a possibility in bringing some of

the institutions of the international economic order, which are currently tied closely to
the concerns of wealthy developed countries, closer to relevant areas of the UN, which
already have expertise and are in some ways more democratic.43
Singer’s utilitarian approach to justice in international trade starts with the
position that the free trade model of international trade may be the best model for
trade if it functions as advertised, although his opinion is, that the results are not totally
clear, as to whether or not the focus on unrestricted free trade has actually been
effective in reducing extreme poverty. The proportion of people living in poverty has
decreased as the human population has increased, but the absolute number of very
poor people has not decreased. Singer mentions several times that as a utilitarian he
does not have a problem with inequality as such, concerns only arise when it somehow
causes actual harm. For the most part this is nearly a universal position on inequality,
and the concern for the relation between economic inequality and diminished ability to
take advantage of political freedoms and educational, social and economic
opportunities is commonly held,44 (although there is also a concern that inequality may
cause envy or shame, and this is less universally considered held to be a harm). Singer
supports his argument, that the WTO has consistently allowed its position in favor of
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free trade to trump the ability of individual countries to address negative externalities,
which are causing harm to people animals or the environment, with specific examples. It
is particularly damning that this is occurring, even as it seems that there is little clear
evidence that the free trade policy focus is delivering poverty reduction for the worst off
in an effective way. Singer’s position on institutional reform in the current international
trade regime is consistent with Rawls’ position on the role of institutions in a society in
ATOJ. However his utilitarian orientation motivates him to take a cosmopolitan position
on justice in international society. Similar to Beitz and Young, he rejects the argument
for limiting obligations of justice to co-citizens of a country. Singer feels the very strong
obligation to take effective action against extreme poverty requires the creation of
international economic institutions that will focus on ensuring the benefit of the worst
off, and will act to limit opportunities to profit from externalities based on nonexistent,
or unenforced environmental, animal welfare and labor regulations.
Pogge: The Rights Model and Reaction to The Law of Peoples
The Human Rights Model
Thomas Pogge has a well-developed model for global justice, which seems to
have been developed in part to address problems that he sees with both Rawls’ position
on justice in global society and that of the utilitarian position. His model is largely, a
rights based conception, of justice, where liability from damages that one is responsible
for causing is the driving force behind the argument for obligations of justice. The rights
based, liability model addresses weaknesses in both Rawls’ argument and the Utilitarian
argument of Singer. The strength of Pogge’s model in relation to the project of applying
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the ATOJ institutional model of justice to international trade, is that Pogge is critical of
Rawls’ decision to limit his theory of justice to domestic societies, and disputes the
position Rawls takes on the special status of states or peoples in the international order.
Rawls takes the position that liberal individualist obligations of justice exist only within
states, Pogge takes Rawls’ claim in TLOP that peoples have an obligation to protect
human rights seriously and clearly shows that Rawls position on international justice
fails. His approach at the same time deals with some of the problems that Singer’s
position faces. The obligation to act in order to alleviate the suffering from extreme
poverty, in Singer’s model, derives from the fact that there is a very grave problem that
we can assist in resolving without very great cost to ourselves, so we therefore have a
duty to act. Singer has used the analogy of a child drowning in a shallow pond. If you can
act save that child by wading into the pond with very little risk to yourself, then almost
anyone would consider that the right thing to do. Singer suggests, that you would still
do so, if you were wearing expensive new shoes that would be ruined, and you would
consider it immoral to allow the child to drown to save even a $1000 pair of shoes.
Singer likens this to those of us living comfortable lives in wealthy countries allowing
children, who could be saved with only a small sacrifice, to die from the effects of
poverty.45 Many people dismiss the obligation, with the claim that they have no
responsibility, as they have not contributed to the problem. Pogge effectively addresses
why this position is mistaken.
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A rights model of justice, at its most basic, takes a conception of human rights,
that is the basic entitlements all persons are considered to have on the basis of being
human (there are rights approaches using rights other than human rights, but Pogge
uses basic human rights), and considers the duties required of all others to ensure that
all persons are able to enjoy those rights. Rights are in a very real sense, an agreement,
they only exist when we acknowledge both the idea of persons possessing the right, and
an obligation on the part of all others with whom they interact, to act in accordance
with a duty to support that right. Making a claim that an individual has a right entails
duties for others. Pogge sticks specifically to rights with negative duties, or the so-called
“negative rights.” Negative rights are called this because the duty they entail is a duty to
refrain from something. As far as they are conceived of as negative rights, the right to
liberty entails a duty to refrain from actions that restrict that individual’s liberty (usually
within the limit that they not restrict the liberty of others). A negative right to life entails
a duty not to cause someone’s death.46 Pogge carefully chooses a very basic conception
of negative rights, one that even a fairly strongly committed libertarian would accept,
because his argument for global justice, will be built from a position that no one,
accepting any type of human rights commitment will be able to deny. Pogge’s argument
sticks to the most basic and widely accepted human rights, which entail negative duties,
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a right to

liberty,47

and a right to life, these are based on a “harm to

others”48

argument

that is not a controversial. Pogge actually tends to focus most directly in building his
case on a right to life.
Pogge argues that in the case of current international society, important
obligations of justice exist across international borders, because actions undertaken by
states and individuals cause harm that violates basic human rights of other individuals in
a global context. His argument is that we have a duty to act to end suffering and death
from severe poverty in global society based on the fact that citizens of wealthy
developed countries are to blame for this, as a result of actions our governments take in
our name. We have an obligation to force our governments to change the conditions
that are causing harm, and repair, as much as is feasible, the harm caused. This part of
his argument is especially important as this approach effectively negates arguments that
make the claim that there is something special about the bond between members of a
state political community, which creates dense obligations of justice between them, and
which do not extend to members of other states. Rawls makes the case that the
difference principle would not apply to international relations, but does accept that
human rights definitely do. Pogge’s position is that it is basic human rights which
obligate us to act for economic justice in global society. Particular bonds between
citizens of a state, do not permit them to systematically violate human rights of others
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on a massive scale, which is what he argues the current global economic order is doing.
And it is not accidental, or unavoidable that global economic order is structured this
way.
Pogge argues that the harm wealthy developed countries are liable for is
extreme poverty, and that this harm causes illness, suffering and death. His claim is that
about 18 million persons die each year as a result of the effects of extreme poverty, and
360 million in the last 20 years. He notes that this is more than died in all wars and all
types of government repression during the 20th century.49 This is a statistic he has used
several times. It makes his point clearly; globally, poverty is a very serious harm.
Pogge makes the claim that wealthy powerful developed countries50 have used
their wealth and power to organize the international economic order in their own favor,
so that the benefits of international economic activity accrue in a highly skewed
manner, to wealthy developed countries at the expense of poor developing countries.
He makes the case that it is historically true that colonialism and imperialism created a
highly unfair world order, and it is also the case that the current international world
order is unjust and harms poor persons.
Whether the historical injustices of colonialism and imperialism have created an
unjust world order, is an important question, as it could be considered a direct harm in
itself, that merits correcting. It also bears very powerfully on the present, as far as the
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unequal bargaining position of poorer less developed countries in the current world
economic order. Many commentators who take the position that the obligations of
justice are very limited between sovereign states take the position that, for states, most
of differences in wealth and position in the international economic order are a result of
internal, domestic factors, attitudes and decisions made by a people and their rulers
over time. Pogge calls this position explanatory nationalism, and he considers it to be
largely in error.51 He argues that people who hold this position seriously underestimate
the influence of world order on the internal structure of domestic societies, and the role
of international interactions in shaping their character and institutions.
This introduces two of Pogge’s influential conceptions of injustices that occur in
developing societies as a result of of the structure and legal understandings of the
current international economic order, the “international resource privilege” and the
“international borrowing privilege.” Pogge believes that there are powerful negative
interactions between the practices of international economics and the incentives for
good government, just institutions, and continuing poverty that result from the current
international economic order. The first of these involves the sale of natural resources.
Pogge points out that one would think there should be a correlation between a country
possessing a natural endowment of valuable resources and the level of wealth in the
society, as there is constant demand in international markets for supplies of energy and
mineral resources. He argues that the correlation is in fact somewhat negative, and that

51

Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2002) 139-43.

143

many developing countries with endowments of resources are actually poorer, and in
general less democratic, than those that have little.52
Our cross-country regression confirms our theoretical insights. We find that a
one percentage increase in the size of the natural resource sector [relative to
GDP] generates a decrease by a half percentage point in the probability of
survival of democratic regimes.53
The current structure of international trade relations accepts that any
government that has the power to exert control over the population of a country and
maintain, at least for the most part, power over the apparatus of government, can
legitimately authorize the sale of the resources of that country on the international
market. That government may be maintaining itself in power by force, and in no way
represent the interests of the majority of citizens, but in our current legal conception of
international trade it is perfectly legitimate for that government to sell, or authorize the
sale of the resources of that country. If this transaction were to happen inside a country,
even one with very poor law enforcement, if someone took by force or simply without
consent, the property of others, or the property of a community and sold it to a third
party, the third party would be considered to be accepting stolen property. They might
get away with it, but they would never be able to legitimately make the claim that it had
been acquired justly. Pogge explains that this feature of the international trade in
resources creates an incentive to bad and undemocratic government in developing
countries with large resource endowments. It creates a situation where prospective
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dictators are aware that if they seize power and can hold onto it, even if it requires
dominating the population with violence, that they will have access to a revenue stream
from the sale of resources on the international market.54 They can use the proceeds to
enrich themselves and to finance the militaries they require to hold onto power.
All petrostates or resource-dependent countries in Africa fail to initiate
meaningful political reforms. … [B]esides South Africa, transition to democracy
has been successful only in resource-poor countries.55
Pogge also suggests that this situation also pushes down the prices of resources
on world markets, as the concern for these types of governments is to get the money
quick, rather than to extract maximum possible benefit for the society from their use.56
The low prices of natural resources on world markets are heavily influenced by the
“international resource privilege.” The true significance in natural resources is their use
value for all people, including future persons. Pogge sees the low prices of resources on
world markets as being reflective of a negative externality, imposed by powerful
wealthy states, in collusion with wealthy and often corrupt elites of developing
countries, on the populations of countries with these resources.57
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The second, related, situation in the international economic order, which Pogge
argues is harming less developed countries and their citizens, is the ability of any rulers,
who can maintain control over the structures of government, to take loans from finance
institutions in the international community, regardless of whether they legitimately
represent the interests of the population, and almost regardless of how they achieved
control over the reins of power.58 He points out that governments that do not represent
the interests of their citizens in any legitimate manner, can borrow huge sums from
banks in developed countries, and spend the money in any way they wish with no
accountability for where it goes or what it is used for. The citizens of these countries are
left with the debt, which Pogge claims, they cannot default on without seriously
worsening their position in the economic order.59When the dictatorships are thrown off,
and new democratic governments try to put in place policies and structures that will
support economic development and pull citizens out of poverty, their ability to do so is
often severely limited by obligations to service the interest on massive debt loads
accumulated by previous governments. This situation ends up being not only an
incentive for prospective dictators to seize power and to remain in power, but also a
huge impediment to rising out of poverty, when a sizeable part of the GDP, of most
developing countries is eaten up by the cost of interest payments to the financial
institutions of wealthy developed countries.
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Pogge argues that the structure and activities of international of international
economic institutions is heavily skewed in favor of wealthy developed countries at the
expense of poor countries. He comments on the WTO, and its TRIPS (trade related
aspects of intellectual property rights) and TRIMs (Trade-Related Investment Measures)
agreements,60 which are a part of it, and he suggests, reflect the design of global
institutions to favor wealthy developing countries.
TRIPS and TRIMs and the WTO are actually an interesting case in relation to
arguments that international economic institutions favor wealthy developed countries.
At least partially in response to critiques of the structure of the World Bank and the IMF,
which give the greatest administrative control to the countries that contribute the most
to them, thus leaving countries which actually use them with virtually no input into their
policies or operating principles, the WTO, which did not come into existence until 1995,
has what was argued to be, a more democratic structure. The WTO is based on all
members having representation in a consensus based decision-making structure. In a
sense it is much more egalitarian. The problem for fairness, is the fact that the WTO
came into existence, already carrying 50 years of trade agreements, negotiated almost
exclusively by wealthy developed countries. The body of agreements that made up the
GATT, (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was consolidated by GATT members
who were in the process of creating the WTO, as GATT 1994, and became the basis of
the WTO. TRIPS and TRIMs were both negotiated into GATT 1994 for inclusion in the
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WTO. Poorer developing countries had mostly not been involved in GATT negotiations
throughout its history, and its agreements represented (in general) the interests of
wealthy developed countries, in trade between themselves. They had established the
basis of protection for many sectors considered to be of strategic importance, such as
agriculture. Since the creation of the WTO, very little has shifted in the basic trade
agreements. The structure of the decision-making makes it so that any member can
veto a decision, so almost no negotiations have ended in ratified agreements. In a sense
that would seem like at least a level playing field, but the background agreements are
heavily weighted towards the interests of wealthy developed countries, so inability to
effect change is in fact strongly in the favor of wealthy developed countries.
Pogge admits that many people make the claim, that, even though there are
problems with the global institutional order generally, and the WTO specifically, it is still
the case that those living in poverty are better off under the current order, than they
would be without them. The concern is that it is unfair to blame the WTO, and the
current global order, for the millions of deaths that occur from poverty, because
without the WTO there would be even more. For Pogge’s position it is important, that
the chosen structure of the WTO actually be to blame for causing harm that could be
prevented. (For my own position, the blame is not particularly the issue, but rather the
argument that the international economic order could be arranged in a way that
resulted in much less harm.) He has three separate lines of argument that he uses to
fortify his position his claims against the WTO and the international economic order.
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Pogge starts by addressing the argument that the poverty rate, and the rate of
deaths from extreme poverty under the current international economic regime, are
lower than they have been historically, and thus the WTO can hardly be blamed for
what poverty exists. He points out that even if the poverty rate is lower now than it
would have been had the WTO not replaced the previous regime, and even if the rate of
deaths from poverty is lower than it would be without an organized system of
international trade, in some sort of hypothetical state of nature, this can’t ever justify
the current regime which causes harm in ways that are reasonably avoidable. 61His
argument is very convincing on this point, suggesting that these types of strategies take
the position, that anything you do to people is ok as long as they are better off than they
were at some historical, or even hypothetical time.
He examines the claim that because membership in the WTO is voluntary, and
developing countries, where the vast majority of the global poor live, have willingly
become members of the WTO under conditions that are available to evaluate before
joining, and that countries are free to leave the WTO if they perceive it to be harmful to
their interests, it is wrong to call the WTO unjust. Pogge calls this the position of “volenti
non fit iniuria,”62 which is the conception that no injustice can be done to the
consenting. He claims that this position fails, as no one can consent to give up basic
rights, the argument being, that people who are desperate can be manipulated into a
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position where they will consent to anything, which is why basic human rights must be
inalienable. This is a very reasonable argument and is analogous to Locke’s position, that
any agreement to sell oneself into slavery must be invalid, which is accepted even by
libertarians.63
Pogge continues his argument by explaining, that it is obviously wrong, to think
that the leaders of developing countries, can legitimately consent to giving up the
human right not to be harmed or killed for their citizens. He uses the analogy of children
not being able to give up their rights, and anyone who permits children to do so, could
not be said to be legitimately acting in their interest. Making this point even stronger, is
the situation that many of the worst off countries are in no way effective democracies.
Pogge suggests that when people consent to cooperating with schemes that harm their
interests, they often do so because they are being forced into situations where the
options are extremely limited. He makes the claim that poor countries do not get
fairness from the WTO, but a country that didn’t sign up would be worse off. Pogge
quotes a World Bank World Development Report64 in his discussion of why developed
countries have so much power to negotiate trade agreements and terms of trade in
their favor. He explains that they have the biggest, most valuable, markets even though
they have only 16% of world population, and produce 75% of products. Access to their
capital, technology and markets allow them to negotiate hard, as the costs are very high
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of being shut out, and generally they also have negotiating expertise and capacity that
less well-off states do not.65 He makes an analogy to the situation of small continental
European states being better off cooperating with a fascist regime in 1940 than not,
which he explains, really doesn’t prove much about what their choices would have
been, or their situation like, if there had been other options.66
Pogge also addresses the claim, that it is wrong to blame the WTO and the
structure of the current international economic order for causing harm to the poor,
because much of the poverty and resulting harm, is a result of bad decision-making by
poor country rulers, and flawed institutions within these poor countries. He has already
addressed this claim, with his discussion of explanatory nationalism, and arguments
against the thesis that the causes of poverty are mostly domestic. The concern is that
the argument develops into a claim, that if some countries, such as the Asian tigers,
have been able to pull themselves out of poverty under the WTO regime, then it stands
to reason, that other countries should also be able to overcome harmful poverty, under
the existing order. There are problems with this claim, as these countries can’t really be
understood to have achieved their economic success under conditions typical of the
current regime, but Pogge does develop his own argument in response. He introduces
the concept of synergistic harm, in which two factors combine to make something much
worse. He suggests that the global order, combined with problems of institutions and
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governance in many poor countries, are synergistic in this sense, so that even if it is the
case that the government and institutions of a country hurt the ability of its citizens to
satisfy their needs effectively, when this combines with the conditions created by the
WTO and the structure of international economic order, the problems are powerfully
exacerbated. Examples of this are the resource privileges and borrowing privileges of
corrupt and undemocratic governments, already discussed. Pogge argues that while the
institutional arrangements and governance of in poor countries have almost no effect
on global order, global institutions can have powerful effects on the structures of poor
countries.67 This seems to be a very strong argument for an obligation to create just
economic institutions for trade in global society, even aside from any other concerns
about unfairness in the current order.
Global Justice and The Law of Peoples
Thomas Pogge, in general, supports the application of a conception of justice similar
to Rawls’ domestic theory of justice presented in A Theory of Justice (ATOJ) at the global
level.68 Like many who are familiar with both ATOJ and The Law of Peoples (TLOP),
Pogge feels there is a fairly strong disconnect between the conception of justice
defended in ATOJ and that proposed in TLOP. Rawls explains in the argument for the
difference, between them, that A Theory of Justice is meant to apply to a single society.
In The Law of Peoples he explains that the conception of justice he put forward for a
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single society cannot make sense in the international context, for what he calls “The
Society of Peoples.”69
Pogge observes in World Poverty and Human Rights, that he in some senses
supports the moral contextualism he attributes to David Miller and to Rawls.70 He notes
that he agrees that a critical moral contextualism is appropriate, that the same moral
principles or principles of justice, do not necessarily apply in all circumstances, contrary
to what a moral universalist position would hold. In this case, Pogge accepts Rawls’
position in ATOJ, in which the difference principle is an organizing principal for basic
structure of society, explaining that it is put in place so that individuals can pursue their
own interests with a fair framework of institutions structuring their activities. Pogge
argues that moral universalists, who claim that, if it makes sense as a principle of justice
in society, it should also make sense as a principle of moral conduct for the individual,
have it wrong. He explains that the difference principle in society, frees individuals from
strict individual moral concern, in order that they may realize their own conception of
the good.71 The idea being, that Rawls’ principles would set up a framework, which
could support a just society, whose members did not necessarily share comprehensive
moral doctrines. Pogge’s claim is that Rawls (and Miller) just have their contexts wrong
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in their understanding of justice in global society. This grounds much of Pogge’s
consideration of Rawls’ position on global justice in TLOP.
In ATOJ the conception of justice is strongly based on liberal individualism, where
the basic unit of moral concern is the individual. Rawls is concerned that good
institutions will function to form a good society, but he is clearly focussed on the moral
value of each individual being free to reach their potential within society, with each
individual being assured a true equal opportunity to do so. In TLOP he abandons liberal
moral individualism completely, it just does not seem to fit in his conception of justice at
the international level, and it doesn’t make it into his “Realistic Utopia” of a society of
peoples. In TLOP the concerns of the individual have no weight in the 2 nd Original
Position, the negotiators who participate in this behind the Veil of Ignorance are
Peoples are conceived of as putting the independence of their society as the highest
value. Rawls defends this by only allowing representatives of well-ordered societies to
be represented, but this also seems problematic.
Pogge writes, “While Rawls's domestic theory gives weight only to individuals and
their interests, his international theory gives no weight to individuals and their
interests.”72 That is, Pogge claims that in his domestic theory of justice Rawls gives
absolutely no weight to the interests of collectives or associations; he makes no
allowance for them to have a moral standing at all in his system, aside from their value
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for individuals who choose

them.73

Whereas in the international system he gives them

all the moral weight, allowing almost none at all for the individual. At the same time he
excludes states that are not what he describes as liberal or decent, from both the
process of choosing the Law of Peoples, and from the actual rules governing relations
between peoples in the Society of Peoples. Pogge explains that Rawls’ Law of Peoples
conception of justice leaves out most of the people who most strongly need justice. It
just doesn’t make sense in relation to the positions Rawls took in ATOJ.
Pogge explains that Rawls’ does make an attempt to justify it saying that to
include decent hierarchical peoples, (who are also governed with common good in
mind) he must include only peoples not individuals.74 Pogge says that this justification
fails, and he does not understand how the conception of justice in TLOP can make any
sense in relation to that which Rawls put forward in ATOJ. His argument is that, it is hard
to accept that in international society liberal conceptions must be discarded to respect
non-liberal positions.
[W]hy should the appropriate mutual accommodation between those who endorse
and those who reject normative individualism be a theory that rejects it? Seeing how
Rawls's international theory of justice disregards the basic liberties of persons
outside well-ordered societies, truncates the basic liberties of persons in decent
societies, and tolerates poverty and huge inequalities worldwide, why should liberals
find it appealing?75
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Pogge is also straight out skeptical, of Rawls concern for not violating the
sovereignty of non-liberal (decent or otherwise) states in the name of imposing
principles calling for more equality. He points out that, in the actual world, non-liberal
states are normally the poorer, economically less well-off countries, and are likely to be
open to global economic reform in the interests of greater equality, while liberal states
resist it.76 Pogge feels that many persons living in impoverished countries, with bad
government, would consider interventions in good conscience, focussed on improving
their economic situation, or assuring their political rights, to be a positive thing.
However, Pogge acknowledges that some commentators feel there is serious
validity to Rawls’ argument. Stephen Macedo defends Rawls’ much thinner and smaller
conception of justice in TLOP, by considering that there is a moral standing that selfgoverning collectives owe to each other. Claiming that a self-governing collective has a
moral right to organize itself in a certain way, and that other moral self-governing
collectives ought to respect the decision about how the society will operate.77 Macedo’s
basic argument is that a liberal individualism forced onto the highly diverse forms of
collective self-governing society internationally would not be just, but rather would
violate respect owed between peoples.
This is definitely worth considering but it seems actually hard to argue that there
is a very strong difference between international society and a multicultural liberal
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nation-state in this. Pogge suggests that in many ways international society fits very well
with Rawls’ definition of a society made in ATOJ.
Since the world at large seems to fit Rawls's stipulations, (being self-contained,
more or less self-sufficient, and a closed system isolated from other societies)—
certainly better than any national societies do—how about structuring it in
accordance with the public criterion of social justice Rawls proposes in his
domestic theory? Rawls not only denies that we ought to do this, but even insists
that we ought not. But what reasons can he offer?78
He argues, the reality of contemporary global society is, that interdependence,
economic and otherwise, creates moral obligations, not dissimilar in nature from those
that exist within states, across international borders. Pogge continues with another
related point that others such as Beitz have touched on. In his domestic theory of
justice, Rawls has argued that his theory is meant to apply to the situation of a closed
system, which he feels must exist at some level. He explains that Rawls describes it as
self-sufficient and self-contained.79 Pogge takes the position that the world as a whole
fits the description Rawls is using better than any state, that it is really the more
appropriate level to apply his domestic theory of justice to. He accepts that Rawls has
clearly stated his opposition to a world state, but also considers that Rawls use of Kant
to support his contention that a world state could not be just and effective, might not
be seen as the most convincing evidence of the contemporary infeasibility of the
project. Pogge suggests that even if a world government is infeasible that would not
invalidate the application of the domestic theory of justice to international society, as
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the domestic theory does not specify the exact institutions, but rather the principles
behind them. He argues that it might require the creation of an effective global
institutional order that acted to secure basic liberties and construct a just economic
order.
Pogge also suggests that Rawls, according to the positions he takes in TLOP,
would consider it wrong even if the majority of the world’s people wanted to design an
institutional world order according to Rawls’ domestic theory because they would be
imposing the liberal order on decent peoples. In this case it seems Pogge might be offbase somewhat, as this situation is totally different from what Rawls considers in TLOP.
There he is considering a just foreign policy for a liberal society in a world that has not
accepted the domestic theory, with the idea that it would be the type of foreign policy
that, when adopted by liberal societies would work towards ending injustices regardless
of what else occurred. In the case Pogge is suggesting, Rawls problems with a world
state would probably continue, but it seems likely that he would not object to some
type of global institutional order if it was the case that the majority of persons were
working towards it.80
Pogge considers, that a variety of commentators have pointed out it is never
extremely clear what “peoples” are and how to tell one from another.81 Are they a
nation within a state? What about national groups which are divided between states or
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completely within one? What about when individuals may have more than one
affiliation (aboriginal person living in Canada)? In any event there are some serious
problems trying to understand how Rawls gets from his position in ATOJ to his position
in TLOP.
Thomas Pogge explains that even if he supported the claim that Rawls makes in
TLOP, that a strictly liberal individualist conception of justice was too problematic in a
culturally diverse international society, and that it required compromise to respect the
right of collectives to govern themselves in a way they see as appropriate, he still feels
like far too much has been given up and the compromise that results abandons much
that was of value most that would support the sort of liberal principles outlined in ATOJ
or any conception of liberal rights at all.
Reforms for a Just International Economic Order
Pogge has a well-developed conception of what he believes would be required to
respond to the harms caused by the current international order, and reform it to create
a more just global economic order. It has been developing over time and consists of
several different sections.
The first area of Pogge’s proposal for a more just economic order is a concern
with shifting institutional moral analysis beyond the state,82 as he doesn’t feel that the
state is the appropriate level of concern for moral analysis in global society. Pogge’s
position is that our concern ought to be not so much an international economic regime
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may hurt states but how it treats individuals. This is important because we know that
most arguments that support the state as the basis of moral analysis in world order, do
so because they believe the state has some sort of crucial or irreplaceable role in justice
for the individual. Pogge makes a strong case that there is a widespread failure to assure
individual rights in this way under the current international economic order.
Pogge also makes the argument that the current international institutional order
also fails, because it does not allow individuals to pursue their own interests within a
framework that will allow them to do so without generally harming others. He explains
that partiality of concern, is acceptable and accepted in many situations where the
setting is at least minimally fair, but in the current world order the world’s worst off, are
harmed by the partiality of the wealthy and powerful states that are able to undermine
the conditions of background fairness and shift the structure of the economic
institutions so that outcomes are in their favor at the expense of the poor.
Pogge favors institutional reform over other possible approaches to addressing
the harm done to those suffering the effects of avoidable poverty. He considers this
approach to be more effective and in a sense less demanding than approaches such as
Singer’s call for the wealthy, both countries and persons, to provide aid which would
alleviate the suffering of the worst off.83 He argues that rule changes are preferable to
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changes in particular conduct, as it is easier to predict the results and it is easier to
maintain in the long term.84
Pogge also argues that the amount of development aid required to end the
worst suffering from poverty (about 300bn) is so far from what is actually being
contributed by wealthy developed countries, that institutional reform seems a much
more plausible project. Pogge explains the opportunity cost of the reform for citizens of
affluent countries is considerably lower, and the benefit for citizens of poor countries is
much higher, than attempting to achieve elimination of severe poverty through aid
while maintaining the current international economic order.85
Strengthening this, Pogge also sees a negative duty to avoid contributing to
maintenance of an unjust global institutional order that harms the poor. If you are
profiting from the maintenance of such a global order, (which Pogge has argued the
citizens of wealthy developed countries are), then he claims you have violated your duty
not to harm others, and have an obligation to work to end the harm.86
In the modern world, the rules governing economic transactions—both
nationally and internationally—are the most important causal determinants of
the extent and depth of severe poverty and other human-rights deficits. They are
most important because of their great impact on the economic distribution
within the jurisdiction to which they apply.87
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Pogge argues for a reform to the WTO, particularly in the area of Intellectual
Property Rights, which favor corporations based in wealthy countries, over the ability of
poor countries to assist their citizens in satisfying basic needs. He also pushes for
assistance for developing countries in effective participation at the WTO, considering
assistance in maintaining effective delegations at the WTO, and measures to ensure that
poor countries have access to expertise in complex trade negotiations and are assisted
in developing their own capacity, vital. Pogge is also very concerned that the WTO put in
place accounting for negative externalities in international trade.
One of the major reforms to the global institutional order that Pogge has been
arguing for is the creation of a reasonably neutral Democracy Panel, to arbitrate over
when a country can legitimately considered to be governed democratically in the
interests of its people.88 Pogge conceives the Democracy Panel as a permanent
establishment of the United Nations, with sufficient staff to monitor elections and verify
developments within countries. A part of the process of creating it would include the
task of formulating a basic general criterion, regarding what constitutes a legitimate
representative democracy, with additional specific criteria being developed as needed.
Pogge considers the permanent general background criteria as being an important
safety feature, which would help the Democracy Panel, avoid having its basic
effectiveness eroded by members of the panel shifting, or attempting to shift, the
criteria to suit various national interests. The Democracy Panel is Pogge’s strategy for
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halting the international borrowing privilege, which facilitates non-democratic
governments (that do not represent citizens), staying in power, and also ends up
creating a heavy debt burden, that limits the ability of poor countries, to develop
successful economies, even after government in the interest of the citizens is restored.
The strategy would require governments to put in place a constitutional amendment
which gave notice that in the event that the situation arose, through a military coup or
other means, that the country ceased to be governed under the parameters set out by
the democratic constitution, that it would be illegal for the government to allow the
public to serve any debt taken on by a government ruling outside the parameters of the
democratic constitution. The constitutional amendment would set out the neutral UN
Democracy Panel as the arbiter of what would be required of a constitution to be
considered legitimately democratic and when in fact a government would be considered
to be a legitimate democratic government governing within the parameters of the
accepted constitution and when it would not be. The Democracy Panel would only
monitor countries which had signed on to be monitored, and would only affirm whether
or not a government was ruling in accordance with its constitution, if the constitution
was judged within the parameters of the criteria set out by the panel.
Pogge considers that because it has been such an accepted and profitable
practice for so long, the constitutional amendment might not immediately stop banks
from wealthy powerful countries from lending to dictators and non-democratic
governments. Dictators could simply declare the constitution or the constitutional
amendment invalid. However he feels, that wealthy developed countries would feel
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strong international condemnation for intervening on behalf of their banks, to make
poor, weak fledgling democracies pay debts, that banks had allowed to be incurred,
knowing that it was unlawful. The Democracy Panel would bring neutrality and
legitimacy to the process, and banks that were concerned that they would not want to
lend to illegitimate government borrowers, would be able to make a quick check, that a
loan they were considering was not going to a government that was considered
illegitimate, with a legal constitutional amendment on record making the loans illegal in
the country they were dealing with. It would make the process clear for banks and
reasonably standardized.
Pogge considers that the effect of this might be, that governments that came to
power by force, would see little benefit in continuing to service existing debts, as they
would, for the most part, be themselves shut out of international borrowing. This in turn
would make financial institutions very concerned about the risk involved in loans to
democracies that were weak or newly established, as if they were to fail, it would be
likely that a non-democratic government that pushed them out would refuse to pay the
loans. The result of this would be that loans would be difficult to arrange, and carry
even higher interest for these countries, which in many cases would already be among
the most needy. Pogge’s solution is a Democracy Fund which would serve as insurance
against failure to pay. Countries would pay into the insurance scheme, and in the
situation that a democratic government was to fail and be replaced by a non-democratic
government that refused to make payments on the loans, the insurance would cover
the banks losses. Pogge argues that with the ability to take international loans to
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support their activities curtailed, the actual incentive to seize power by force would be
reduced.
The same Democracy Panel would also go towards restricting the problem of the
International Resource Privilege. In the same way, a country would add an amendment
to its constitution to the effect that only a legitimate democratic government can
authorize the sale of public property and natural resources. It would function the same
way as the borrowing amendment, the government of the country would advise the
Democracy Panel of the amendment, and the panel would begin to monitor whether
the government of that country was in accordance with its constitution. If a democratic
government was replaced by a non-democratic government, or no longer fulfilled the
democratic requirements of the constitution, the Democracy Panel would note, that it
was no longer a government which, according to its own legitimate constitution, legally
possessed the right to authorize the sale of public property and resources of the
country. Pogge notes that this process would not likely cause an immediate halt, to all
sales of resources by governments that don’t represent the interests of their citizens, as
maintaining the cheap flows of natural resources, is a matter of powerful self interest
for persons living in wealthy developed countries. He suggests though, that it would
bring clarity to the situation. No one could reasonably deny that the purchases were
illegal and unethical, and in clear contravention of the actual laws of the country as this
would be made transparent by the Democracy Panel, available for consultation, before
concluding major resource deals.
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Pogge feels these reforms are particularly valuable, because the international
borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege contribute powerfully to the
inability of many developing countries to succeed economically and lift their citizens out
of poverty, but also, he argues, because they are important reforms for achieving
democracy in global society. He feels they promote democracy for both developing and
developed countries. In developing countries the reforms would undermine the
benefits, which would be dictators could expect would accrue to them, lessening in the
economic incentives to seize power by force in a weak or newly established democracy.
They would also lessen the ability of those that gained power by force to maintain
power by denying them access to loans or streams of cash from resource sales to use in
maintaining military forces or other tools of domination. It might also mean that newly
established democracies might have less crushing debt burdens which diverted
resources from social programs and economic development.
Pogge also feels the reforms would improve democracy in wealthy developed
societies. He explains that there is, in wealthy developed countries, a democracy deficit
around foreign policy, most members of these societies have little understanding of the
effects of their foreign policy on developing countries, and have not approved it, in the
sense of knowing the options and their impacts, and selecting it. The reforms, would
help citizens of wealthy developed countries hold their governments accountable,
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helping them to choose not to support a harmful international economic order, once
the situation is made more transparent.89
Pogge also considers that ending extreme poverty requires a cosmopolitan
understanding of our moral obligations to others in global society. He means that we
acknowledge our own duty as individuals to uphold or at least not violate the rights of
all others, who are members of our global society. He explains that if a global society did
not exist, if we were all members of isolated, separated cultures whose lives had little
influence on one another across those boundaries, then those obligations would not
exist, but because we live in a global society, where our interactions may have effect on
the chances of others, across the boundaries of cultures and states, and are participants
in a global institutional order,90 all of us are potentially responsible for the rights of all
others. He argues that the most effective way to uphold our duties in this case is to
reform the global institutional order. For these institutions to be successful in creating a
background framework that in general structures economic interactions in international
society in a way that supports the rights of all individuals, Pogge argues that, we need to
modify the way we conceive state sovereignty. He is arguing for a vertical dispersion of
sovereignty.91
From the standpoint of a cosmopolitan morality—which centers on the
fundamental needs and interests of individual human beings, and of all human
beings—the concentration of sovereignty at one level is no longer defensible.
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...the proposal is that governmental authority—or sovereignty—be
widely dispersed in the vertical dimension. What we need is both centralization
and decentralization...And their political allegiance and loyalties should be
widely dispersed over these units: neighborhood, town, county, province, state,
region, and world at large. 92
Pogge’s position is that we need to move decision-making to the level closest to
all those affected by it, but, that also ensures inclusion of all those with a relevant
interest in the decision-making process. Some authority in decision-making processes
may need to move from the level of states to global institutions, and some can shift to
social structures below that level. Pogge feels that the current understanding of state
sovereignty allows a justification of competitive self interest to interfere with the duty
to ensure that the rights of all individuals are protected.
Pogge takes the position that Rawls took in ATOJ, on the role of markets in a
society, that self-regulating free markets by their nature produce inequalities, which
over time can result in extreme poverty and/ or exclusion from effective political
participation and medical and educational opportunities. Pogge supports developing an
institutional framework, structured to act and react, to skew market results towards
equity.93 He argues that this is more stable, and more just, than a system of
redistribution, which takes away a surplus accumulated by some individuals (that they
understand themselves as entitled to, through participation in the accepted institutional
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system), and redistributing it to others, who have been less successful within the
system.
The Global Resource Dividend
A key part of his recipe for creating an achievable just international economic
order, is what he calls the Global Resource Dividend (GRD). Pogge argues that because
we are complicit in the violation of the rights of the poor, and participate to our benefit,
in a system that harms them, we have a duty to support measures that would redress or
mitigate this harm. He explains the three grounds he sees as basis for this, that the
injustice we are responsible for includes the following: “The effects of shared social
institutions”; a result of “Uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources”;
and “The effects of a common and violent history.”94
The proposal is not that we create a system of resources as common property,
but that we understand that the poor have a basic interest in how all finite natural
resources are used. He explains that he is formulating it in relation to the three grounds
that are the basis for our responsibility for injustice, particularly the idea that there has
been an uncompensated radical exclusion from the use of the world’s resources. He
explains this is justified, because the other grounds would be addressed by virtual any
arrangement that addressed the problem of poverty. It will take the form of a dividend
that users must pay when they use non-renewable natural resources. The dividend will
go into a fund to be used in the reduction and elimination of extreme poverty. “This
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payment they must make is called a dividend because it is based on the idea that the
global poor own an inalienable stake in all limited natural resources.”95
He calls the Global Resource Dividend a modest proposal in the sense Rawls use
“realistic” in his discussion of the idea of realistic utopia, which is that it makes sense,
and could be implementable and sustainable, in the world as we know it. He leaves each
government in control of the use and management of resources within their territories,
and explains the level must be such that it can be reasonably implemented and
sustained.96
Pogge explains that one might think that the amount of the dividend would have
to be very high to be effective in addressing the harm of extreme poverty, but he claims,
in relation to the gravity of the situation, it is actually fairly low. He suggests that about
$312 billion annually or approximately 1% of the global aggregate income would be
appropriate. And he explains that this is a similar amount to what would be needed to
bring the 2.8 billion persons (40% of the global population), who live on incomes below
it, up to the $2/ Day poverty line used by the World Bank Group.97 He explains that the
amount is fairly insignificant for wealthy developed countries.98 And it would not be
particularly economically onerous to pay. Pogge suggests $2/barrel GRD on crude oil
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extraction would raise 18% of the total required and would cost probably about
$.05/gallon for the end user.99 In the long term it might require a lesser GRD to sustain
much greater equity in the global economic order, and that could be considered when
the priority of elimination of extreme poverty had been addressed.
Pogge explains that the criteria used to select which resources to apply the GRD
to, and in what way, would be important. He suggests that it would require
consideration of what resources could relatively easily be monitored, in their
consumption, production or discharge into the atmosphere. As well as, how a
reasonably cost effective accounting and collection, could function (obviously related),
and how the overall cost of the GRD to consumers of the end products could be kept as
low as possible, while still satisfying the goals. He argues that the GRD could also be
heavily focussed on encouraging conservation and minimizing environmental damage.
Pogge points out that disbursement of the fund, to those who will use them to
satisfy their basic needs, also needs to be structured as efficiently as possible. He
suggests that specific expertise would be needed to design the details, but that some
basic ideas seem fairly clear. In many cases it would occur through governments, with
incentives, (in the form of further funds) to ensure the funds were used effectively in
poverty reduction. In the cases of governments that failed to distribute the benefits
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fairly and efficiently to citizens, in response to incentives, the funds could be used by a
variety of organizations to provide services for those people.
Pogge considers that the GRD proposal fits with his concern for institutional
reform and promotion of a just global economic order. He argues that it would be much
less costly for the results received, less difficult to sustain, and probably more likely to
succeed than any scheme of development assistance. Pogge is concerned though that
the GRD would have a higher cost than the millennium development goal target of 0.7%
of GDP, agreed to by wealthy developed countries. And he is also concerned there
would be some resistance, because the transparency in disbursement would make the
GRD less useful as a political tool, than development aid currently is.
Pogge considers that once agreed to and implemented, the GRD would be
reasonably enforceable, in the same way that the WTO enforces sanctions on countries
which violate agreements. The mechanism is through imposition of tariffs, on imports
coming from countries which are in non-compliance. He explains that since the
proportion of GDP related to exports and imports, is quite high in most wealthy
developed countries, the cost of trade sanctions could very quickly add up to the cost of
the GRD, making enforcement relatively simple if a majority of wealthy developed states
are participating.
Pogge makes a very strong case, that the current international order, which was
imposed by wealthy and powerful countries, and is maintained by them, violates the
rights of the poor and weak members of a global society, causing them harm. His
argument that responsibility for causing harm to others, creates an obligation to act in
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order to remedy that harm, is powerful and difficult to ignore ethically. Many of both
Pogge’s explanations for the mechanisms of harm, and his solutions to the harm,
consider a large picture of the international economic order, and it can be difficult to
separate trade issues from larger concerns. Pogge’s solutions address unjust issues in
trade such as the International Resource Privilege, and International Borrowing
Privilege, but also use the interconnection of trade as mechanism to address other
issues, such as with the Global Resource Dividend.
Although Pogge’s position is very strong, his model has also been criticized for its
limitations. Iris Young considers it to be problematic, in that it focuses blame, holding
wealthy developed countries responsible for the problem, and ignoring the complexity
of the interactions. Pogge actually does address this with his conception of synergistic
harm, but he mostly uses it to point out that even when there is a serious problem in
the countries which are extremely impoverished, the actions of wealthy developed
countries have made it much worse. It is also the case that there can be an intuitive
feeling that blaming and shaming wealthy countries, could generate more defensive
resistance, than positive reform. However, Pogge’s argument is strong, and his
proposals are comprehensive and in many cases reasonable. If it were a case going to
global court, Pogge’s approach would seem to be the model to choose.

CHAPTER THREE
THE SELF-REGULATING FREE MARKET IN FREE TRADE
Mercantilism
In Europe the expansion of trade and the growth of banking systems were
accompanied by a new way of understanding wealth. Mercantilism was not so much a
full-fledged economic system, as it was a specific way of understanding wealth. Wealth
was to be seen as the accumulation of precious metals rather than control of productive
land.
The historical model for international economics that has traditionally opposed
free market models for trade is the mercantilist orientation to international trade. Laura
LaHaye (a GATT research economist) defines it as a form of economic nationalism, in
which the goal is to restrain imports while maximizing exports, in order to extract the
most benefit from trade for the nation state.1 Maximizing exports while minimizing
imports will cause gold to flow into the country.
Basically mercantilism is protectionism, where domestic markets for most goods
that are producible within the country, are protected legally, against all foreign
competition. In the early emergence of mercantilism that accompanies colonization of
the Americas, generally, the mercantilist protectionism took the form of complete ban
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of imports of manufactured goods from foreign competitors (example: New Spain
[Mexico and Latin America] in the 16th and 17th C and British American Colonies under
the Navigation Acts in the 17th and 18th C). Later in the mercantilist period protectionism
began to take the form it has in current discourse, of protecting markets using high
tariffs on imported goods to make competition from imports impractical or unprofitable
rather than strictly illegal (example: British Corn Laws in the first half of the 19thC).
England began the first large-scale and integrative approach to mercantilism
during the Elizabethan Era (1558–1603). An early statement on national balance of trade
appeared in Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England, 1549: “We must
always take heed that we buy no more from strangers than we sell them, for so should
we impoverish ourselves and enrich them.”2
The mercantilist model is based on the idea that international trade produces no
net gain for those participating in it, and that someone wins in international trade only
through someone else losing. In mercantilism, trade is understood to be a zero-sum
game, in which the outputs exactly equal the inputs, with the only change being the
distribution. This perspective ties closely with the realist position in international
relations, based on the conception of international relations in general as being a zerosum game. These approaches to trade and international relations developed side by side
in the early modern period. (The idea that international trade must be strictly a zero-
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sum game is generally rejected today, even by those who are fairly strongly
protectionist.)
Thomas Mun is generally considered to have stated the doctrine of mercantilism
most clearly in his work, England’s Treasure by Foreign Trade.3 The key point of Mun’s
conception of successful international trade is his discussion of “balance of trade.”
Certainly there were mercantilists and mercantilist orientation to trade before Mun, but
Mun uses the concept of balance of trade to make the tenets of the doctrine explicit. To
maintain a positive balance of trade is the central concern in trade and is more
important than any other economic policy, monetary, fiscal or otherwise.4 The trade
balance referred to is the ratio of exports to imports. A positive balance of trade would
be where the state is able to export a higher value of goods than the value of goods that
is imported. The positive balance of trade is achieved both through protectionist
measures to avoid foreign competition in domestic markets, and attempting to create
captive overseas markets for one’s own products, either through military force or
political pressure.
Mun’s position on international trade, in relation to considerations of justice, is
obviously problematic. It is clear that a mercantilist position in international trade is a
position that does not accept the concept of obligations to protect one’s trading
partners from poverty, and clearly it would be working against equality, at least in
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balance of trade. However, it was also the case that early capitalism or proto-capitalism
was explosively far ahead of the moral thought of the day, which was just beginning to
consider the problematic nature of genocide and slavery, associated with the colonial
economic expansion of the period. So it not really surprising, that trade practices based
on creating economic inequalities were adopted without much reflection on their
fairness.
Mercantilism can be understood to belong to the pre-capitalist state (although it
is not a complete either/or situation in England), where there are often strong social
structural ties between resources and official status or position within society. Free
markets, in the capitalist sense, are still developing. Although markets existed in various
forms from very early times, the “market mechanism,” which controls prices via supply
and demand, is still not the main model for distribution of resources, particularly labor
and other factors of production. In international trade in the mercantilist model, there is
little distinction between the state and business.
The East India Company, for example, is almost identical with the state, acting
basically as the foreign policy arm of the state (or at least acting with the understanding
of close support of the military). It attempts to structure its relations with colonies in
such a way as to create a dependence, that supports a favorable balance of trade at the
expense of the colony. The trade relationship itself, even when undertaken in private
interest, is not separate from government.
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The Free Trade Model
In international trade there are two main branches of support for the free trade
model, that arose in opposition to mercantilism. The first of these is based on Adam
Smith’s conception of a free market economy being “led by an invisible hand” towards
the best results for society as a whole. If everyone involved in a competitive market is
allowed to freely make economic decisions in their own self interest, not only will
participants in the exchange benefit, but resources will be allocated efficiently to the
overall benefit of society. The concept of “society” is simply expanded from the nation
to the global market. The second branch consists of the theories that arise in the late
18th and early 19th centuries. This branch divides into two sub-arguments, absolute and
comparative advantage, in support of the free trade model for international trade.
An important consideration in discussing the free trade model or self-regulating
free market model for international trade, is what exactly, is being allowed to be
exchanged freely when we discuss free trade. Through much of the history of trade the
actual exchange consisted of finished goods or products, although it was also fairly
common for natural resources to be exchanged, in some circumstances. In general,
capital and labor were not considered to be subject to trade across international
borders for a variety of reasons (although immigration has definitely been a labor
market factor at times). In the contemporary debate on international trade it is certainly
the case that, capital is one of the important items being traded across international
borders. The trade in capital is different in some ways than the trade in goods or
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products in the traditional sense, and has game changing effects on international trade,
regarding who benefits under which conditions. There are several contested positions
on how trade in capital fits with the argument supporting the free trade model. Trade in
capital came into the WTO from GATT under TRIMs (Trade Related Investment
Measures) and it is an important feature of international trade today.
It is worth noting that, although protectionism made a comeback in the 1930s,
few economists support it today. As Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin note:
While many aspects of the Great Depression continue to be debated, there is allbut-universal agreement that the adoption of restrictive trade policies was
destructive and counterproductive and that similarly succumbing to
protectionism in our current slump should be avoided at all cost. Lacking other
instruments with which to support economic activity, governments erected tariff
and nontariff barriers to trade in a desperate effort to direct spending to
merchandise produced at home rather than abroad. But with other governments
responding in kind, the distribution of demand across countries remained
unchanged at the end of this round of global tariff hikes. The main effect was to
destroy trade which, despite the economic recovery in most countries after
1933, failed to reach its 1929 peak, as measured by volume, by the end of the
decade. The benefits of comparative advantage were lost. Recrimination over
beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies made it more difficult to agree on other
measures to halt the slump.5
Absolute Competitive Advantage: Adam Smith
Adam Smith challenges the mercantilist view that maintaining a positive balance
of trade is of overwhelming importance (thus necessitating that domestic industries be
protected). In The Wealth of Nations, Smith writes:
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What is prudent in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that
of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper
than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with them with some part
of our industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. . . . In
every country, it always is and must be in the interest of the great body of the
people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition
is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor
could it have ever been called into question, had not the interested sophistry of
merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. Their
interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the
people.6
The basic premise of Smith’s model is that all members of society individually,
making economic decisions in their own self-interest, will, in the aggregate, produce the
best overall result for society as a whole. Any planned intervention in the market to
achieve specific results or benefit particular segments of society, at best, yields lowered
efficiency and reduced aggregate benefit to society. Smith famously argued for an
economy “led by an invisible hand”:
Every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as
great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of the
domestic over foreign industry he intends only his own security; and by directing
that industry in such a manner that its produce may be of the greatest value, he
intends only his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his intention. He generally,
indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he
is promoting it.7
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This type of market-based economic system is now commonly known as “laissez
faire,” a usefully descriptive term, as the model consists of leaving the participants in
the market alone to do what they think is in their own interest (which, according to the
theory, will be society’s interest as well). Free markets are known as “self-regulating”
because without regulatory input they automatically perform the crucial economic tasks
of deciding what the appropriate price for any good or service should be (high enough
to motivate producers to supply it, while keeping it sufficiently low that consumers can
afford to buy it) and determining the appropriate quantity to be supplied to market.
According to the premises that underlie the case for the self-regulating free market in
economics, the only real role for regulative governance in this model, is the
enforcement of contract and property law, and those anti-monopoly statutes that keep
the economy competitive, since, in a free competitive economy, production and pricing
decisions are already being handled in the most efficient manner achievable. It is also
claimed to be a just model, for it allows owners of resources the greatest possible
liberty with respect to how they will make use of their own resources, and rewards
them according to their productive contribution.
Adam Smith formulated the theory of absolute advantage in international trade,
which is in accord with his theory of the efficiency of self-regulating free markets.
Absolute advantage is the idea that many countries will have some climactic,
geographic, or other advantage in producing a specific good or service. Each country
ought to, as much as possible, concentrate in producing the product they are the most
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efficient at producing, and import those things they produce less efficiently than other
countries. In this way they would use their labor resources as efficiently as possible,
(perhaps even gaining economies of scale as well) and would create more overall value
of products with the same labor input, than would have been possible producing things
that were produced less efficiently, in the country than elsewhere.
If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves
can make it, better buy it of them with some produce of our own industry,
employed in a way in which we have some advantage.8
The theory of absolute advantage should motivate countries to pursue free trade
policies, for any tariffs or quotas in place to protect less efficient industry from foreign
competition, will only make it more expensive to import the needed products, when the
countries concentrate on producing the products where they possess an absolute
advantage. The other side of this would be that, if other countries had barriers in place
against your products, it would tend to negate some of the advantage and make your
product less competitive. According to the theory of absolute advantage, protectionist
measures such as tariffs (or even subsidies to less efficient industries), while protecting
certain producers, end up hurting the countries involved, since the efficiency strengths
that each possess cannot be exploited effectively.
Of course, there are countries that would not possess an absolute advantage in
any product. (One can imagine some of the poorer countries in today’s world being in
this situation.) They would tend not to benefit from trade in Smith’s conception, (except
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for necessary things they might not be able to acquire otherwise) and for these
countries absolute advantage is not very useful. They could in fact benefit from putting
in place protectionist measures. Smith also, interestingly, suggests that, it is worth
deliberating on whether or not it is a good idea to rapidly move to free trade in areas
that have been protected and are major sources of employment in a country.9
Comparative Advantage: David Ricardo
David Ricardo wrote On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817.
The book has many strengths and is considered one of the founding works of modern
economics as a discipline. Its single most lasting contribution is the theory of
“comparative advantage” in international trade. The theory was not entirely new, but
Ricardo was the first to state it clearly and effectively detail how it would function. It
builds upon Adam Smith’s theory of absolute competitive advantage, but it departs
importantly in maintaining that, even in situations where a country has no absolute
advantage in the production of any good, it can still specialize in production of the
goods at which it is relatively more efficient at producing than the other goods it
produces and gain a benefit in trade.
Ricardo works with the example of England and Portugal to describe how the
comparative advantage functions.
If Portugal had no commercial connection with other countries, instead of
employing a great part of her capital and industry in the production of wines,
with which she purchases for her own use the cloth and hardware of other
9
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countries, she would be obliged to devote a part of that capital to the
manufacture of those commodities, which she would thus obtain probably
inferior in quality as well as quantity.10
Ricardo uses the example of cloth and wine, both of which are produced more
efficiently in Portugal than in England. In this example Ricardo considers only labor but
in theory it works even considering other factors of production. England requires the
labor of 100 men for a year to produce a unit of cloth and the labor of 120 men for a
year to produce a unit of wine. Portugal requires the labor of 80 men for a year to
produce a unit of wine and the labor of 90 men for a year to produce a unit of cloth.
Portugal is more efficient than England, in absolute terms, in both cloth and wine. It
takes more men to produce a unit of cloth in E than it does in P (100 vs. 80) and more to
produce a unit of wine (120 vs. 90).
So, without specialization, these 390 men will produce 2 units of cloth and 2 of
wine. But if England specializes in cloth, its 220 men will produce 2.2 units of cloth. (200
men produce 2 units. The extra 20 produces another 0.2.) If P specializes in wine, its 170
men will produce 2.125 (160 men will produce 2. The extra 10 will produce 10 x (1/80)).
Clearly more of each product is produced via such specialization, so an exchange could
be arranged that would benefit both countries.
And indeed, the free market will arrange such an exchange. Consider the
situation of a British importer. Both cloth and wine are produced more efficiently in
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Portugal than in Britain. Which should they import? Well, British importers will find it
profitable to import wine from Portugal, where they need only exchange 8/9 units of
cloth to obtain a unit of wine from Portugal (the exchange rate of cloth for wine in
Portugal), but that wine that is equal to 120/100 = 6/5 units of cloth in England. That is
to say, their outlay of 8/9 units of cloth gives them a product worth 6/5 units of cloth, a
profit of (6/5-8/9)/(8/9) = 35%. (Transportation costs are ignored in the example.)
However, if they chose to import cloth, they would have had to pay 9/8 units of
wine to the Portuguese to get a unit of cloth (since wine is easier to produce than cloth
in Portugal), which is worth only 5/6 units of wine in England. That is to say, they would
lose money.
So British importers will find it profitable to import wine from Portugal, and, by
parity of reasoning, Portuguese importers will find it profitable to import cloth from
Britain. To import a unit of cloth, they need only pay 5/6 units of wine, but that cloth, in
Portugal, is worth 9/8 units of wine. They too make a 35% rate of profit (exactly the
same rate as the British importer)—and would lose money trying to import wine.
We can see in Ricardo’s example, that specialization in the production of the
most, relatively, efficiently produced product, and allowing Smith’s invisible hand to
work its magic, works to the benefit of both countries. Thus, it would seem like it would
be a terrible move for anyone concerned about poverty, to resist trade liberalization.
Ricardo uses this very simplified example with only two products and two countries, but
the theory scales with many products and many countries. Without much difficulty
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economists can construct a much more complicated model embracing many products
and many countries. However, in recent years there has been a growing concern that
some of the conditions (particularly immobility of capital, but also to some extent labor
mobility) necessary for comparative advantage to hold in international trade have
diminished or disappeared. There is a large division over how to understand this. Some
are convinced that this negates the case for free trade, others that comparative
advantage does not hold, but that the case for free trade remains, and still others
maintain that factor mobility in no way affects the validity of comparative advantage. 11
Floating-Exchange-Rate Free Trade: Milton Friedman
Milton Friedman supports free market economics in almost all situations. He
argues his case on the basis of the value of freedom and efficiency. The two efficiency
concerns are; one, determining what consumers actually want, and two, providing
incentives to producers to satisfy those wants, without wasting inputs. He also argues
that economic freedom is an essential component of personal freedom. One cannot
really be free if one is not free to dispose of one’s property in the manner in which one
chooses for oneself. He also argues that inequality is a good thing. Wealthy people
provide resources for innovation, a market for new products that, eventually become
accessible to the general public, and a counterfoil to the concentration of political
power in the hands of charismatic politicians.

11

Ralph Gomory and Herman Daly for the first position, Jagdish Bhagwati for the second position and
Milton Friedman assumes the third, but does not explicitly explain why.
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Friedman’s ideas (along with the similar ideas of his one-time colleague at the
University of Chicago, Friedrich von Hayek) were taken up by government leaders at the
end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, after spiking world energy costs
contributed to economic slowdown and stagnation in the mid 1970s. They became the
ruling ideas of the US and Britain, and the main ideological influence of international
financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The push to transform the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) was also animated by these same ideas.
Friedman’s position is actually more “radical” than those calling for global trade
agreements that reduce trade barriers. He claims that, the best way to move to free
trade is to unilaterally drop one’s own tariffs, regardless of what others do.
Given that we should move to free trade, how should we do so? The method we
have tried to adopt is reciprocal negotiation of tariff reductions with other
countries. This seems to me the wrong procedure. In the first place it ensures a
slow pace. He who moves fastest moves alone. In the second place it fosters an
erroneous view of the basic problem. It makes it appear as if tariffs help the
country imposing them but hurt other countries, as if when we reduce a tariff we
give up something good and should get something in return in the form of a
reduction of tariffs imposed by other countries. In truth the situation is quite
different. Our tariffs hurt us as well as other countries. We would be benefited
by dispensing with our tariffs even if other countries did not. We would of course
be benefited even more if they reduced theirs but our benefiting does not
require that they reduce theirs.12
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Friedman admits there may be exceptions to this but, apart from a very few
genuine national security concerns (like trade in weapons), he dismisses them as largely
theoretical, and of little practical importance.13
For Friedman, a major concern in international trade is international currency
convertibility. He argued forcefully that a free-floating, market-based currency exchange
rate would be preferable to the international system of fixed exchange rates in effect at
the time. He provides an example of why a fixed-rate system of currency exchange is
problematic, and in the long term, unsustainable in international trade.14
Suppose for simplicity that Japan and the US are the only two countries involved
in trade and at some exchange rate, say 1000 yen to the dollar, Japan could
produce every single item capable of entering into foreign trade more cheaply
than the U.S. At that exchange rate the Japanese could sell much to us, we
nothing to them. Suppose we pay them in paper dollars. What would the
Japanese exporters do with the dollars? They cannot eat them, wear them or live
in them. If they were willing simply to hold them, then the printing industry
printing the dollar bills would be a magnificent export industry. Its output would
enable us all to have the good things of life provided nearly free by the
Japanese.15
Friedman argues that this sort of situation is unsustainable, because no one in
Japan would choose to buy a dollar with 1000 yen, when a 1000 yen could be used to
purchase more of everything than a dollar could. The exporter would need to sell his
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During the post–war, fixed-exchange-rate period, protectionists argued their case by warning that
without such measures, we would soon lose all our jobs to low-wage parts of the world (like Japan at the
time). His example is meant to show that this cannot happen if exchange rates are market-determined,
not government-determined.
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dollars for yen, in order to pay his workers, and other for Japanese inputs to produce his
export goods, but no one would want to give up yen for dollars, at a price where
everything you could buy with a dollar could be purchased more cheaply with 1000 yen.
Nothing produced by the US and available for purchase with dollars is competitive in
price, with anything produced in Japan and available for purchase in yen. You would
always be able to buy more of a product with 1000 yen in Japan than you could buy of
the same product with 1 dollar in the US.
Friedman argues that if we are going to be able to access the benefits of free
international trade, currencies must be allowed to be bought and sold in a free market
without price controls, so that the price reflects the value of what can be bought with it.
The exchange rate between any two given currencies, will naturally balance at a level
where some products are a better value purchased with each of the currencies, because
if there is nothing that would make it worthwhile to sell some of your currency to
purchase the other, no currency would be exchanged. For example if there was nothing
that holders of yen wanted to purchase with dollars at a particular price, then no yen
would be sold for dollars, until those holding dollars offered a low enough price, that
there were things that could be bought at a better price with dollars. (If the value of the
dollar dropped to, say, 500y, then 1000y would buy $2 worth of American goods, twice
as much as it would before.) The argument is simply an application of supply and
demand.
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A key point Friedman makes is that this argument in no way depends on the
incomes or standards of living of the workers in the countries. Friedman says that if the
workers in one country, under this system, have a lower standard of living than in
another, this is the result of them being less productive than the workers in the better
off countries. Friedman uses the (perhaps reasonable at that time) example of US
workers being on average four times more productive than the Japanese worker, as a
result of factors such as training, and access to capital and land (resources or raw
materials). He explains that it would not be a wise use of resources for US workers to
produce any product where their efficiency of production is below the average. They
would be most productively employed, producing things they were more than four
times as productive at producing, and importing those things they would produce less
efficiently, from Japan. Friedman’s explanation is taking into account both Smith’s
theory of absolute advantage, and Ricardo’s comparative advantage. It would apply
whether there were some things the Japanese worker produced more efficiently than
the American worker or not, as it would be advantageous to produce whatever could be
produced relatively more efficiently, and trade for those things that could only be
produced less efficiently, even if the Japanese worker in the example produced
everything less efficiently than the US worker. Regardless of the absolute productivity of
each side in the exchange, both countries in the example could enjoy a greater quantity
of products (produced with the same quantity of inputs) by specializing where they have
an advantage.
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Ricardo’s theory, invoking hours of labor as the cost of production, implicitly
assumes, given the gold standard of his time, that wages are equal in both countries.
Friedman shows that free international trade needs to be accompanied by a free
international market for money in the contemporary environment, where a better
understanding of macroeconomics and monetary policy had convinced mainstream
economists that a gold standard for currency was problematic and likely impossible to
sustain. Friedman’s argument for free international trade is based on both the claimed
efficiency of free markets compared to government direction, manipulation or
intervention in the economy and also the theory of comparative advantage which can
lead to a better material lifestyle for all countries concerned.
Friedman’s arguments, in general, are focussed only on the ability to produce
efficiently the greatest quantity of what is needed in an economy. His prescription is the
same for rich and poor countries alike: unrestricted free trade. He does not address the
question of inter-state inequality. As noted above, he does not feel that inequality is an
important domestic concern. In fact, he argues, it has certain positive benefits.16
Friedman, as a self-professed classical liberal, agrees that any harm one party
does to another in the productive process, unless agreed to by both parties, is
problematic. Such externalities, called by him “neighborhood effects,” do permit, in
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Friedman is strongly opposed to any attempts by government to redistribute wealth via progressive
taxation, though he does allow that a negative-income-tax safety net is justified, on the grounds that large
numbers of impoverished people constitute a negative “neighborhood effect.” As he puts it, it is
acceptable for top 90% of us to tax ourselves to aid the bottom 10%, but it not acceptable for the bottom
90% to tax the upper 10% at a higher rate so as to decrease their (the 90%) tax burdens. (See Capitalism
and Freedom, Chapter X and XII.)
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some circumstances, government intervention. He does not discuss externalities
connected to international trade, but his insistence that government intervention itself
generates negative externalities would likely make him wary of international
agreements that impose, or sanction restrictions on free trade.
Globalization as a Poverty-Reduction Strategy: Jagdish Bhagwati
Jagdish Bhagwati, whose background is that of a development economist from
India, a poorer developing economy, takes a strong normative position supporting the
free trade model for international trade as a means of addressing the concern for
alleviating extreme poverty.
Bhagwati, coming from a country where extreme poverty has been a large long
term problem, believes that unrestricted free trade and removal of barriers to
international trade are the most appropriate solutions to this problem. He argues that
those who protest against free trade, the WTO and rapidly increasing globalization are
wrong-headed, for their policy proposals (to the extent that they have any) would
actually harm the poor.
Bhagwati starts his argument with the claim, “trade enhances growth, and
growth reduces poverty.”17 The claim that trade enhances growth is reasonably non-
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controversial, especially if growth is being measured strictly as increasing GDP (although
the World Bank claims this is the case even using the UN Quality of Life Index).18
The second part of Bhagwati’s claim is based on his support for the “trickle
down” theory of distribution in economics. He definitely supports “trickle down”
economics, claiming that he has researched and found that internationally across
countries in very different political and economic situations, there is very little
difference in the pattern of the distribution of wealth. 19
Countries seemed to have somewhat similar income distributions regardless of
their political and economic cast. So the primary inference I made was that if
there was no way to significantly affect the share of the pie going to the bottom
30 percent, the most important thing was to grow the pie.
In this view, growth was not a passive trickle down strategy for helping
the poor. It was an active pull-up strategy instead.20
Bhagwati makes the claim that for India “trickle down” was an active strategy
for poverty reduction, in the sense that believing they could not achieve a more equal
distribution of resources, they have been trying to increase the total productiveness of
the Indian economy, so that even the smallest relative share of it would be larger.
Adopting “trickle down” as a strategy of poverty reduction means that Bhagwati
makes reducing poverty a much higher value than reducing or limiting inequality. In fact
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Dollar, David and Kray, Aart. Trade, growth, and poverty, Volume 1.(2002) The World Bank:
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6&menuPK=64216926&entityID=000094946_02082304142939 (accessed July 2011).
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“Trickle Down” economics is the idea that making the rich richer is an effective way of fighting poverty.
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Bhagwati’s position is that, inequality is not an important concern in international
economics and development. In fact, he considers the efforts of the World Bank to
measure inequality within societies, to be silly.
And this lunacy—how else can one describe it?—extends to what the World
Bank, with its abundance of economists aid funds, has been doing in recent
years, which is to put all households of the world onto one chart to measure
inequality of incomes.21
It is pretty much necessary that he take this position on inequality if he is to
endorse “trickle down” economics as a poverty reduction strategy. Indeed, I think that a
cogent argument could be made that relative inequality is less important than assuring
that everyone has their basic needs satisfied. Singer supports this position (that relative
inequality is more acceptable than extreme poverty, not trickle-down). Rawls allows
inequality (but doesn’t explicitly support trickle-down) in his influential Theory of Justice,
if it improves the position of the worst off. 22
Bhagwati does address the issue of externalities, at fairly serious length, in his
support for a free market model of international trade. His argument takes three
different approaches to addressing the concern. While Bhagwati accepts that, there are
many concerns expressed by critics of globalization regarding labor exploitation and the
social or cultural costs of international competition for labor, his strategy in this

21
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Rawls, A Theory. Rawls specifically limits his principles of justice in A Theory of Justice to within a
particular economy. This makes sense in relation Bhagwati’s discussion of trickle down and inequality in
the Indian economy, but Rawls would not support their application to relations between states as he
states clearly in Law of Peoples.
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situation is to point out that, those expressing the concern are largely mistaken about
the costs, or misunderstand the true causes of the problems.23 His position on many of
the social and human rights costs of the externalities is that, they would be worse
without the removal of barriers to trade, and that increasing trade is actually the
solution, to many of the problems people who are against a self-regulating free market
for international trade, cite as evidence in their support.
Bhagwati takes the position that the problem of externalities in the free market
model of international trade, is generally, not a concern that affects the viability of the
model very strongly, since most of the issues are either misunderstood, misrepresented
or far outweighed by the benefits achieved by the model.
An example of this would be his dismissal of the problems for women that have
been pointed out by anti-globalization activists. Bhagwati takes on the concerns for the
rights of women workers in Export Processing Zones (EPZs).24 Bhagwati doesn’t cite
particular sources, but explains that many authors have claimed that young women are
exploited as laborers in these zones, for low wages, in often problematic working
conditions.25 He argues that the reality is that, in these situations, these women are
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An Export Processing Zone is a an area usually around a port or adjacent to a border where special
tariff/ taxation rules apply, incentives to establish businesses funded by foreign capital are provided, and
in some cases special environmental and / or labor laws have been put in place to encourage foreign
producers to locate facilities there that produce goods for export markets. For example the
“Maquiladora” Zones in Northern Mexico, where goods and materials can be imported, processed and
exported again without paying tariffs unless they are marketed in Mexico.
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Naomi Klein’s No Logo (1999) and Iris Young’s Global Challenges, 165-167.
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almost always better off than they would be without the option of working in the EPZ
industries, and in fact, are normally better off than the standard for labor in the
country.26 In the case of the very high rate of crime against women in the Mexican
Maquiladora zones near the border with the U.S. Bhagwati argues that this is really not
a factor associated with the EPZ but rather a background factor which just happens to
coincide with the area.27
Bhagwati takes the same sort of position regarding the concern that the WTO
ignores issues of environmental and animal welfare. He argues that, most of the
environmental concerns are overstated or unproven, and explains that environmental
issues are generally not a focus of concern for trade economists.
The environmentalists tend to value the environment over income, whereas
trade (and other) economists conventionally tend to value income over
environment.
…In fact whereas environmentalists often disdain markets, prescriptions
such as the regulatory imposition of “polluter pay” taxes amount to nothing
more than demands to create the missing markets.28
He suggests the reality is that, what environmentalists actually want is best
achieved, by ensuring environmental values are included in the calculation of costs of
doing business. In fact, his position is not so far from Singer’s in the end: that the issue
of externalities in international trade is one where, because of weaknesses in the
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international law, the control over the ability of producers to externalize costs in
international trade, is much weaker than within territorial states. The most effective
approach is to ensure environmental values are effectively assigned value in trade.
Bhagwati admits there are some issues with externalities in international trade, but he
feels that the value of an unrestricted free trade model for international trade is so
strong for alleviating poverty in countries such as India, that these externalities, which
he sees as exaggerated, are worth tolerating.29
In summary, Bhagwati argues that the case in favor of the free-trade model for
international trade, is both very strong and fairly clear. His position can be understood
as being that, free trade promotes economic growth much more effectively than any
other trade regime, that economic growth is the only way to effectively fight poverty,
and that any of the downsides, such as inequality, or environmental, cultural and human
rights concerns are either, not really true, or are heavily outweighed by the benefits of
economic growth.
Critiques of the Free Trade Model
The self-regulating free market model for international trade has more than two
centuries of support, starting with Adam Smith, and has been shown to be a model that
in general produces economic growth.30 However, it has also raised a variety concerns,
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even for ideal situations—and ideal free market conditions have never been achieved,
and may well be unachievable.31
In opposition to the free market model stands protectionism. “Protectionism”
actually describes several orientations to trade, ranging from isolationism to expansively
nationalistic mercantilist and strategic tariff models, and also includes several prominent
economic development strategies. The protectionist model was, in the early stages of
capitalism, the traditional model for international trade, but protectionism as economic
theory (not always as a practice) has been out of fashion for more than thirty years, and
economists who supported it have until very recently been considered cranks or
backwards socialist holdovers. Recently, however, there has been new support for some
sorts of protectionism, mostly in the form of critiques of the efficiency and real
sustainability of the free trade model.
One of the key issues with the free-market model is that market solutions tend
to create inequality. Those that advocate them have often admitted this, such as
Bhagwati who simply dismisses inequality as a problem, or Friedman, who suggests
methods for easing the situation for those in the home country who are inevitably less
successful in competition. While the economic-growth aspect is important, there are
many who regard inequality per se a serious issue both within societies and between
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states on the international stage, which indicates that it might be worth considering
other options.
Bhagwati’s dismissal of inequality as an important issue in economic justice is
problematic. While his position, can derive support from the idea that satisfying basic
needs is more important than equality, it seems clear that if it was possible to supply
basic needs without worsening the problems associated with very pronounced
inequalities, there would be a strong obligation to choose that other option as being
much more just than “trickle-down” economics.32
A justice concern when considering the free-trade model, (is actually brought up
by Bhagwati, when he argues that effective participation for the poor in democratic
systems is an important factor for alleviating poverty and ensuring their voices are
heard so their needs can be met.
But the ability of the poor to access the growth process and to share in the
prosperity depends at least as much on their ability to get their voices heard in
the political process. Without a voice, it is highly unlikely they will get
appropriate and effective legislation.33
He makes this argument for democratic participation and effective democratic
structures as a tool in fighting poverty, almost at the same time as he points out that the
democratic structure of the WTO is heavily undermined by disparities of wealth and
power.
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The United States is protected only by its size and its ability as a hegemon to
browbeat other nation-states into not passing such legislation.[such legislation
as would go against its interest] But that leaves a gaping incoherence and
cynicism in the world at the inherent asymmetry and injustice of a WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism that implicitly, even if perhaps unwittingly, favors the
powerful.34
This would seem to be a serious inconsistency in his case, for he also argues that you
can effectively fight poverty by increasing inequality.
Another concern about Bhagwati’s argument in support of the free-market
model of international trade is that, in the end, his support is based almost completely
on the idea that trade will increase GDP, and increasing GDP will alleviate poverty. It
certainly is the case that increasing GDP may alleviate poverty (especially in the very
weakest economies), but while increasing GDP may be necessary in alleviating poverty,
it is not a foregone conclusion that simply increasing GDP will mean that more wealth is
available to the most impoverished members of a society. Certainly, the most
impoverished countries need their GDP to increase by many times to lift the poorest out
of danger, if they retain their extremely unequal distributions of wealth. In fact it is
often the case that, countries can create conditions that allow some to amass huge
amounts of wealth, while the poorest seem to reap little benefit. (An example of this
would be Mexico, which is a middle income country is the home of Carlos Slim,
sometimes listed as the world’s richest man, but also a country of grinding poverty,
which for many at the bottom has actually shifted very little since the 1980s.)
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Comparative Advantage Is Likely False: Ralph Gomory
One of the strongest arguments for protectionism is put forward by economist
Ralph Gomory, research professor at Stern School of Business at New York University,
and President of the Alfred P Sloan Foundation 1989-2007, who argues effectively that,
a complete focus on free trade is not in the national interest of wealthy developed
countries. Gomory argues that the theory of comparative advantage has some serious
problems when applied to real world economies.
The first problem pointed out by Gomory is that comparative advantage will only
function to the extent that all countries involved in the trade, be it bilateral or complex
and multilateral, possess a comparative advantage, in some trade good for which there
is sufficient demand to support the goods they will import.35 This is important for the
US, as Gomory points out, where this is not currently the case, with manufactured
goods being imported from countries with cheap labor. Gomory argued, in Global Trade
and Conflicting National Interests (2000), that it seemed impossible that the workers of
the US and other developed wealthy economies, could continue to create 10 to 100
times more value per unit of labor-input, than countries such as China. And that it is
likely to be difficult in the long run, to export enough of anything, to countries with
labor costs 10 to 100 times lower, to be able to pay for imports at our current level of
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consumption. He claimed that it would likely lead to a levelling down of standard of
living, in the long term.
Ten years later Gomory is no longer suggesting this as a mere possibility. He now
arguesthat, it has happened. There is no way produce anything that has demand as an
export comparable with the level of imports, and that our imports are now basically
being paid for with IOUs in the form of Treasury Bills.36
It should be recalled that paying for imports with pieces of paper, is exactly what
Milton Friedman suggested would be a great export industry, if it were possible. Of
course Friedman claimed it wouldn’t be possible. Gomory agrees the practice is
ultimately unsustainable, but argues that, it will drain the resources of the countries
practicing it during the time it is being practiced.37 Friedman claimed that, it wouldn’t be
possible, and the reality is that he was right. Although the Treasury Bill “IOUs” are, in
one sense, just pieces of paper, the reason they are accepted in trade, when we
produce nothing now that the Chinese want to buy from us, is that they could be used
to buy assets in the US comprised of the wealth that has been accumulated over the last
two centuries. The Chinese don’t want much that we produce now, (We might earn
some exchange selling designs of some high technology items to them, but they don’t
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need to buy them since they get them when those items are produced in Chinese
factories anyway) but considerable wealth is held in the US in the form of financial
capital, resources and real estate. For the time being Treasury Bills are still attractive, as
they are supported by the accumulated wealth of the US economy. It is a lot of wealth
but it is not infinite, and a huge amount has already been traded off. When it is gone the
trade in pieces of paper for imported manufactured goods will be over.
Each year we make up for the year’s huge trade deficit, not by shipping gold, but
by shipping IOU’s: treasury bills which are essentially promises to pay later. As
Warren Buffet puts it, “we are selling the nation out from under us.” When we
come to pay this enormous accumulation later we will then be poor indeed.38
Related to the concern for the problems with the theory of comparative
advantage, but also an important issue on its own, is the problem of speculative flows of
international capital. International capital speculation may interfere with assumptions
of the theory of comparative advantage (which presumes capital and labor to be
confined within national borders) and has created massive instability in international
economics. While free flows of capital may benefit those who are in a position to
speculate, the instability can damage an economy by producing recessionary
unemployment. Even Bhagwati, who is a strong advocate of the free-trade model, is
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strongly opposed to unrestricted flows of capital or capital account convertibility
(promotion of which has been an important part of WTO and IMF policy).39
Friedman argues that without the ability for currency to flow freely between
countries the free market model is not sustainable. In Capitalism and Freedom, he does
not explicitly equate a free market for currency with a free market for capital. (He only
discusses the money necessary to pay for goods.) However in practice the two are
difficult to separate, and policy that began with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT, predecessor of the WTO) and has continued into the WTO, requires
members to make commitments to liberalizing or deregulating financial services within
their countries.
Another serious problem with the free-trade model is the assumption of
perpetual economic growth in competitive international capitalism and the reality of a
world of limited resources, which will be examined in more detail later in the chapter.
The Development of Underdevelopment: Andre Gunder Frank
Free Trade has gained such overwhelming support from economists in recent
years, that it is considered shocking when a prominent mainstream economist steps out
of the orthodox dogma and questions the assumptions of free trade. Princeton
economist Alan Blinder is quoted in the Wall Street Journal:
Like 99% of economists since the days of Adam Smith, I am a free trader down to
my toes.” [However this is shifting to some extent.] Mr. Blinder has changed his
39

Bhagwati, In Defense, 8, 203-205. See also Session 17: The future of trade in financial services:
Safeguarding stability. Report written by Melinda St. Louis, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch:
www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public...e/session17_summ_e.doc (Nov. 2011).

204

message -- helping lead a growing band of economists and policy makers who
say the downsides of trade in today’s economy are deeper than they once
realized. 40
However, in the immediate post-war period, characterized by decolonization and
the rise of independent countries in what was then called the “Third World,” alternative
development strategies were often proposed that involved a degree of protectionism.
Infant Industry Protection and Import Substitution are closely related models for
economic development that, rely on protectionist approaches to international trade. In
general, the difference can be understood as, Infant Industry Protection being a
targeted protectionism, that allows specific, selected industries to develop behind a
protective curtain of tariffs, while Import Substitution is a more generalized effort to
make imported products more expensive than domestically produced products across
an economy, so that, the domestic industries will develop to produce goods that, were
once generally imported.41
Infant Industry Protection and Import Substitution models of development have
two different branches of argument supporting them. The first branch argues that,
creating a protected environment where competition with external competitors is
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avoided, is an effective way of producing industries that will eventually be
internationally competitive and able to survive without protection, developing an
economy that will eventually no longer need protection. The idea here is that, an
economic development strategy can be (and has been) used to build poorer
underdeveloped economies into wealthy developed countries.
The second branch is more focussed on economic justice for the citizens of the
country adopting the policy. It holds that, Import Substitution can be used to foster the
growth of industries that will provide high quality employment and good quality of life
to the citizens of a country, where most citizens are currently locked into low-skilled,
low-paying agriculture and unskilled urban labor employment. Changing this situation is
difficult, not only because it is difficult for new start-ups in industry to compete
internationally, but also because international competitors have little interest in losing
the market they have in that country to domestic competition, and will arrange to slow
it as much as is in their power. The focus here is not completely separate from the first
position, but it has a much stronger focus on economic justice for citizens.
Andre Gunder Frank has taken an even stronger line regarding this situation.
“Underdevelopment,” he argues, is not a static condition from which poor countries
have not yet emerged, but is the result of what he calls the “Development of
Underdevelopment.”42 The development of underdevelopment is understood as the
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situation, which was in many ways an extension of colonialism, whereby wealthy
developed countries created an economic relationship with poor countries, through
control over terms-of-trade and control of investment in developing country economies.
Developing countries thus developed only in ways that tended to profit the wealthy
developed countries, which were able to use the underdeveloped countries as sources
of inexpensive raw materials and markets for manufactured goods.
Gunder Frank has argued that it is possible to circumvent this exploitative
relationship by cutting off the unequal trade relationship, and focussing on using the
countries own resources to satisfy domestic needs and wants that had been previously
satisfied by imports, paid for by exporting raw materials.
This argument for Import Substitution protectionism has a strong moral
character. The argument in Development of Underdevelopment is that, the
underdevelopment of many poor country economies is no accident, but is a result of
terms of trade and investment policies of developed countries.
Joseph Stiglitz, ex–White House and World Bank chief economist, and Nobel
Laureate in economics, makes the same point (the idea that underdevelopment is
planned rather than accidental) when discussing the situation of Korea in the 1960s.
International economic advisors and the IMF suggested that the best course for Korea
would be to focus on rice agriculture where they possessed a comparative or even
absolute advantage.43 The Korean government resisted this, because the rate of return
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on labor for rice is so much less than for industrial manufactured goods that even very
successful rice farming meant poverty for those working in the industry. (Luckily for
Korea, it was an important ally during the Cold War period, and was thus supported by
the United States in its quest for industrial development, which has, in fact, been
stunning.)
The argument for Import Substitution, in the case of Gunder Frank’s
“development of underdevelopment,” is a protectionist position on international trade
for developing countries, taken on the basis that wealthy developed countries are
generally using their wealth and power to create conditions, (terms of trade) that
contribute to the underdevelopment of many poor country economies. Import
Substitution is often dismissed by many development economists, (such as Bhagwati)
because it seems to ignore the efficiencies (and ability to increase everyone’s material
well being) provided by comparative advantage. However, Gunder Frank and others
who support the theory of Import Substitution, do not generally ignore Comparative
Advantage (although some do), but rather judge that the unfair unequal exchange that
results from promoting international trade under less than ideal conditions, created by
the bargaining power wealthy developed countries have over less developed countries,
negates the benefits of it.
Stiglitz, who is very concerned about global social justice, has pointed out that
for many countries, particularly in Latin America, the “post-reform” period after importsubstitution industrialization policies were discarded in favor of Washington-Consensus-
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style free markets and trade liberalization, has in many cases seen less consistent
economic growth, and what growth that has occurred has mostly accrued to the
wealthiest 10% of Latin American societies.
Indeed, at this juncture, the growth record of the so-called post-reform era looks no
better, and in some countries much worse, than in the widely criticized importsubstitution period of the 1950s and 1960s when Latin countries tried to
industrialize by discouraging imports. Indeed, reform critics point out that the burst
of growth in the early l990s was little more than a “catch-up” that did not even
make up for the lost decade of the 1980s.44
Free Trade and a Race to the Bottom: Joseph Stiglitz
Joseph Stiglitz also suggests that there is almost certainly another strong
argument for some form of protectionism in international trade, or at least the need to
take a close look at how trade is regulated. He suggests that international wage
competition, based on the fact capital and resources are generally free to move
wherever the cheapest labor can be found, while labor is generally bound by the
frontiers of territorial states, is leading to a situation where wages for labor are
becoming a lower and lower share of the global economy, with the share of the very
rich who hold capital ever increasing.45 Since wage earners must spend a much higher
percentage of their income just to live day to day than the very rich, increasing
concentration of income in the hands of those who are already wealthy, means that
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there is a strong possibility of a reduction in global aggregate effective demand.
According to Stiglitz, this can lead to stagnation in economies around the world, if there
is no strategy to address it.
In fact, Stiglitz blames the trend towards international labor competition, and
hence the reduced aggregate demand, for contributing to the type of monetary policy
that led to the 2007-8 financial crisis. Basically his claim is that the strategy was to
increase US aggregate demand, by using credit to replace the money many people no
longer had, due to the shift to international sources of labor, such as China.
The problem that Keynes recognized was that wages can be too flexible. Indeed,
when wages fall, people’s income falls and their ability to demand goods falls as
well. Lack of aggregate demand was the problem with the Great Depression, just
as lack of aggregate demand is the problem today. 46
Economists such as Stiglitz understand this to be a problem, but the dominant
paradigm in economics, beginning in the 1970s, and continuing strong today, has been
“supply–side economics,” which focuses on the supply side of the market equation, and
how to make the factors of production come together in the most efficient manner.
Supply-side economics takes the demand side of the supply-and-demand operation of
markets for granted, assuming that if the supply side is functioning as efficiently as
possible, there will be sufficient demand for products at a high enough price level to
support their production.47
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The concern for those that disagree with supply-side economics is that, if it is the
case that international competition on wages tends to bring down the proportion of the
value of the economy paid out in wages on a general global scale, we may well be
looking at a situation where decreasing effective demand on the part of consumers
globally, leads to economic stagnation, and even a global recession.
Environmental and Ecological Economics Critiques
Environmental Economics and Ecological Economics have both become
important areas of international economics and trade. The ideas of both are becoming
increasingly involved in international environmental and economic discourse,
particularly since the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on the Environment
and Development) report to the United Nations.48
The Brundtland Commission report was the first official, extensive, description of
the links between international trade and environmental problems. The concept of
sustainable development comes into common use and is defined in the report. Some of
the key concerns noted were the connections between protectionism on the part of
industrialized countries against manufactured goods coming from less developed
countries, and the need for the least developed countries to sell mineral and energy

doesn’t consider the demand side to be magic. Rather, the argument is that the cost of the factors of
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resources to generate foreign

exchange.49

This is accompanied by an increasing shift

from the use of domestic energy and non-renewable resources, to the use of imported
energy and non-renewable resources in wealthy developed countries. The problem was
that developing countries, which were relying on exports of non-renewable resources,
were often doing so, at the expense of environmental preservation, and maintaining a
supply of resources for the future. The commission generally took the position that
resource use was becoming less intensive per capita in developed countries, with
increasing technological development, and that technology increases would likely ease
some of the pressures on non-renewable resources caused by economic growth. An
important understanding developed by the report, was that environmental concerns
were not separable from concerns about trade and development, and that it is
necessary to have effective cooperation on both, to address issues of poverty, as well as
environmental degradation. Since the Brundtland Commission report, environmental
issues have been an issue that arises consistently in international trade, although
environmental concerns have often been more visible in protests against the WTO, than
in its negotiating agenda.
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Environmental Economics and the Concerns of Resource Scarcity and Environmental
Degradation
Environmental economics is considered a separate field from ecological
economics, and they approach environmental issues with very different perspectives. In
general, environmental economics is a branch of conventional neoclassical economics,
which applies the tools and paradigms of neoclassical economics to environmental
issues. There are two broad areas Environmental Economics addresses, which are
relevant for considering the environmental/ecological concerns for justice in
international trade. The areas are usually considered to be resource scarcity, questions
about the long term supply of productive resources, and the concern over
environmental degradation, pollution and destruction, or damage to desired features of
the natural environment.
Concerns about the environment and the resources necessary to maintain a
productive economy, capable of satisfying the needs and wants of human beings, are
almost as old as the field of economics itself. Thomas Malthus, a contemporary and
friend of David Ricardo, wrote An Essay on the Principle of Population50 in 1798, which
was famously concerned with the different growth rates of human population and
human capacity to produce food. He suggested limits on population growth would be
required soon, or catastrophic shortages of food would arise. He based his argument on
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the idea that, because usable agricultural land was limited (with the best land already in
use), there would be diminishing marginal returns to investment in agricultural
production. Humans would put more labor and capital into farming, but as the extent of
land was limited, this would bring less and less improvement, as the available land was
used more intensively (the idea being that beyond a certain point adding more plows
and laborers will not increase the yield much on a specific acreage of land).
In the period after the Second World War, the 1950s and early 1960s, there was
considerable interest in the academic community, in the harm the massive industrial
development occurring in wealthy industrial economies was causing in the
environment.51 Both the concerns regarding possible depletion or impending scarcity of
resources, and about pollution and environmental degradation were of interest.
In the area of depletion of resources, the findings of Harold Barnett and
Chandler Morse have become an important foundation of environmental economics.
Barnett and Morse were interested in the question of whether or not the basic idea of
Malthus’ concern for scarcity of natural resources was testable. They understood
scarcity in the sense of economic scarcity in a market. They considered, if resources
were becoming increasingly scarce, they should be able to see the evidence of
increasing scarcity, in a historical rise in prices over time,52 the idea being that, if
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resources were becoming scarce, the cost of extracting the resources and getting them
to market should be increasing over time. They examined a wide variety of resources,
including agricultural products, lumber, metals, minerals, petroleum and coal from the
1860s to the 1960s. They found the costs for bringing resources to market had
decreased rather than increased. They thus claim that the hypothesis of increasing
resource scarcity, made by Malthus, seems to fail, as what they found was increasing,
rather than diminishing, returns to resource production. It seemed as if, their research
showed resources becoming economically more plentiful. They also checked the cost of
resource production against other types of production, to control for technology
improvements, and found resource production costs were decreasing even in relation to
other types of production.
In Scarcity and Growth, Barnett and Morse suggest that calls for conservation of
natural resources were not the correct approach to ensuring the future viability of the
economy. In fact, they claimed it would have a perverse effect, as it would stifle
innovation. They argued that, natural resources were a less important component of the
assets that we should pass to future generations than the technological development,
knowledge and capital, which would lead to substitution of new resources, and would
more than make up for any depletion of specific natural resources. Their findings, and
the position they developed from them, have become the supporting basis for the
conception of unlimited economic growth.
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The concern for managing harmful pollution and environmental degradation also
has a long history in economic thought. A.C. Pigou is credited with being the first
economist to work on the problem of what we now call externalities. In The Economics
of Welfare, Pigou was concerned with what he called uncompensated services or
disservices, experienced by third parties to economic transactions. 53 These were costs
or benefits of producing a good or service that were not paid (or compensation received
for) by the supplier of a good or service in a market transaction. Pigou accounted for
them with a figure he called social net product, which was an expression of the actual
benefit of production of any good or service for society, including these uncompensated
services and disservices.54 Uncompensated disservices would lower the “social net
product”, and uncompensated services would have the opposite effect. He included the
effects of pollution, and other problems caused by production, on others in the
environment where it was produced. His solution was for the government to regulate or
tax these uncompensated disservices, so as to force the producer to pay the social net
cost or refrain from producing the uncompensated disservices. The idea eventually
became known as internalizing externalities.55
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In 1960, Ronald Coase took Pigou’s idea of the uncompensated

3rd

party

disservice, known as a negative externality, and applied his concern for achieving
maximum efficiency in use of economic resources to the problem. Coase felt that much
government regulation and many of the taxes directed at motivating producers to
internalize negative externalities into their production costs, or restricting their
productive activity to avoid them, are extremely inefficient, in the sense that they are
almost never exactly geared to internalizing the accurate cost of the externality into
production. Regulation may prohibit an activity altogether, when in fact, there is
sufficient demand for the products, that the cost of the negative externality could be
included in the production costs, (the damage paid for) and the process would still be
profitable. A tax would often be inaccurate in relation to the actual cost of the
externality, which might vary from case to case. And if the cost of the tax was too high,
it could stop productive activity from occurring in cases where the actual cost of
internalizing was less than the tax (but the tax was enough to make it unprofitable). On
the other hand if the tax was too low, uncompensated harm would still be generated
from the activity (this is the situation when companies consider the fines they get for
breaking regulations to be a cost of doing business). In each of these situations there is
inefficiency occurring, because either usable resources are not being used in production,
or there are harms occurring that are not being compensated for. Coase took the
position that the best way to address this efficiently was to give someone the property
rights to whatever was being harmed. In Coase’s first example, it is the harm caused
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when the cows belonging to a rancher whose property is adjacent to a farmer, wander
onto the farmer’s property and destroy the crops. Coase assumes wandering cows are
unavoidable without a fence. The crops are obviously the property of the farmer, and he
has a legal right to be compensated for the crops the cows destroy. If the rancher had
no obligation to compensate the farmer, he would have no motivation to control the
cows in any way. Since the crops destroyed belong to the farmer, and the rancher must
compensate for their destruction, he must take the cost of doing so into consideration.
If the cost of paying the damages is less than the cost of fencing the cows in, and less
than his profit from raising the cows, he will compensate the farmer, and not build
fencing. If the cost of fencing is less than compensating the farmer, and less than his
profit from raising the cows, he will build a fence to keep the cows in. If the profit he will
receive from raising the animals is less than the cost of fencing or compensating the
farmer, he will decide not to raise cows.56
This is a simplification, but illustrates Coase’s position on the efficiency of
property rights over regulation. If there is simply a blanket regulation that cows be
fenced to avoid damage to crops, it would in many cases be less efficient than the
situation where the rancher must pay the costs incurred by the damage to the holder of
the property rights. Regulation calling for fencing, would create a situation where the
raising of cows was less efficient, because in many cases, fencing would have to be paid
for even when it might be less expensive just to compensate the farmer, or the rancher
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would abandon ranching altogether, if fencing was more expensive than the profit of
raising the cows. Also in a situation where there was no property rights the rancher
might elect just to pay the fine for not fencing and allowing the damage to occur, if the
fine was less than the cost of fencing (and less than the expected profit).
Coase made the argument that assigning property rights was much more
efficient than regulating or taxing, as it allowed the externality to be internalized as a
market transaction, which would set the price of the use of the right, at the level of its
utility to each of the parties. Interestingly, Coase takes the position that, as far as
efficiency is concerned, it really doesn’t matter who owns the property right, whether
the person who would experience the cost owns it, and the producer must compensate
(or avoid the damage) the owner, or whether the producer owns the right, and the
person who experiences the harm decides to pay the holder of the right not to use it. He
explains it doesn’t matter for efficiency, if the farmer owns the property the crops grow
on and the rancher must compensate or fence, or whether the rancher owns the right
to have the cows wander, and the farmer must offer him enough compensation that he
doesn’t use the right (fences or doesn’t raise cows). That it doesn’t matter for efficiency
(a deal will be made according to the value of the right to both parties) is one thing, but
it definitely ends up having a serious impact on distribution.
Coase`s position was very convincing for many neo-classical economists, and has
become one of the foundations for environmental economics. It had a surge of
popularity from the late 1990s until about 2010, in the form of a drive towards carbon
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emissions trading. The Tragedy of the Commons by ecologist Garret Hardin in 1968, did
quite a lot to focus Coase`s conception with respect to environmental issues. The
Problem of Social Cost considers environmental issues only as they apply to specific
harms to individuals, whereas Hardin`s The Tragedy of the Commons deals directly with
the issue of overexploitation of natural resources.57 The actual tragedy of commons is
Hardin`s explanation of the individual incentives to overexploit open access common
resources, in a way that ends up harming the interests of all, in the long term. Hardin
sees two ways to stop the incentive to overexploit: breaking the commons up with
individual property rights or regulation by a central authority (similar to Coase vs.
Pigou). In general those that favor market approaches have seized on the economic
efficiency of the private property approach as being preferable because of its perceived
efficiency. This is important for international trade, because the conception that free
markets and growth are the best way to address poverty often carries with it the
concern that, attempting central regulation of externalities breeds inefficiency.
In general, environmental economics, which applies the paradigms of orthodox
neoclassical economics to environmental issues, has been the main, but not only,
approach taken by international economic institutions to environmental issues and their
relation to trade and development. This has meant that the assumption of unlimited
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economic growth (and unlimited resources) has often been applied to international
trade. The application of the assumption of unlimited growth (and unlimited resources)
to international trade, can lead to a lack of concern regarding whether, economic
growth is based on the trade in non-renewable energy resources that involves serious
externalities in the production process, and often promotes concentration of wealth in a
few economically powerful and politically connected hands,58 or whether this is trade
that uses resources efficiently, and creates wealth that is shared widely in the society.
Herman Daly and the Ecological Economic Critique of Free Trade Model
Herman Daly is an economist at the School of Public Policy of the University of
Maryland. He was senior environmental economist at the World Bank from 1988 to
1994. It seems fair to say he was a voice of dissent during his time at the World Bank.
Daly has been influential in making ecological economics into a recognized field of
economics, he has made some serious critiques of orthodox economic thinking about
problems of poverty and the environment, and he has a well thought out position on
international trade and global economic integration. To simplify Daly’s position, his
understanding of economics is different from orthodox neo-classical conceptions of
economics, because Daly conceives the economy as existing inside the ecosystem that
supports life on the planet, and considers the economy to be bounded, or limited by the
ability of the earth’s ecosystem to provide the resources we need to survive and thrive.
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Daly believes there is a human carrying capacity for the planet, and that we must live
within that, or like any other species, run out of resources.
Daly is very concerned about the concepts of economic growth and
development. He argues that contemporary mainstream economists, neo-classical
economists, in general use the terms growth and development interchangeably in
economics, while they should in fact be separate concepts. Daly takes the position that
we should understand economic growth as an increase in the overall size of the
economy in relation to the ecosystem that contains it, or growth as increasing
throughput of resources to produce more goods and services, while on the other hand,
we should understand development, as improvements in process in the economy, that
allow us to use resources more efficiently, producing more goods and services, without
increasing the input of resources and output of waste. He argues that the idea of
sustainable development has been co-opted into the phrase sustainable growth. Daly
critiques this because, it ignores the reality that economic growth is constrained by the
limits of the environment. Growth achieved through increasing the throughput of
resources is growth at the expense of the future. Daly argues that trickle-down theories
of fighting poverty, which suggest that wealthy developed countries must focus on
growth to support the growth of impoverished developing countries with markets,
capital and technology, are problematic, because they assume unlimited growth. He
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argues that the issue is, we do not actually know how big the subset of the economy can
get inside the larger ecosystem before it cannot be sustained.59
Daly considers that the assumption of unlimited growth, based on the
assumption of infinite resources, illustrates some of the problems with the abstraction
from the actual physical / historical economic world, and reliance on mathematical
modelling that are features of neoclassical economics. He explains that models of the
circular flow of the factors / resources of production in the economy contribute to this,
showing raw materials, capital and labor flowing to producers, being transformed into
products, and flowing back to the factor providers, in a continuing cycle, with only vague
arrows leading in and out, connected to nothing. Daly explains that the flow of
resources and counter flow of money, abstract from the fact that neither the resources
input into the system, nor the products, actually move in a circular flow. Resources are
input into the system, and are output as waste at various points. In no case, do high
entropy wastes from the process ever actually substitute for new inputs of low entropy
resources or energy in the cycle.60
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Low entropy resources are resources, energy or raw materials which are structured in their usable
state, examples include: oil, coal, or wood, or metals or minerals. They become high entropy (and are
usually waste) through use in a production process. Complex hydrocarbon molecules are broken down
into a variety of less complex compounds (such as CO2 and H2O) which are no longer a form usable for
energy. Wood might not break down chemically, but its organized structure of linked cells is disassembled
(cut), making it less usable as a structural material in building (without new inputs). Low entropy equals
high structural organization. High entropy equals lower structural organization, or more disorganization of
the structure.
In the case of recycling, high entropy wastes are input into the cycle again but are accompanied
by low entropy energy. Most recycling is not very efficient ecologically (or economically much of the

223

There is much confusion about what, precisely, is supposed to grow as GNP
grows. Many people speak of the “dematerialization of the economy” and the
possibility that GNP can grow forever without encountering physical limits,
because it is measured in value units rather than in physical units. [T]he notion
that we can save the “growth forever” paradigm by dematerializing the
economy, or “decoupling” it from resources, or substituting information for
resources, is fantasy. We can surely eat lower on the food chain, but we cannot
eat recipes!61
Daly notes that, the infinite resources assumption is often maintained in
orthodox economics,62 even though there is a growing understanding of the importance
of resource use and environmental concerns among economists, because most poverty
reduction and development schemes are tied to continuing unrestricted economic
growth. He explains that, the usual argument in support of this assumption is the
presentation of possibilities of technology, and resource substitutions, as a dynamic
force, which constantly counters depletion and degradation. One flaw in this position is
that, another low entropy resource is always substituted for a depleted low entropy
resource, Daly explains that we never, under any circumstance, substitute high entropy

time,) some is fairly efficient, requiring reasonably low energy inputs (aluminum cans) and technological
development may make more types of recycling ecologically feasible.
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The infinite resource assumption is a position that works with the assumption that there are no
effective limits to economic growth, that economies can keep growing infinitely. The infinite resources
assumption is the idea that resource availability will not be a limiting factor in economic growth because
technology will always allow us to find substitutes when scarcity forces the price up enough to make it
profitable to work on it. This is obviously to some extent true, this does happen, but also very obviously
there are limits.
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wastes for low entropy resources in net terms, and the pool of low entropy resources is
finite and diminishing.63
He explains that it is often claimed reproducible capital is a near-perfect
substitute for resources. Daly argues that this makes no sense, for it assumes capital can
be produced independently of resources, and is in opposition to the concept of the
coordination of factors in production. Capital is a necessary component of transforming
resources into products; it can’t substitute for fewer resources, except in a limited
margin. Daly argues that the abstraction from actual economic activity in models, leads
to the error of considering the problem of resources in economics to be a problem of
human social ingenuity, which is basically limitless, rather than a problem of the laws of
nature. He understands the problem of resource scarcity or depletion, as belonging
exclusively to neither category, and that it requires consideration from both
perspectives.
Daly’s critique of the free trade model of international trade is based on his
concerns for ecological sustainability, and bringing economic practices in line with the
carrying capacity of the environment, but he is also very concerned about other issues
of justice such as inequality and poverty. Daly’s position is that free trade, and the
economic growth it promises will not end poverty in the short term, and in the long
term will make us all worse off. He does believe free trade may bring economic growth,
but he feels that it will not benefit all, and the distribution will, for the most part, not
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take poverty reduction into account. He also believes that the focus on growth alone,
rather than satisfying as many human needs as possible, will mean the resources used
lavishly now, will not be available to satisfy human needs in the future, increasing
poverty in the long term.
Daly makes note that free trade is the default position for almost all orthodox
economists. He explains it is, for the most part, the unquestioned belief of economists
that free trade is desirable and brings benefit to all. He notes that it was also his belief,
and he required considerable accumulated evidence before abandoning it. He explains
that, the reason that most economists hold this belief is their faith in the theory of
comparative advantage.
Daly’s Critique of Comparative Advantage
In order to consider the possible benefits and costs of free trade, Daly suggests it
is important to understand the theoretical assumptions it is based on. He explains that,
absolute advantage is fairly simple and doesn’t take much explaining to make sense. He
credits Adam Smith for first laying it out as a clear argument against mercantilism.
Absolute advantage can be exemplified as a situation, where there are two countries,
both producing cheese and oranges. Country 1 is much more efficient at producing
oranges than country 2, and country 2 is much more efficient at producing cheese than
country 1. They each have an absolute advantage in one of the products. And they could
benefit by specializing in the product they are the best at producing, and trading for the
product the other country produces more efficiently. Daly says no one needs an
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economist to point this out, but he explains, David Ricardo’s theory of comparative
advantage changes this because it means that you don’t have to be the most efficient
producer of anything, to benefit from trade.
Daly breaks down how Comparative Advantage works, and uses an example of
coal and wheat between two countries, country A and country B. Ricardo uses units of
labor, but Daly uses a total inputs cost, which he calls unit cost.64 This makes sense, as
the model has been shown to function similarly (assuming similar assumptions) even if
other factors are included.65 The unit cost in Daly’s example is expressed as “a” and “b”
for each of the countries.
Country A: requires 1a to produce a unit of coal (C), and 1a to produce a
unit of wheat (W); it has a total of 2a (units of resources), and uses them to
produce 1C and 1W
Country B: requires 1b to produce a unit of coal (C), and 4b to produce a
unit of wheat (W); it has a total of 5b (units of resources), and uses them to
produce 1C and 1W
The total aggregate production of both countries is 2C and 2W.66
Daly explains that while country B produces nothing more efficiently than
country A, it does produce coal 400% more efficiently than wheat. According to
comparative advantage, country B could specialize in coal and import wheat. Country A
produces coal and wheat equally efficiently, and produces both as efficiently as Country
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B produces coal. According to comparative advantage they can each specialize and
enjoy more total goods with the same resources.
If Country B specializes in coal, it can use its total of 5b (5 resource units) to
produce 5C and no W. Country A can specialize in wheat and use its total of 2a (2
resource units) to produce 2W and no C.
The total world production will have increased from 2C and 2W to 5C and 2W.
Countries A and B can then work out between them what the ratio of exchange
between C and W will be based on demand. Daly says that Ricardo explains that in the
situation, although it is not possible with this information to know the exact distribution,
it is certain that both countries will be better off, or they would not engage in trade.
Daly notes that this is an impressive result, more than doubling coal production,
with no sacrifice in wheat production. He suggests that it is necessary to examine the
assumptions to bring to light the complications the theory doesn’t consider. Some of the
costs and problems are veiled by the assumptions.
He argues that claiming the coal is produced with no additional resources input
is misleading. The increased production of coal means that the reserves of coal are
depleted 500% faster in country B, and 250% faster worldwide, and that an additional
250% more pollution is created, as the extra coal is burned. Daly claims that the
problem is that conventional or neo-classical economists normally do not count costs
outside of capital and labor. He argues that a reasonable form of accounting would
include some factor based on the depletion of non-renewable resources.
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He also explains that, transport costs are missing from the calculation; Wheat
must be shipped from A to B, and Coal from B to A. Daly points out if the cost of
transport is near 3C, then even without any other concerns, the world gains nothing. He
argues that in general energy is subsidized, in many countries it is subsidized directly, in
most cases it is also subsidized because many of the negative external costs of energy
are not internalized into the cost of producing it. Daly claims that international trade,
which relies heavily on energy intensive transportation, is indirectly subsidized by
energy prices that do not reflect the full price of actually producing them.67
Daly points out a third assumption to be considered. This third assumption is
that, the cost of specialization is negligible, but it turns out there are costs that must be
considered. Each of the countries loses an entire economic sector; in one all farmers
must give up their occupations and become coal miners, and in the other all miners are
forced into farming. In each country, the loss is the loss of a lifestyle and choice of
occupation. Daly claims that, while it is fairly widely understood in societies, that people
derive a considerable portion of the satisfaction in their lives from the way they earn
their living, economists identify welfare with the range of consumer choices, and say
little about it in respect to choice of occupation.68
The second part of the cost of specialization is very powerful. After specialization
countries lose the freedom to choose whether or not they will engage in trade. Daly
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points out that one of Ricardo’s fundamental assumptions, that trade will always be
beneficial, assumes that trade is voluntary, and we can reject an exchange if it is not to
our benefit.
The voluntariness of “free trade” is compromised by the interdependence
resulting from specialization. Interdependent countries are no longer free not to
trade, and it is precisely the freedom not to trade that was the original
guarantee of mutual benefits of trade in the first place.69
Daly explains that once committed to specialization, the freedom in free trade
becomes much more problematic, particularly for countries with a large portion of their
economies specialized in nonessential commodities. In this situation countries are
particularly vulnerable to market conditions for those products. They may be forced into
very bad terms of trade to supply basic needs, if the market conditions are such that
quantity supplied exceeds quantity demanded.70
Capital Mobility Negates Comparative Advantage
Ricardo makes it clear that comparative advantage assumes immobility of
capital. Daly argues that mobility of capital in international trade shifts the situation of
comparative advantage to one of absolute advantage. Capital will be moved by its
owners to wherever there is an opportunity for it to produce more with less input, and,
instead of moving between industries within countries, owners of capital move it to
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more productive industries in other countries. This means there will be less total
production of all types, in countries that do not have an absolute advantage.
Comparative advantage is a clever second-best adaptation to the constraint of
international capital immobility. But without that constraint, it has no reason to
be, and absolute advantage is all that counts.71
Daly argues that, the reality of the situation in free trade is that capital today is
vastly more mobile than goods.72 He claims comparative advantage is completely
irrelevant in our contemporary international trade regime.73
Daly explains that it is possible in situations of comparative advantage for
everyone in a country to benefit from specialization in particular products, but it is not
automatic. It requires that the winners compensate the losers. In Daly’s example, it
means that in Country B, as resources shift from farming to mining, in order for
everyone to benefit, it is necessary that, the benefits from the winning mining sector
compensate the losses in the losing farming sector, otherwise, although there is still
aggregate benefit, those that lose their livelihood and are scrambling to engage
successfully in the new industries will be harmed, even though the total benefit for the
society is increased. Within countries there are sometimes institutions and policy
mechanisms that compensate losers (although Daly says it is not common for there to
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be effective compensation), but internationally there are no structures which
compensate losers when capital is moved from one production process to another. 74
Interestingly, Daly points out that the move ends up being from a situation
where all countries will benefit, (none will be made worse off) to a situation where
there will be winners and losers, but there is still an aggregate benefit. Winners could
compensate losers, if they chose to, and still be better off.75
The nice thing about the comparative advantage argument is that both countries
benefit from free trade, and gains are mutual—at least in theory, if not always in
fact. The problem with absolute advantage is that both countries do not
necessarily gain. If one country has an absolute disadvantage in both
commodities, it will lose jobs and income as capital moves abroad. But under
absolute advantage, world production will still increase. In theory, it would
increase by more than under comparative advantage.76
Daly explains that absolute advantage is less politically convenient to promote,
because it doesn’t have any guarantee of mutual benefit. He comments, “All countries
still could be better off if there were a regulatory institution whereby winners could
compensate losers. But then it would no longer be ‘free’ trade.”77 Daly does not feel
that, the comparative advantage justification for free trade always being the best
choice, holds in our current world economic order. He thinks that, absolute advantage
can definitely produce growth, but it comes at a cost, with winners benefitting while
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losers see little compensation. He argues outright that, Adam Smith and David Ricardo
looking at the actual conditions in today’s world, would not support a policy of free
trade.
In the presence of capital mobility, money will logically flow to wherever there is
an absolute advantage of production and away from countries where this is
none. The world’s poorest countries may be poor precisely because they are
inefficient at producing nearly everything. If this is true, then resources are likely
to flow away from the poor countries, and the countries most likely to suffer
from globalization are in fact the very poorest.78
Daly argues that, there is some empirical support for this. He explains that while
in the last 40 years the poorest quintile of the world’s population has seen increases in
income, when measuring from 1995 (founding of the WTO) to 2003, eight of the twenty
poorest countries, for which data is available, actually experienced a loss in real per
capita income.79 Daly notes for contrast that the wealthiest 20 countries averaged an
increase of 17.6%
A problem with this, explains Daly, is that the gains of the wealthy developed
countries are fueled by non-renewable resource consumption (including unsustainable
depletion of renewable resources). Once consumed, these resources will not be
available in the future to improve the well-being of the poorest. He also comments that
the resource use generates waste that harms ecosystem services that could otherwise
benefit the poorest countries.80
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Most of these poorest countries were involved in international trade in the one
area where they might have an absolute advantage: the extraction and export of
natural capital. The revenue they received from both export and domestic sales
of these resources counted as part of their income. Without this revenue,
income as measured by GDP would have fallen even more. Yet as you will recall,
we earlier defined income as the amount you can consume in one period
without affecting your ability to consume in subsequent periods. Thus, revenue
from non-renewable natural resource extraction cannot be counted entirely as
income, and the situation of these poorest countries is even worse than it
appears.81
Daly considers that countries competing on the basis of low cost labor will have a
very difficult time under free trade conditions, breaking out of poverty, because
competition under conditions of absolute advantage will prevent increasing the rock
bottom wages, and maintain a pressure to externalize social and environmental costs.
He takes the position that, most countries that have successfully fought poverty with a
focus on trade, such as Korea, Taiwan and China, have not actually done this under
conditions of free trade.
Trade in Financial Capital
Daly takes the position that, the free trade in financial capital, which is an
important part of our current international trade regime, is destructive to the
environment, exacerbates poverty, and worsens inequality by increasing the
concentration of wealth already held by the wealthiest elites. He does not support free
trade in international capital, even aside from the negation of comparative advantage
(which he thinks would cause many problems even if it held).
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He argues that, historically financial assets have grown faster than the economy
as a whole over the long run, as they are not constrained by any of the physical limits of
the real economy.82 Many financial investment firms earn most of their profits using
computers to detect small discrepancies in international exchange rates, buying and
selling very large amounts of currency very rapidly, which produces huge profits, but
does absolutely nothing to increase real wealth. It is an exercise in using financial capital
power to redistribute real wealth in the favor of those who are already wealthy. These
situations give huge information advantages to the extremely wealthy; leaving the
average investor at a major disadvantage, and leaving the majority out of a huge
positive sum game. Daly claims that, these very large funds capture the gains from very
risky gambles, and society pays the costs.83
Daly also holds a position in many ways similar to Pogge’s International
Borrowing Privilege. He focuses on the problem of free trade in financial capital, as a
root of the problem of corrupt, incompetent, or simply kleptocratic governments in
poor developing countries, taking on debts that their population will be forced to repay.
The consequence of free international finance (a necessary complement to free
trade) has been the running up of unrepayable debts. Large surplus
accumulations of money resulting from trade imbalances sought ways to grow
exponentially and to recycle back to the deficit country to finance further trade
deficits. Banks pumped money into Third World countries at a rate much greater
than the ability of those governments to build wisely or to administer honestly.
Government officials and associated elites wasted or stole large amounts of the
borrowed funds, which consequently generated no increase in wealth. Yet these
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loans must be paid back at interest not by those few who benefited, but by the
general public, who received none of the benefits. The benefits were privatized,
and the costs socialized.84
Daly sees the international debt problem for poor countries to be consistent
with the problem of focus on growth as a solution to poverty. The practice of giving new
loans to poor developing countries to pay the interest on loans that they already cannot
repay causes a massive increase in debt, with the idea that it will stimulate economic
growth, in the hope growth will increase faster than debt. Daly considers that this is
often near impossible, as debt has no physical limits to growth, but the actual physical
production of goods and services, to pay the debt, is limited by its physical dimension.85
He argues that, even when financial assets do contribute to real growth of market goods
and services, even in wealthy developed countries, the marginal costs of the growth
often outweigh the benefits.86
Daly believes free international trade in financial capital is a source of many
more problems than it solves. He is in favor of limiting the trade in financial capital,87
and instead suggests a trade account clearing house of the type proposed by Keynes at
Bretton Woods for the IMF.88 This would allow trade to occur without the need for
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floating exchange rates which encourage speculation. Daly is also in favor of very high
reserves for banks, and tight regulation of financial instruments, and the trade in them.
Daly has critiqued the free trade model for international trade, from the
perspective of both, concern for sustainability of the economy within the carrying
capacity of ecological systems, and also out of concern that it causes massive inequality,
and is ineffective in addressing concerns about poverty. He feels that the conception
that free trade creates growth, and that economic growth is the solution to poverty, is
mistaken. While he agrees that free trade should create growth, the costs of growth
have been, and are likely to continue to be, very high considering the resources used
and environmental degradation caused, when compared with its poverty reducing
effects for the worst off. Daly also argues that resources used inefficiently now, in a
growth at any cost style approach to poverty reduction, will make the situation worse
for the worst off in the future.

CHAPTER FOUR
ALTERNATIVES
Strategic Protective Tariffs and National Interest: Fletcher
Ian Fletcher advocates a protectionist trade model based on strategic tariffs to
protect the development of desired industries. This model is a contemporary
protectionist model, addressing the negative issues stemming from the push to free
trade, with a strategy for implementation. In his book, Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What
Should Replace It and Why, Fletcher spends considerable time explaining why his
strategic tariff model is the best alternative to free trade. In doing so, he looks at the
weaknesses of free trade models and the way the assumptions that support them, are
at best problematic, and in some cases just not true.1 He attempts to refute key claims
of the free trade model and also points out weakness he feels are often ignored. He is
concerned, in the same way Gomory is, about the lack of sustainability in a situation
where we are not exporting enough high-end products to cover what we spend to
import goods that, under free trade, can more cheaply be produced elsewhere.
Fletcher explains the problem of having a long term trade deficit. Trading is an
exchange, and Fletcher notes, we must pay for the goods we receive from other
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countries. There are three ways we can pay for goods we receive: with goods we
produce today (his example: jet planes), goods we produced yesterday (his example:
office buildings), or goods we will produce tomorrow (debt). Fletcher explains that since
we are already in a position, where we are unable to pay for the goods we consume
with present or past goods, there are going to be problems paying the debt incurred by
our trade deficit.2
Fletcher also considers it problematic that the free-trade model tends to put
strong downward pressure on the wages of laborers, while maximizing the returns to
capital. He sees this to be bad for society in the long term, and not a just path for the US
economy. Contrary to views such as Bhagwati’s, which consider inequality a reasonable
price to pay for economic growth, Fletcher is concerned about inequality.
Even if it expands our economy overall, it could still increase poverty. In a word:
Brazil, where an advanced First World economy exists side-by-side with Third
World squalor, the rich live behind barbed wire, and shopkeepers hire off-duty
policemen to kill street children.3
Fletcher also points out that there is also a problem with assuming any
comparative advantage is worth exploiting. He argues that there are some industries
that are good to focus on, while others are bad for the economic and social
development of a country. He explains that good industries have continuing returns to
investment, and are susceptible to continuing improvements, both to product and
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process. Product improvement is particularly important, as it breaks away from the
pressure to compete strictly on price.4 Good industries also tend to have what are
known as “ladder” externalities, which are basically positive externalities of a
production process that stimulate other industries, or create virtuous circles of
industrial development and innovation (Fletcher uses RAM chips in the semiconductor
industry as his example5).
Examples of bad industries include resource industries and agriculture, because
there is little possibility of product innovation, and the concern that process innovation
usually develops from outside industries, rather than from the industry itself. He also
notes that resource industries tend to foster a parasitic elite that contribute little of
value to society at large.
At this point Fletcher is ready to describe his alternative model. A first concern is
that the model not be too complicated. Complicated strategies for organizing a
protective system of tariffs would be difficult to implement and, more importantly,
would be beyond reasonable democratic accountability.6 What we need, he says, is
“some simple rule for imposing a tariff which will produce the complex policy we need.
All the complexity will be on the ‘economy’ side not the ‘policy’ side.”7
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Fletcher advocates a “natural strategic tariff”—a 30% flat-rate import

tax.8

This

proposal might seem simplistic, because it is a blanket policy that would not necessarily
target important industries, but Fletcher claims that it would actually do the work of
steering the US economy towards the industries that will provide the most long-term
benefit. He argues that a flat 30% tariff would do little to protect industries competing
on the basis of cheap labor, as it would not begin to compensate domestic workers. It
would also not be enough of a barrier to protect industries that have exhausted their
potential for improvement through innovation. However Fletcher claims, for industries
where there is still a strong potential to build an advantage that will allow economies to
scale, 30% would confer a strong competitive advantage in the part of the development
curve where costs to produce each unit are still very high.9
Fletcher considers this the ideal model for the US, since it would favor industries
where highly trained workers produce high value per unit of labor, and tend not to
compete on labor costs. A model focusing on development of this sort of industry would
tend to produce goods with high demand in other markets, since they would generally
be the main players in these industries. (His examples include jet airplanes from Boeing
and Airbus and watches from Switzerland.) Such industries would also tend to support a
larger proportion of the profits from industry returning to labor, which increases
aggregate effective demand.
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Interestingly, Fletcher thinks this model would only work well for the US,
because it has the size (GDP) and industrial productivity to support a large number of
retainable industries (what he refers to as “good” industries). For other countries,
Fletcher considers a targeted tariff rather like Infant Industry Protection, where selected
good industries are focussed on, and much of his concern is with the need for these
countries to have the control over trade and flows of financial capital to allow this.10 His
concern with this approach, however, is that, unlike the Natural Strategic Tariff,
targeted strategy requires an effective bureaucracy to be successful at picking winners,
whereas the flat import tariff takes advantage of the fact that some will spot market
opportunities that bureaucracies would miss.
Fletcher suggests that the US will benefit if other countries also effectively
develop retainable good industries, because then there will be other countries with
effective demand for the products of US industries. Moreover, as far as industries not
considered “good” industries, the US will actually benefit from a laissez-faire race to the
bottom on the part of countries engaged in them, since the cost of these imports will be
lower, and the US would not be interested in competing in those industries anyway.
Fletcher`s protectionist model swims against the current of the last thirty years
of economic orthodoxy in thinking about international trade, and is one of very few
arguments by economists that openly call their model protectionist. However Fletcher`s
argument is well-supported in many ways, with reasoned economic analysis of Gomory
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regarding flaws in the theory of comparative advantage, which, as we have noted, has
been used indiscriminately as a trump argument for free trade. Fletcher offers
considerable empirical evidence regarding the importance of government involvement
in industrial development, both in the sense of creating and supporting new industries,
and also in ensuring they have a protected environment in which to develop.
Chang`s breakdown of the actual history of Industrial development, supports
Fletcher`s argument that protection and sound industrial development policy are
required to maintain and build the types of industries he categorizes as “good,” or
“retainable,” and that free market models for trade are not the models that brought the
US and other wealthy developed countries to their current positions.
Fletcher is supported in some ways by Stiglitz’s analysis, particularly in the
concern that the current trade regime has allowed developed economies to be
weakened by the shifting of a considerable proportion of the returns from the
production process from labor to capital.
Although Fletcher`s argument, in many ways, seems very strong, there are also
concerns with the position he takes. Fletcher`s protectionist model of a natural strategic
tariff largely ignores any international concerns for justice. It is a nationalist argument
which pays little attention to international obligations. Fletcher`s model is meant to
reduce a trend towards greater inequality in US society, a worthwhile goal, but it
ignores the concern for inequality in international relations, which many commentators
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have noted, is highly influential in determining the terms of trade relations (these would
include Pogge, Bhagwati, and Chang explicitly).
Fletcher’s strategic protectionism is explicitly oriented towards improving the US
economy and is not focussed on global poverty in any way. He mentions that it is
important for some trading partners to be successful enough to provide a market for US
industries, but he also suggests that a laissez-faire race to the bottom for some goods
would in fact not be problematic for the US Essentially Fletcher takes a nationalist, IR
realist position, which ignores the concerns of other countries, except when they might
be beneficial to the US These concerns do not necessarily invalidate his protectionist
model completely, but do indicate that it would need to be reviewed from a global
perspective, in order for it to be useful in addressing the concerns for global poverty and
inequality.
Strategic protectionist models for international trade are well supported by
historical evidence that they have served as an effective tool for economic development
in many cases. The proponents of strategic protectionist models make it clear that free
trade models do not generally lead to development of lesser developed countries, and
very likely create long run sustainability and inequality problems, even for wealthy
countries. The greatest apparent weakness of the strategic protectionist model,
according to the criteria being used to evaluate international trade in this project, is that
they are focussed on effective trade strategies for individual countries. This is
problematic when considering international trade from the perspective of global justice.
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While Fletcher’s perspective may support abandoning the goal of having the IMF and
World Bank enforce trade liberalization, as conditions required to achieve development
and economic stabilization assistance, and might allow developing countries to choose
their own trade strategy, which would be of benefit to them, it does little to address the
obligation of citizens of wealthy developed countries to actively work towards reducing
extreme global poverty.
The strategic protectionist model is argued by such proponents as Fletcher, to be
a useful tool in reducing inequalities among the citizens of states that are using it. This
is an important consideration from the perspective of justice, but as its orientation is
nationalist, concern for reducing inequalities among states at the international level is
not addressed at all. Fletcher suggests that it would be advantageous to have some
economically successful trading partners, but that extreme competition among the
states competing based on labor price in products from “bad” industries is in the
interest of the countries that are well positioned in “good” industries. Fletcher definitely
sees international trade from the point of view of international relations realism, where
if the US doesn’t use its economic power to shape its position in the world in its own
benefit, others will shape it in theirs.
Another concern of the nationalist perspective of the strategic protectionist
model is that, there is no mechanism specified that would work to limit the ability of
producers to benefit from using production processes that generated negative
externalities that are mostly felt in other countries.
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Strategic protectionist models have considerable potential to produce economic
development that could lessen domestic poverty and reduce inequalities, but they will
need to be combined with a global justice perspective in order to eliminate some of the
problems that arise from their generally nationalist orientation.
Stiglitz and Charlton: Fair Trade for All
Joseph Stiglitz has made forceful claims about problems in the current
international trade regime, and with the current focus of international bodies tasked
with facilitating international trade (WTO) and supporting international economic
stability and development (The IMF particularly).
Stiglitz is critical of unrestricted free market approaches to free trade,
particularly in the case of impoverished developing countries. In his recent book, coauthored with Andrew Charlton, a Research Officer at the London School of Economics,
he points out, “To date not one successful developing country has pursued a purely free
market approach to development.”11
A first major concern for Stiglitz and Charlton, in the case of developing
countries, is that the assessments of the unrestricted free trade model on welfare in
developing countries assume a model where there is full employment. They argue (as
did Keynes eighty years earlier) that this assumption is problematic, and clearly not
reflective of the economy of most poor developing countries. They argue that the
theory of comparative advantage, which works on the assumption that resources which

11

Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 17.

246

are committed to less efficient types of production will quickly shift to new areas where
they will be used in more efficient types of production when they face more efficient
international competition, rarely holds in developing countries. This is because most
developing countries have vast reserves of resources, particularly labor, so there is no
need to free up labor for use in new more efficient industries. It is already available,
awaiting any type of opportunity to be put to use. When a developing-country’s industry
is outcompeted by a more efficient international competitor, often the workers move
from low productive inefficient employment to zero productive employment rather than
moving from low production inefficient employment to employment in a more
productive enterprises.12
However Stiglitz and Charlton definitely view increasing trade as an important
part of long run plans for economic development and decreasing poverty. They view
trade liberalization as an important tool for economic development, but see it as
something that needs to be managed and achieved cooperatively, in conjunction with
appropriate development strategy for each countries situation.
The alternative to the current international trade regime suggested by Stiglitz
and Charlton is one that would generally be based on the current WTO structure, but
refocused to create a true “development round” of negotiations, which would be
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conducted in such a way as to actually promote poverty reduction and economic growth
in developing countries.13
Stiglitz and Charlton argue that within the WTO, bargaining has been conducted
almost exclusively from the position of self-interest, whereas to be successful, a
development round would require a set of cooperative principles. They suggest that
negotiations should be based on several largely self-evident principles:
1. Any agreement should be assessed in terms of its impact on development; items
with negative impact on development should not be on the agenda.
2. Any agreement should be fair.
3. Any agreement should be arrived at fairly.
4. The agenda should be limited to trade-related and development friendly
issues.14
Stiglitz and Charlton acknowledge any general definition of “fairness” is likely to
be disputed. They suggest several more concrete principles:
Fairness 1: GDP growth—Any agreement that differentially hurts developing
countries more or benefits developed countries more should be viewed
presumptively as unfair.
Fairness 2: Trade disputes—Since, given the costs to bringing a claim against
another country are high, developed countries should, at minimum, provide
financial assistance to less developed countries involved in such legal disputes so
as to level the playing field.
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Fairness 3: Initial conditions—Even though developing countries in general have
higher tariffs than developed countries, reducing them should be gradual, so as
not to be disruptive. Moreover, developed countries should not, as they often
do now, impose higher tariffs on goods imported from developing countries that
products imported from other developed country.
Fairness 4: Historical considerations—Fairness should also take into account
economic conditions in a country that are the result of colonial relationships or
unfair previous trade agreements.15
Stiglitz and Charlton suggest that in order to keep a true development round on
track, and not subvert its purpose as a tool for promoting economic development and
reducing poverty, a principle of conservatism should be adopted regarding what goes on
the agenda at negotiations. Issues ought to be included in a development round only if
they score highly in the following: (1) the relevance of the issue to trade flows, (2)
development friendliness, (3) the existence of rationale for collective action (i.e., nations
should not be forced to undertake certain actions unless their actions have effects on
the trade of others that require collective action to resolve).16 The main purpose of
these restrictions would be to limit the inclusion of the types of issues, which developing
countries often felt were included so as to tip the scales in favor of developed countries
A problematic issue for developing countries in trade negotiations has been
“Green” (environmental) and “Blue”(Labor) regulatory tariffs. Developing countries
often claim that strong regulations are forced on them to protect developed countries.
Stiglitz and Charlton feel that standards should not be included in a trade agreement—

15

Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 76-78.

16

Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 86.

249

with three exceptions: (1) international negative externalities—trade policy should
recognize that not forcing firms to pay the true social costs of their environmental
damage is a subsidy which other countries should have the right to take action against;
(2) matters of human rights—human rights violations that are reducing the costs of
operating should be susceptible to countervailing duties (example forced labor,
expropriation of land); (3) restrictions on collective action on the part of labor that
results in lowered production costs.17
The biggest single part of the Stiglitz-Charlton proposal, although it has many
other important facets, is their Market Access Proposal. The Market Access Proposal
consists of the fairly simple idea that all member countries would commit themselves to
providing free market access to all goods from all countries with both a smaller percapita GDP and a smaller overall GDP than they do.18
Stiglitz and Charlton suggest that there would be several important benefits to
this proposal. Firstly, there would be very significant liberalization of trade in goods that
were important to developing countries. The agreement would also tend to increase the
amount of trade between developing countries, opening markets of somewhat
developed countries (mid-level GDP) to very impoverished countries (South–South
trade). Another strong point of the proposal, according to Stiglitz and Charlton, is that
its obligations are progressive. The poorest will not be forced into much liberalization;
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middle-income countries will have to liberalize significantly, and developed countries
will need to open to developing countries generally.
This proposal seems reasonable in the sense that it is progressive, and should, in
the long run, fulfill both the concern for reduction of poverty in international trade, and
to reduce inequality, at least between countries if not within them. A proposal like this
would require that countries take the position that they are cooperating to assist
developing countries and promote poverty reduction, which is consistent with Stiglitz
and Charlton’s insistence that, a true development round would require adopting
cooperative bargaining, instead of bargaining only in national self-interest.
Another important area that this proposal would address is the concern over
escalating tariffs. Escalating tariffs are tariffs which tend to restrict the level of
processing of exports, by increasing the level of tariff applied as the product is more
processed. This means a lower tariff on raw materials and a higher tariff on
manufactured goods. Such escalating tariffs tend to lock developing countries into
exporting raw materials with little value added, which produces little skilled
employment, thus limiting industrial development.
TRIPS the agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, is another
area that Stiglitz and Charlton think should be a focus for a true development round of
negotiations. They argue that if the goal were actually to support development and
poverty reduction, the TRIPS agreement would need to largely exempt poor countries. 19
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They argue that in many cases, the basic research behind most innovations is publicly
funded, and that material reward provides little of the motivation for this sort of
intellectual activity. “There is little evidence,” they say, “that stronger patent protection
would generate greater flows of basic ideas.”20
Private-sector intellectual property rights should be understood as an innovation
tax on the difference between marginal cost and selling price of a product. Stiglitz and
Charlon think it is unfair to charge this innovation tax to some of the poorest people on
earth, who desperately need the assistance that could be made readily available. If the
international community feel that more basic research is necessary, this research should
be funded directly, and not by levying a tax on the poor.21
The TRIMs agreement (Trade Related Investment Measures) is another matter of
concern for Stiglitz and Charlton. TRIMs, when enacted by many members of WTO (and
previously GATT), opened their banking system and financial services to purchase by
foreign banks. This created a situation where governments lose much of their power to
support or motivate lending to underserved and riskier sections of the population,
which they might choose to do in an attempt to promote economic development of
those sectors and reduce poverty.
Stiglitz and Charlton see little point insisting on general rules to regulate capital
flows:
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There does not seem to be a compelling rationale to force national governments
to adopt a uniform multilateral agreement. Idiosyncratic national regimes are
often more sensitive to national development priorities than one-size fits all
multilateral disciplines.22
They are also concerned that some aspects of TRIMS create a situation, known
as “hot money,” where foreign investment flows into and out of countries very rapidly,
and can create a “race to the bottom” type of situation, as investors rapidly shift money
in and out of countries looking for slightly better investment terms. They see a strong
link between this type of investment and financial instability.23 Stiglitz and Charlton are
generally concerned to avoid any investment services liberalization that would
exaggerate financial instability in developing countries. Despite this concern, they feel
that one of the areas that should be included in a pro-development round of
negotiations would be the liberalization of labor-intensive services, as this is an area
that they feel would strongly benefit developing countries:
Facilitating the free mobility of capital is far less important for global efficiency
or for the developing countries themselves than facilitating the movement of
labor, particularly that of unskilled workers. Indeed there is a strong case that
capital market liberalization may actually lower global economic efficiency.24
Stiglitz and Charlton also feel that not only the content of negotiations will need
to change to support development and poverty reduction in international trade, but
also that the WTO itself will need to undergo some significant changes. They suggest
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institutional reform will be required in the WTO to support a focus on supporting
development and reducing poverty.
A first concern here is representativeness and openness of negotiations, Stiglitz
suggests that the current negotiating practices are problematic; they occur to an extent
behind closed doors and end up with agreements that contain portions many
governments would not have included if they had not been forced to as part of a
package.25 (Here one can think of Pogge’s comment that trade has been beneficial, but
could have benefited the least well off much more than it has.) Stiglitz calls for an end to
“Green Room” bargaining, where only a select fraction of countries represent
developing countries at the actual negotiations. Stiglitz says that while the practice has
been formally abolished, is still largely how negotiations are conducted.26
Another area of concern is admission to the WTO. The process has become
increasingly lengthy and requires more and more liberalization as a price of entry.
Stiglitz and Charlton advocate clear rules that are manageable by least developed
countries, a shortened and simplified process, as well as a halt to forcing unfair levels of
liberalization on developing countries seeking admission.27
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There will need to be a body developed to assess what measures are best
adopted to support countries facing economic crisis. There is also a strong need to
develop a fair resource at the WTO to assist developing countries in assessing the real
costs and benefits of various proposals, (for trade agreements to be included in the
WTO) as many developing countries lack the technical resources to do this effectively
before agreeing to or rejecting proposals.
Another area where reform is suggested is in the WTO dispute settlement
system. The WTO dispute settlement system favors wealthy developed countries, both
in the costs of successfully making a claim, and in the ability to assure that a successful
resolution will be followed up with action.28 (Bhagwati also gives extensive support for
this measure in his defence of free trade.)
An effect that developed countries do not normally consider for implementation
of trade liberalization proposals, but should, is the fiscal cost of the loss of tariff
revenues to government. In developed countries tariffs are not usually a very important
form of revenue for government operations, but in lesser developed countries tariff
revenue can be a significant form of revenue.29 This is because in many such countries, a
very significant portion of the economy is underground and not taxable. Many
governments in such countries lack effective tax revenue collection systems, and tariff
revenues are relatively easy to collect. (Stiglitz and Charlton suggest that a value-added-
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tax (VAT) system can be welfare-enhancing as compared to tariff revenues, but admit
this fails in developing countries with substantial underground economies.)
Another cost Stiglitz and Charlton think it is important to consider, is the
implementation costs of particular proposals. Implementation costs from the Uruguay
Round for the parts of the agreement that required regulation changes were costed at
an average of $150 million for twelve sample developing countries. In eight of those
twelve this exceeded the total budget for development spending. Stiglitz and Charlton
point out that the extensive non-compliance on this point indicates that many
developing countries felt the price was too high, and that the money was better spent in
areas such as basic education.30 They recommend that regulatory proposals with
extensive implementation costs be left out of a development round.
While Stiglitz and Charlton support trade liberalization in general, as a source of
long run benefits to developing countries, they are concerned that the extremely poor
will not be able to sustain themselves through even small short run drops. They insist
that assistance must be rendered for the development of social safety nets and
insurance. Stiglitz and Charlton, in fact, argue that employment insurance can be
economically efficient, because it allows displaced workers to search longer for a job
that makes effective use of their skills, rather than accepting a drop in employment
standard.31
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Stiglitz and Charlton comment that even with fair trade liberalization, there will
be a problem of supply constraints; that developing countries may still not be able to
benefit from new favorable access to markets:
In the context of low productive capacity, a deficient policy environment, poor
infrastructure, poor access to technology, and missing/imperfect markets
(especially financial markets), liberalized markets will not stimulate the required
development to take advantage of new trading opportunities.32
They suggest that technical assistance, technology transfer, and the
development of functional financial markets will need to be negotiated into the
agreements, if international trade is to be effective in supporting economic
development and reducing poverty.
The Stiglitz and Charlton proposal for a more just approach to international trade
is important in that it generally relies on existing international institutions, and does not
depart radically from some of the ideas already being considered in international society
to assist developing countries. However Stiglitz and Charlton make clear that their
proposal would require a change in the spirit of negotiations, from individual national
interest to a cooperative attempt to aid in the economic development of the least
developed countries.
Schweickart: Socialist Protectionism
David Schweickart, a philosopher working in the area of political economy and
economic justice, offers a proposal for an alternative to the current international trade
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regime as part of his project to articulate and defend an economically viable, ethically
desirable alternative to capitalism, which he calls “Economic Democracy.” His proposal
is formulated in response to the question, “How would a country structured as an
Economic Democracy conduct trade relations with other countries?”
When his answer is examined, it becomes clear that the policy he proposes for
an economy that has gone “beyond capitalism,” might also be suitable for a capitalist
country committed to a just system of international trade. Schweickart proposes that
international trade should be based on fair trade rather than free trade. He labels his
proposal “fair trade,” for it stems from, as he explains:
[T]he moral conviction that one should not, in general, profit from, or be hurt by,
the exploitation of the cheap labor of others... Consumers should not benefit
because workers in other countries work for lower wages than domestic
workers, nor should home country workers be put at risk by these low wages.33
Schweickart means fair trade in the actual sense of trade that is fair, rather than
in the sense of the Fair Trade marketing strategy. He also calls his proposal “socialist
protectionism”:
Free trade is fine so long as the trading partners are roughly equal in terms of
worker incomes and environmental regulation. However when trading with a
poorer country or one whose environmental regulations are lax, Economic
Democracy will adopt a policy of socialist protectionism.34
Schweickart embraces protectionism as a strategy to prevent race to the bottom
competition on worker wages and environmental regulations, and as a strategy to allow
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the development of strategic industries. As we have seen, such protectionism has
considerable support as a useful tool for all three of these purposes, both from strategic
protectionists like Ian Fletcher, and also economists who are generally in favor of trade
liberalization such as Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton. As Schweickart points out,
protectionism is not a radical position, given that every economically successful country
has employed protectionism at some point; a claim supported by others already
considered in this work.35
Schweickart proposes a two-part trade policy. The first part is protectionist: the
imposition of a Social Tariff, on imported goods, designed to compensate for low wages
or lack of commitment to social goals regarding the environment, worker health and
safety, and social welfare on the part of the exporting country. The second part of the
policy is where Schweickart’s alternative differs from other proposals. It states that all
tariff proceeds will be rebated back to countries of origin of the goods on which tariffs
were placed.36
The first part of the policy is fairly straightforward: in a situation where imported
goods (or services) are coming from a country where they are being produced through
the use of labor paid at wages lower than the domestic rate, a tariff would be imposed
to compensate for the difference in wages. This is intended to eliminate international
competition driving down wages, avoiding a “race to the bottom” in the area of wages.
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The same approach would be taken in the case of negative environmental or
health and safety externalities. Any time a product was imported that was produced in a
way that evaded paying the full environmental or health and safety costs of its
production, it would be assessed a tariff that would effectively be equal to the
estimated value of environmental or health and safety costs that were evaded in its
production. Again the purpose is to avoid competition based on unjust production
practices.
The second part of Schweickart’s proposal takes a different approach than that
taken by other proponents of protectionism. The assessed tariffs are rebated back to
the country, whose goods they are assessed on, to be used in development activities.
They aim at providing these countries with resources to work towards developing
industries that do not operate based on unjust relations of production.
It is noteworthy that Schweickart’s proposal says nothing about international
capital flows; a concern of most trade theorists. This is because a country practising
Economic Democracy will generally not have significant international flows of capital.
Virtually all funds for investment are generated publicly (via a capital-asset tax on all
business enterprises), and are reinvested in the domestic economy. These funds are the
property of the society in general, and are used to support productive enterprises in the
domestic economy, rather than speculative investment. This arrangement avoids the
downward pressure on wages and environmental standards that occurs when a country
needs to attract foreign investment capital, or counter threats to move capital
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offshore.37

(Schweickart claims that not relying on foreign investment capital may well

be an important benefit, even for relatively poor developing countries.38)
Schweickart’s model also addresses the issue of IP (Intellectual Property).
Intellectual Property has been a contentious issue during the discussions around
implementation of the Uruguay round of GATT, and currently in the WTO (TRIPS). 39 In
many cases developing countries are forced into agreeing to very stringent IP
agreements as a cost of entry into trade agreements, that leave them unable to afford
medications and technologies that would facilitate important improvements in welfare.
As we have seen, Stiglitz and Charlton in general want to avoid forcing IP agreements on
developing countries, as they tend to be costly to implement and slow economic
development.
Schweickart’s proposal suggests that once the motivation to avoid international
competition based on low wages is removed (and hence the worry that low-cost
production abroad would displace domestic workers), there would be no reason to
protect IP internationally at all, and in fact, it would be easy for a country practising
Economic Democracy to promote free technology transfer to developing countries and
exemptions from patent restrictions for less developed countries (which is impossible to
build support for under the current international trade regime).
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Schweickart’s proposal focuses on avoiding trade competition based on
exploitative labor or environmental practices. It is based on the assumption that
relative economic self-sufficiency is an important value, but addresses the need for
international trade in many situations. The proposal is intended to promote
international cooperation on development, as opposed to facilitating a race to the
bottom in wages and both social and environmental standards, which is something the
current trade regime often receives criticism on.
Daly: Ecological Economics Proposal
Herman Daly has a proposal for an approach to international trade that is more
just than the current regime. He suggests thinking about his proposal in terms of empty
world versus full world economics. He explains that the contemporary free trade model
develops from classical economics, and in Adam Smith’s time, compared to today, the
world was empty.40 Free trade economics, and a belief that least developed countries
can simply grow their way to a similar standard of living to the now developed
countries, are “empty world” thinking. Daly’s proposal is based on “full world”
economics. His proposal is known as the steady state economy (SSE). Daly notes that he
doesn’t pull his ideas out of thin air, that the concern for the ability of the environment
to sustain the economy, is as old as the study of political economy, he is influenced by
Mill, and his conception of a stationary state economy.
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His proposal for a steady state economy is based on two main concerns. The first
is, ensuring that the size of the economy, or the size of the resource throughput of the
economy, is sustainable within the limits of the ecosystem that supports us. The second
is a concern for distributing the benefits of that sustainable economy in a way that
provides a decent standard of living for all. Since we do not actually know the limit of
our ecosystem, to sustain our economy, and many people who study ecology and
biology believe we are already past its carrying capacity, Daly suggests we must adopt
precaution as our principle. This means we must begin to limit, and work towards
reducing, the quantity of natural resources we use up in our economy, and the wastes
we put out into natural sinks. Daly`s steady state economy defines the concept of
economic development as, the efficient use of a steady or fixed quantity of natural
resource and energy inputs in an economy, to satisfy more needs of human beings,
through improvements in technology and distribution.
Daly claims that economists are always concerned with efficiency and the
maximization of something. He explains that what is maximized in SSE is life. The
maximand is measured in cumulative person-years of life lived at a standard sufficient
for a good life. Daly does not go into particular depth about what a good life ought to be
defined as, but explains that it is possible to tell that it is a life that allows individuals to
pursue their interests and potentials, rather than just absolute bare minimum.
Daly rejects a strictly free trade model for international trade, because adjusting
the national economy, including labor markets, natural resources and capital to
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international markets, makes it difficult to control negative environmental and social
externalities, and manage monetary policy in a way that ensures prices reasonably
reflect full social marginal opportunity costs, in interest of public welfare.41
International free trade conflicts sharply with the national policies of (1) getting
prices right, (2) moving toward a more just distribution, (3) fostering community,
(4) controlling the macroeconomy, and (5) keeping scale within ecological
limits.42
Daly argues that free trade really only maximizes efficiency in one of the areas where
efficiency should be maximized in an economy. Free trade maximizes the efficiency of
allocation of resources to the most productive uses, but it does nothing for concerns of
efficiency in distribution, in order to satisfy the needs of the most people with the
resources available, and it completely ignores, what the efficient sustainable scale of the
economy should be, in relation to the environment that sustains it.43 His proposal for
trade is really more of a proposal not to trade.
There is clearly a conflict between free trade and a national policy of
internalization of external costs. External costs are now so important that the
latter goal should take precedence. In this case there is a clear argument for
tariffs to protect not an inefficient industry, but an efficient national policy of
internalizing external costs into prices.44
Daly`s proposal, when considered as an economic model, is a form of import
substitution industrialization, based on tariffs.
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Daly’s proposal, keeps national and international economics separate, he rejects
cosmopolitan conceptions of global citizenship, and does not welcome the idea of a
global government without individual nations. He suggests reform is needed at the
international level, the national level and the regional level within countries.
[A] "community of communities," an international federation of national
communities cooperating to solve global problems under the principle of
subsidiarity. The model is not the cosmopolitan one of direct global citizenship in
a single integrated world community without intermediation by nation states.45
His concern is based on the concern that “cosmopolitan globalism” weakens the
power of national communities (and subnational communities) to control negative
externalities and financial capital, and increases the power of transnational corporations
to resist this control. He feels that capital must be made less global and more local. He
describes the buzzwords he would like to see as “renationalization of capital”, and
“community rooting of capital for the development of local economies.”46 He quotes
Keynes, explaining that he would like to see goods be produced nationally as much as
possible, and that capital being national was important above all.
Daly in general, advocates self-sufficiency for nations, not isolation, and not
complete trade barriers, but self-sufficiency for the most part. He says for the US, selfsufficiency is industrial self-sufficiency, and argues that de-industrialization of the US
means that American labor will experience a drop in standard of living. He explains that
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if US workers want to compete with workers in developing countries, to produce the
highest return on capital to production, free trade is fine. Daley argues that if the US
does not want to compete in a race to the bottom on wages and environmental
standards, the appropriate tool is the tariff.
Tariffs would protect now-endangered industries from further erosion and allow
them to begin to recover lost ground. Tariffs would also encourage new
enterprise in areas where the United States has become dependent on imports.
With the assurance that these industries could be profitable while paying
suitable wages, capital would flow to these opportunities. The operation of the
free market, within national boundaries reinforced by tariffs, would lead to the
industrial self-sufficiency that would make possible truly free trade, that is, trade
in which the nation is free to engage or not.47
Daly explains that the use of a tariff system would carry a cost. It would probably
slow overall economic growth in the sense of GDP, and would lower the purchasing
power of a particular wage, but wages could be set high enough to assure a desirable
standard of living for working people. It would also lower returns to US capital, which
would not be able to profitably use low wage foreign labor to produce goods for the US
market.48 Daly is concerned not just with the harmful effects of free trade in general,
but also about free trade in financial capital. He feels the most effective way of ending
the harmful effects of the international trade in financial capital, is a tariff system set
high enough to protect domestic production from competition in the form of domestic
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capital being invested in foreign production, and the products being imported to
domestic markets.
In fact Daly is critical of the power of financial capital in the economy generally,49
and in his proposal for a steady state economy he argues for both a minimum income,
which he explains has fairly strong political support, and a maximum income, for which
he says there is virtually none. He assumes this is because there is a belief that there is
no limit to total possible increase of wealth.50 He argues for a progressive tax that,
above the accepted income differential, would have a very high marginal rate in order
to minimize accumulated inequality in wealth.
Daly suggests that while labor would likely see the value in buying local, and
would be willing to accept higher costs, holders of financial capital would provide
powerful resistance to the proposal, as it restricts their ability to seek the highest rate of
return. And retailers and large corporations that make most of their profits from selling
low priced imported goods would also resist the proposal. He suggests that the impact
on retailers would be lessened if the proposal was phased in slowly. He feels that low
wage service workers, which have become a large sector of the workforce, might also
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suffer from the proposal, as prices for goods in the economy would rise, and their
already limited purchasing power would diminish.51
Daly is also concerned about intellectual property rights. He argues that many
forms of knowledge should not be converted into property rights with a market value.
[K]nowledge, unlike throughput, is not divided in sharing, but multiplied. Once
knowledge exists, the opportunity cost of sharing it is zero and its allocative price
should be zero.
Sharing knowledge costs little, and does not create unrepayable debts,
and it increases the productivity of the truly rival and scarce factors of
production. Existing knowledge is the most important input to the production of
new knowledge, and keeping it artificially scarce and expensive is perverse.52
Daly feels that the benefits to everyone from sharing knowledge, far outweigh
the possible benefits to innovation of costly (both to spread of innovation, and to
implement) intellectual property regimes.
While Daly`s proposal is for protectionist tariffs at the national level, he is also
concerned about institutions at the international level. He claims that it is necessary to
rethink how balance of trade accounts are calculated. Daly argues that the World Bank
(and in fact national governments) need to begin to use measures of economic growth
that separate growth, in the sense of increasing use of resources, from the ability of an
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economy to satisfy human needs. He considers that the export of non-renewable
resources should not be classified solely as income, that a portion of this value needs to
be registered as sale of a capital asset, rather than income from production. He
considers that if this were done accurately, it would change some countries’ apparent
trade surpluses, under current accounting, to deficits resulting from foreign sale of
capital assets. The IMF recommendations and actions for those countries would then
change to reflect this. Daly suggests this shift in balance of trade accounting would be
an excellent initial focus for the IMF in sustainable development.53 Daly is concerned
that GNP (or GDP) is a poor economic indicator, as far as measuring how efficiently an
economy is using a limited stock of resources to satisfy human needs. He suggests an
indicator, the Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW), which separates categories of
consumption and production, as well as recognizing investment in several types of
capital.54 Daly`s main concern here is that traditional measures such as the GNP or GDP,
tell us very little about the sustainability of an economy in use of resources or the
distribution of its benefits, which are crucial concerns for both national governments
and international institutions in Daly`s proposal.
In his critique of international trade, Daly suggests he would like to see an
international currency clearing house, to manage currency and balances of trade. He
explains that this was the proposal Keynes initially developed for the IMF, but it was
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rejected at Bretton

Woods.55

The strength of it would be that it would allow

international trade in goods to be paid for over time without requiring an immediate
balanced exchange, and avoid the necessity of developing a speculative market for
currency. Countries would maintain accounts with the institution in a currency that only
existed as accounting numbers at the clearing house. Interest of a sort would be
charged on both positive and negative balances, to provide for an incentive for
countries to adopt policies which would favor a neutral balance of trade over the long
term.
Even though Daly`s proposal is based on tariffs, it is quite different from
Fletcher`s tariff based protection proposal, as Fletcher`s proposal is focussed on
maximizing economic growth in strategic industries that will also target international
markets. Daly`s proposal differs from other proposals, because its specific focus is
development of an economy that can provide a good quality of life for all people in the
long term, while recognizing the finite nature of the world`s resources. There are many
strengths to Daly`s proposal, but its weakness is that it fails to effectively address the
concern for alleviating extreme poverty in least developed countries. Daly does not
ignore this he suggests that developed countries should work through international
institutions to promote self-sufficiency for developing countries. He makes a strong
argument that least developed countries are often failed by the current free trade
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regime, but his proposal, while probably an effective option for most people in wealthy
developed countries, doesn`t seem to acknowledge very much ethical obligation on the
part of wealthy powerful countries in the current regime. It seems like an effective
alternative to the current international trade regime would need to take Daly`s concern
for long term sustainability into account and would need to consider the arguments
Daily makes about the problems of free trade, and particularly his concern about the
unrestricted mobility of financial capital in relation to the ability to achieve just
distributions and manage negative externalities.

CHAPTER FIVE
A COSMOPOLITAN PROPOSAL FOR JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
I came into the project of applying philosophical conceptions of social justice to
the problem of injustices occurring in, and resulting from, international trade, which I
perceived in many ways to be a worthwhile problem in the field of social justice that had
received only passing attention from philosophers, with the plan that I would attempt to
apply principles of justice, derived from Rawls’ two basic principles in ATOJ to
international trade. In ATOJ Rawls very specifically lays out how the principles would
require economic institutions of a society to be structured, and what would be required
of their basic functions. I thought that his extensive discussion of institutions and social
structures, a part of his conception of justice, as structuring the social processes to
produce just results from the interactions of members of society in pursuing their own
interests, made it a useful approach. My project was to understand the problems with
the current international trade regime, and develop a proposal for an alternative
scheme for international trade, based on principles of justice.
The proposal is the end result of a process of several steps. The first was
examining some of the philosophical literature on global justice, in order to illuminate
and critique positions taken on international trade and international economic
interdependence. The second was evaluating the current free trade model for
271
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international trade and the main alternative model, which is protectionism. And then,
finally, I looked at several alternative models for international trade to consider how
they fit with the principles of justice with which I was working, and attempted to
evaluate them against the commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the free
trade and protectionist models, by economists with a normative concern for justice in
global society (although their conceptions of this varied strongly). In the end, all of the
proposed alternatives that I worked with seemed to fall short.
I will now outline the main features of a proposal for a just alternative model for
international trade and global economic interaction and explain each of the features in
reasonable detail. I will explain the basic argument supporting the choice of each, and
address some of the possible counter arguments. The proposed model is a cosmopolitan
conception of a new regime of international trade, including most features of
international economic activity that are currently covered under various international
trade agreements and the WTO, and several which are not. It is based on principles of
justice that could be used in building just global economic institutions to support a
global economic environment that promotes vibrant economic activity within a
background framework of fairness. These would be global institutions in the
cosmopolitan sense, with a focus on effectively inclusive democracy that represents the
interests of all members of global society. The proposal would make sense within the
context of a larger liberal cosmopolitan project, but I will proceed as if the proposal is to
stand alone.
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My approach is heavily influenced by Rawls’ contractarian understanding of the
reasons that justice is appropriate within a society. The principles put forward in this
proposal are derived from the goals of the principles Rawls’ puts forward as coming out
of his 1st Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance. Rawls did not think that these
should apply to global society, but the position I take is that there is enough support for
the idea that Rawls’ principles of justice are reasonable, but his conception of
international relations and global society, are not in line with his own position on the
obligations that develop as a result of being a member of a society, or the value of
individuals within society. I conceive the principles of fair trade to be similar to what
Rawls suggests would arise as the structure of the fair background framework for
international trade, agreed upon in the 2nd Original Position. It is important to
remember that this is a proposal for a framework for fair trade, not a comprehensive
proposal for a just global society.
The proposal embraces Rawls’ conception of social justice as procedural, that is,
that justice in a society is about creating an institutional framework that enables
individuals to pursue their own particular interests in a way that is fair to them and to
the rest of society. This is a conception supported also by Iris Young in her description of
the social justice obligations of individuals as an obligation to work towards
establishment of just institutions,1 and by Charles Beitz, who argues that Rawls’ position
in A Theory of Justice on the role of institutions in social justice also makes sense at the

1

Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 249.
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international

level.2

It is also supported by Thomas Pogge in his discussion of the unjust

institutions of the current trade regime, and the reforms needed.3
Principles for a Just International Trade Regime
My proposal requires the creation of new global economic institutions that
would be put in place to ensure that trade would be conducted in accordance with the
principles of justice in international trade. The principles of justice in trade represent
what I feel is required to structure international trade, and economic activity in global
society reasonably considered trade related, in a way that supports a just global society.
My proposal is inspired by Rawls’ discussion of the economic institutions of a just
society, but because it is a proposal with a scope limited for the most part to trade, not
all the concerns Rawls has in structuring the economic institutions of a just society show
up as principles in the trade proposal. Briefly, there are three principles, each with a
different focus:
1) Whenever possible international economic activity ought to be conducted in
such a way that it works to reduce absolute poverty in global society.
2) International economic activity ought to be conducted in such a way that it will
contribute to a reduction of harmful inequality in global society, both between
states and within them.

2

Beitz, Political Theory, 170.

3

Pogge, Politics as Usual, location 923.
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3) International trade ought to be conducted in such a way that international
economic activity does not produce negative externalities, that is, impose costs
or harm on parties who have not consented to the exchange, including present
and future generations.
These principles should not generally be considered to have a particular order of
priority. Each one is a basic principle that independently, directly or indirectly, works to
support justice in global society.
The first principle, that international economic activity ought to be conducted in
such a way that it works to reduce absolute poverty, is fairly simple to defend. Absolute
poverty is harmful, in the sense of causing death and illness, and is also understood to
make it impossible for individuals to pursue their interests in society. Even those that do
not support extensive obligations to address justice in global society, accept that there is
an obligation to act to mitigate the effects of extreme poverty, regardless of causes.
Although the principle is non-controversial for anyone concerned at all with
global justice, it is less clear how elimination of severe poverty should be achieved, and
what a suitable economic status, below which one is considered to be experiencing
unacceptable poverty, should be defined as. This is a proposal for justice in international
trade, and in general, the mechanism for working to eliminate poverty will be using
trade to facilitate economic development that can sustainably lift people out of poverty.
However, because extreme poverty is a very serious harm that should not be tolerated
in a world where we can afford to end it, the proposal also includes the proposition that
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some of the funds raised through controls on financial capital and energy use, would be
directed to support sustainable economic development in societies which are
experiencing extreme poverty. These societies may lack resources to easily develop
efficient productive economies, and it seems reasonable to use a portion of the
aggregate benefits of economic cooperation in global society to address this, until
avoidable extreme poverty is eliminated. As discussed in the positions of Rawls, Pogge,
and Daly, there may be situations in which the governments of societies experiencing
extreme poverty may, through bad planning and decision-making, inefficiency,
corruption or explicit criminal behaviour, make it very difficult to assist the members of
some societies. Resolving these situations is beyond the scope of this proposal, but the
reasonable approach would seem to be extending the level of assistance possible
through international government organizations, and non-government organizations,
which would be able to work with the people.
Determining a poverty cut-off would also require consideration. Two concerns
seem immediately obvious, what the cut-off would be, and how to measure it. Setting
the cut-off at a low level, such as the World Bank $1.25 /day USD (PPP),4 makes
elimination of poverty very clear and very quickly achievable. This is different than the
type of cut-off envisioned by Rawls for the “duty of assistance” in The Law of Peoples,
which is described by Rawls as the level at which a country can sustain the institutions

4

Purchasing Power Parity.
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and social structure of a decent or liberal

society.5

He does not specify a particular

figure. Rawls says that it would not need to be particularly high, although I assume, it
would likely need to be higher than $1.25/day.
It is also worth considering how this would be measured. The proposal has been
considering wealthy and impoverished countries, but there can be important
differences in the structure of wealth and income within countries that have very similar
levels of per capita GDP. This would require research both in defining groups within
countries that required special attention, and also in considering how projects and
assistance would reach those most in need within a society. Both the UN and World
Bank currently do research in this area, and would be useful partners. Another side of
the measurement that is of concern is what statistics should be used. Income is
commonly calculated from GDP, but there are concerns that Gross Domestic Product
may have drawbacks for sustainability and actual satisfaction of human needs.6 Herman
Daly is particularly concerned that measurements of income should not include the sale
of non-renewable resources (which should instead be discounted from income as the
sale of capital assets,) and that addressing this concern may require retooling whatever
indicator is chosen. The UN has done considerable work with a variety of versions of the

5

6

Rawls, The Law, 118.

See Daly in chapter three in this dissertation, but Amartya Sen is well known for his concerns about
measuring economies in society.
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Human Development Index (HDI), which measures, health education and

income.7

A

version of the HDI, combined with an effort to assess differences between groups within
states, would be an effective approach.
The second principle, that international economic activity ought to be conducted
in such a way that it will contribute to a reduction of harmful inequality in global society,
requires a more complex argument to justify. The inequality principle is based on the
concern that great inequalities are harmful to fair decision making, and the
maintenance of effective and inclusive democracy. Rawls, Schweickart, Stiglitz, Pogge,
and Beitz all take the position that, extremes of inequality harm people’s interests by
tending to lead to diminished ability for individuals to effectively participate in
democratic decision-making and weakening their position in agreements and
exchanges. The proposal takes a concern for political equality in institutions seriously,
and requires democratic political equality in the functioning of the Global Trade
Organization (GTO) as an institution, but the goal of the proposal is not absolute global
economic equality.
Following Rawls, the principle is not a trump which requires total economic
equity, but rather a concern that equality is a high value for effective democracy, and
inequality ought to be limited, in keeping with the concern that economic efficiency
cannot be permitted to overrule the ability of members of society to participate

7

United Nations Human Development Programme, Human Development Reports. Accessed at:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data.
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effectively in democratic decision-making processes. The inequality principle will be
focussed on addressing harmful inequalities, where large differences in economic power
translate into political inequality or difficulty in addressing human rights concerns and
environmental issues.
The inequality principle is limited, in that it does not consider active
redistribution of the background wealth of countries or individuals in a direct manner,
accepting some level of differences in wealth, but seeking to create a structure of
economic interaction that supports equality, by requiring it in terms of trade, except in
cases of trade where the poverty principle would apply, and in some situations concerns
for equity. It might be considered that the inequality principle would be a presumption
of actual free trade, in the sense of an equal absence (or presence) of barriers to trade
between partners. In situations where a country was below a poverty cut-off, or where
the ratio of difference in wealth between states was beyond a specific ratio, it would
arranged that terms of trade could shift to favor the expected returns towards the
poorer party.
One model for this would be something like the “Market Access Proposal”
suggested by Stiglitz.8 In the proposal he suggests that in an effort to economic
development for developing countries, that all countries would eliminate barriers to
their markets for countries with lower GDPs and lower per capita GDPs than
themselves. The Global Trade Organization proposal would take an approach that was

8

Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 94.
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similar in principle, but not exactly in structure. This proposal does take the position that
a long term levelling down of levels of consumption of non-renewable resources is
desirable, and Stiglitz’s proposal does seem likely to likely to lessen inequality, but it
lacks a mechanism for ensuring that economic development will be sustainable. Because
it will likely encourage competition based on low wages rather than efficiency, it may
actually lead to generally less efficient use of resources in the global economy. Leveling
up of developing countries to a level of throughput of non-renewable resources that is
similar to the current level of wealthy developed countries, would be disastrous
ecologically, and for the quality of life on the planet.
This proposal would be similar to Stiglitz’s, in that it would have a basic principle
that trade agreements ought to work towards ending economic inequalities that limit
people’s ability to participate, and effectively pursue their interests in global society and
its institutions. Market access would be facilitated, but there would also be a focus on
ensuring that this was accompanied by effective regulation, to ensure that this did not
encourage competition based on externalizing social or environmental costs. (This
would include competition based on labor exploitation or unsustainable environmental
practices. And the proposal would, almost certainly, require assistance in developing
capacity to support the regulation and developing industries.) In many cases, it might
prove that support for strategic economic development would be preferable in the long
term to simply opening all markets, and allowing poorer countries to use an absolute
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advantage they might have in production costs, because their impoverished citizens will
work for very low wages.
Another concern with a blanket policy like Stiglitz’s Market Access Proposal is
that if not managed carefully, (with controls on financial capital) it may create a
situation where holders of financial capital in wealthy countries, could use it to benefit
from cheap factors available in poor countries, to the disadvantage of labor in wealthy
developed countries. This might lower the inequality between states, but would worsen
inequality within developed countries, which is already becoming a source of political
and social injustice for many of them. So the proposal will embrace the general spirit of
the Market Access Proposal, which is for wealthy developed countries to assist
developing countries with economic development opportunities through trade, but will
not adopt a complete open market policy for less developed countries, without
consideration of environmental and social impacts.
The inequality principle is included in the proposal, with the goal of reversing the
trend of rapidly increasing inequality between states and within states. Its goal is not
complete global economic equity, but is focussed on ensuring that conditions which
support fair agreements and exchange are promoted and maintained, rather than
continually eroded by the natural effects of markets and free exchange over time.
The third principle is that international trade ought to be conducted in such a
way that international economic activity does not produce negative externalities. This
principle in a sense is fairly non-controversial, as all societies accept it in principle, and
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all wealthy developed societies enact more or less effective and comprehensive sets of
laws and regulations to prevent negative externalities, or provide for sanctions or
damages when they occur. As we have seen, Rawls suggests that this as an important
function of the economic institutions he proposes in ATOJ.9 Singer suggests that
effective regulation of negative externalities is, in general, considered vital in the legal
systems of developed states, but is effectively absent in international society.10 Pogge
considers the lack of effective measures to restrict the ability of international economic
actors to impose uncompensated costs and burdens on third parties, to be a cause of
important harms in the current international trade regime.11
The reason that the ability to restrict negative externalities is absent in the
current structure of international economic interaction is the result of a combination of
two factors. One is the focus of the WTO on reducing barriers to trade, which means
that its Appellate Body finds almost all claims to harmful 3rd party effects to be less
important than reducing barriers to increased trade.12 And a second is the structure of
contemporary world order, where there is very little agreement on standards of
regulation for many concerns between countries, and virtually no capacity for consistent
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Rawls, A Theory, 244.
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Singer, One World, 93-94.
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Pogge, Politics as Usual, location 962.
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Singer, One World, 57. This is also the position taken by Bhagwati, who, as discussed in chapter 3,
doesn’t actually see it as much of a problem.
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enforcement of what regulative agreements exist, particularly in the case that the
negative effects are experienced by members of poor countries.
Another particularly thorny concern is for the effect of negative externalities
where the costs or harms created are placed onto future persons. There is some
regulation aimed at reducing this in wealthy developed countries, but it is very much an
emerging concern. There are basically no effective measures to address this in the
current international order, as evidenced by the inability to come to grips with powerful
environmental issues such as climate change.
The externalities principle will be addressed in general by the global nature of
the institutions that regulate the global economic activity. Fair regulation should be
achievable through the inclusive democratic and global nature of the Global Trade
Organization institution, in the sense that reasonably effective representation of most
interests in global society is the goal, and under those conditions regulation should
generally reflect the interests of all to avoid being on the receiving end of negative third
party effects from international economic activities. Since this is a stand-alone proposal,
enforcement is likely to be much more of a problem in some ways. Issues brought
before the institution that is charged with this regulation, in general, can be expected to
be dealt with fairly, as the institution would have a focus on just economic interactions
rather than economic efficiency as its highest value. However, there would be a concern
with how to actually enforce the decisions once made. One structure might be the
imposition of fines or damages on parties that engage in practises that result in
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recognized negative external social or environmental costs, but in some situations these
may be difficult to enforce, as WTO judgments of this type, when they have occurred,
have often been. In the stand -alone proposal the most effective enforcement would
likely have to be membership in the institutions of global society itself. There would
likely be enough benefit for all members of the economic agreement in global society
that the costs of being left out are greater than the benefits of behaviour that will cause
a party to lose its membership. This is the current strategy of the WTO, but it is
weakened at the WTO by the ability of some members to just ignore issues that don’t
suit them because of their economic power in global society.
Functions of Institutions
The functions of institutions of a fair system of global economic interaction, as
mentioned, would include most of the areas covered in the current regime by the WTO,
as well as several others that are currently outside the WTO. The institutions would
need to structure trade agreements, focussing not on removing barriers to trade at any
cost, but on facilitating conditions that increase trade and economic activity in
international society in ways that are consistent with the principles of justice.
As we have seen, the long-time, widely purported, theoretical basis for making
the elimination of barriers to unrestricted free trade the focus of international trade
regimes is very problematic. Comparative advantage appears to be much more limited
in the conditions to which it applies than has been argued. We should encourage the
reduction of barriers to trade under conditions where analysis showed that there would
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beneficial returns from comparative advantage, absolute advantage or efficiencies
produced by free markets that in general would be distributed in accordance with the
principles of justice. In other cases the function of the Global Trade Organization
institutions could be to structure tariffs or duties and restrictions or limits, in ways that
supported the three principles. Ideally the institution opens its doors to a clean slate of
historic agreements, as many existing ones have been negotiated under conditions that
were far from just. The institution would take free trade to be desirable as a starting
assumption for many types of trade, and the function of the institution would be to
fairly determine when it was, and was not, the best option for supporting the principles
of justice. This position can only be just when it is assumed that the decisions would be
fairly based on the principles of justice, rather than power and self-interest. It is a
position that requires the institution to be inclusively democratic and transparent in its
decisions.
Regulation of Trade in Financial Capital
The WTO currently has the TRIMS (Trade Related Investment Measures)
agreement, which concerns the flow of international capital (which came into the WTO
as part of GATT,) with a focus on trying to ensure that there is as little restriction as
possible on the ability of those who hold capital to move it freely around the world in
search of the highest returns. Many commentators, even those who in general support
a free trade model for international trade, consider that the unrestricted trade in
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international capital contributes more harm than good to global

society.13

Unrestricted

flows of capital from country to country, or market to market in search of short term
profit has proven to both promote instability, sometimes provoking acute financial crisis
in countries where capital flows out very rapidly, and to be of little use in supporting the
types of economic activity which permit stable development and lift people in poor
countries out of poverty.14 Managing this situation will be one of the functions of a new
global institution for international trade. The goal of the financial capital section will be
twofold: first, it will be to ensure that trade in financial capital does not create injustices
in global society, in the sense of creating economic instability or forcing poor countries
to make choices that ignore the basic needs and concerns of their people in order to
secure capital or avoid capital flight; second, it will be to try to ensure that global
financial capital is put to constructive uses, where it will do the most good in reducing
poverty and harmful inequality. Thomas Friedman suggests that international capital
can be thought of as “the herd.”15 In this sense the role of a just institution for
international trade would be that of a thoughtful shepherd, knowing the value of the
animals, but aware of the hazards of stampedes and overgrazing.
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The tools the institution would use would be regulatory. One would be a tax on
transfer of financial capital. The regulatory role would be to ensure that the trade in
financial capital did not violate the principles of just trade or any specific regulations
which were developed to support these principles. The tax tool would be similar to a
“Tobin tax,”16 but with modifications specifically formulated to support the principles of
justice in trade. The tax would take the form of a tax on the trading of stocks, bonds and
other forms of financial capital. It is possible that a straight tax on financial capital would
in a sense be more effective at reducing inequality, but one of the concerns is to support
stability, so a transfer tax would seem to be more likely to reduce very rapid shifts in
flows of financial capital that occur to take advantage of small, short term differences in
the rate of return.17 A straight tax on capital could serve the purpose of redistribution
but would seem to do little to reduce the rapid speculative activity and its effect on
capital markets.18
There would be a transfer tax on global financial capital of the type generally
known as a Tobin tax. The rate would be set at a level that was determined to restrict
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Finance and Economic Stability. (Edward Elgar, 2005). And ul Haq, Mahbub, Inge Kaul, and Isabelle
Grunberg, eds. The Tobin Tax: Coping with Financial Volability. (New York: Oxford, 1996).
17

18

Piketty, Thomas, Capital In the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Belknap, 2014), 515-36.

Keynes suggested that very liquid markets which allowed speculation to dominate investment
strategies over enterprise or the development of productive business were against the best interests of
society. Keynes, John M. “The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money,” In The Real Price of
Everything” ed. Michael Lewis (New York: Sterling, 2007) Chapter 12, section VI: “It is usually agreed that
casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps the same is true of
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the profitability of short term speculation, but was still in keeping with financial capital
having a global role in economic activity. How high the rate would be set could be
decided in keeping with the democratic opinion of the representatives guiding and
managing the institution, on the role international financial capital ought to have in
international economics. They may decide that the role of international capital should
be very limited and set the rate very high, or they may decide to set it lower,
encouraging international investment in the real economy, but high enough to reduce
short term speculation or gambling. Setting the particular rates would likely require
economic expertise, careful thought concerning the desired outcomes, and possible
side-effects, as well as some trial and error.
An important possible role for the global transfer tax on investment capital
would be as a source of revenue to provide capital for agreed upon economic
development projects to assist societies in developing sustainable economies that
would help to lift their members out of absolute poverty. This would be a separate
branch of the Global Trade Organization. Raising revenue in this way seems very much
in keeping with the idea that the aggregate benefit of international economic activity
ought to accrue, in a fair way, to members of the global society.
Intellectual Property
Another important area of function for an institution that is charged with
promoting just international economic activity would be the area of intellectual
property. In the current international trade regime intellectual property is an area of
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contention between wealthy and poor states on several levels. Poor countries are
required to accept the protocols (TRIPS: Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights)
concerning intellectual property in order to ascend to membership in the WTO. As
several commentators have pointed out, while it is a voluntary commitment, the extent
of international economic interdependence and the importance of international trade
mean that in many senses the choice ends up being the selection of the least bad option
rather than a free decision. Accepting the intellectual property protocols means, for
developing countries, several different types of costs. On one level it means the cost
upfront to developing a regulatory regime that is capable of recognizing intellectual
property rights and assessing and collecting royalties imposed on the use of those rights
that are owed to their owner.19 The second is the actual cost of the royalties to
developing economies, which are essentially rents, and are for the most part, held by
corporations operating out of wealthy developed countries, which transfer the returns
from production in the economy from poor societies to rich societies. A third cost, which
is potentially even more problematic for developing countries, is what the current
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system of rents on intellectual property means for the quality of life and health of the
poorer majority of persons in global society. The rents on intellectual property mean
that many drugs to fight diseases that are considered curable or manageable in wealthy
societies are priced beyond the reach of most of the population. Governments must in
general act to restrict or eliminate the availability of cheaper generic versions, which do
not pay IP rents, in order to comply with the IP portion of the trade agreements. The
other side of this is that because drug manufacturers recognize that poor persons in
developing countries will be unable to pay high prices for drugs they develop, very little
is spent on research for drugs effective against diseases which affect mostly poor people
in developing countries. A well-known example is malaria, which has had the most
documentable impact of any disease throughout human history, and continues to take a
very high toll of deaths as well as long term incapacitating illness, in many developing
countries. Little concerted research has been done on this disease by for-profit
pharmaceutical companies.
A just approach to intellectual property rights would require different strategies
to address the different concerns. In an economic system where it is conceived that
innovation and research are, at least partially, driven by private for profit interests, it
seems necessary that some effective system of intellectual property rights must exist in
order to provide incentive for research and innovation. A system where any successful
innovation, idea, design or product of research, is immediately copied and marketed by
others who can undercut on price, as they do not have to include the amortization of
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the research costs in their costs of production, is a system where the types of research
and innovation will be limited. There are two ways of approaching this: one is to ensure
there is a system of intellectual property rights that is reasonably enforceable and
balanced between cost and protection for research and innovation in place; the other is
to assume that some types of research can be understood to be a form of public goods,
which will provide benefit to all or many in society, and therefore are worth paying for
as a society.
If a society is committed to both forms, it influences the way that each of the
types of systems can be structured. A society where some forms of research and
development are considered public goods, in a sense will alleviate some of the sources
of concern in intellectual property.20 The remaining concerns for a justice in intellectual
property would for the most part be a balance between allowing producers who are
involved in research and innovation sufficient protection of their intellectual property to
amortize their research, and avoiding intellectual property rights becoming a rent in the

20

The question of whether intellectual property developed in a society, that considered it a public good,
would be freely shared internationally is an interesting one. In a sense, as a public good it might be free
only to members of the society that supported its development. Ideally many cases could be resolved
through negotiation. A country paying the costs to develop a particular product would not be happy to
face competition on price in that industry from someone from a country which hadn’t had those costs to
pay for. The Development Branch would likely be a way to negotiate this. A country might be able to
negotiate tariffs against a competitor who had violated an agreement not to compete in certain markets
(any agreed upon) using IP that had been taken without compensation for the cost of development. Again
this a complex issue. It would not seem very just, for a rich country specializing in products needed to
provide basic or essential services to impoverished people, to negotiate a level of compensation for IP
they develop that would limit the ability of poor persons whose lives can be improved to a relevant
degree to access it. This is where a global institution working to balance justice in distribution of the
benefits of research with ensuring the needed research and development actually occurs would be most
valuable.

292

economy, where, once gained, they provide a protection from competition that allows
holders to raise prices beyond a reasonable return on investment costs (even
considering recouping the investments in research ) and reduce a continuing research
effort to develop new products or technologies.
It is my position that a reasonably efficient system of just international trade
would best be a combined system of intellectual property. In the combined system,
some agreed upon areas of research or even particular projects would be considered
public goods, where an effort to fund research that was in the general interests of
society, or that which served a particular purpose in interests of justice, would be
publicly funded (through the transfer tax on capital or the energy dividend). Projects
would be funded by an international public research funding body, which would
delegate funding grants to research proposals based on perceived value of the research
project as a public good. It would probably be necessary to have several international
research funding bodies, as it would be necessary for funding bodies to have sufficient
expertise in the area to judge the value of research proposals in both applied and basic
research areas. These could be similar to institutions which exist within states (such as
NSF in the US, and NSERC, CIHR and SSHRC in Canada), but they would exist at the global
level and be concerned to fund projects that were valuable to global society, both
generally and specifically aimed at reducing harms of poverty and disease. They could
also become part of international bodies that already exist, in which case the existing
international research bodies would have access to a larger pool of resources to provide
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grants and support research, which would come with a caveat of requiring transparency
in the process for supporting research. Intellectual property resulting from research
funded in this way, (with funds from capital transfer tax or Energy Dividend) would in
most cases become public (in global society) and would focus on research that was
concerned with solutions to the problems of the least well off, who otherwise, because
of their extremely limited effective demand, would not be a focus of research by forprofit companies.
Resources to fund research could come from taxes levied on some types of
international economic activity, including the global transfer tax on investment capital
and a tax which would be a form of Pogge’s conception of a global resource dividend tax
(to be discussed later).21 The amount of resources available would vary with the level of
commitment in global society to the idea of research in various areas as a public good.
International trade may not be reasonable as the only source of funding for all research
that could be considered a global public good, and it would be possible for other
schemes of contribution to supplement this.
In a combined system there would still be a system of private intellectual
property, but it would be different than the current regime in several important ways.
One of the influential differences is that it would be managed by an effectively
democratic institution in the interests of global society as a whole, with the principles of
justice in international trade as a primary concern, rather than being something that
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large wealthy corporations have lobbied the governments of rich and powerful
countries to impose in trade negotiations. Because it is managed democratically
according to the principles of justice in trade and in the interests of global society, the IP
system will attempt to balance maintaining enough protection to promote research and
innovation in a global economy with not permitting IP rights to become too powerful as
rents in the global economy, a situation in which they function to funnel wealth from
poorer members of international society to wealthier members. This will not be an easy
balance to find, and would likely require different regulations negotiated for different
types of industries.
The Regulatory Branch
The regulatory branch and its working groups would constitute a crucial part of
the institutional framework of the Global Trade Organization, needed to support justice
in international trade. A main focus of the regulatory branch would be attempting to
prevent or correct negative externalities. It would do this in support of the principle of
justice in international trade that states: international trade ought to be conducted in
such a way that international economic activity does not impose costs or harm on
parties who have not consented to the exchange, including present and future
generations. Its role in doing this would include two distinct functions. These two
functions would probably require two separate panels of representatives charged with
decision making.
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The first would be to formulate a framework of regulations. Initially it would use
existing international agreements on human rights, environmental regulations and
other issues such as ownership or control of resources to formulate a framework of
regulations that would apply to the standard sorts of externalities associated with
international trade. All members of the organization would have representation on this
panel.
A further part of this first function would be an ongoing effort to identify
important areas for new or reformed regulations that might be needed to support the
principles of justice in trade. Immediate examples that come to mind are the concerns
Thomas Pogge has repeatedly articulated. These include the current accepted practise
of permitting any government that can maintain control over a population and territory,
regardless of its legitimacy, behaviour towards its citizens, or whether it can in any way
be considered to represent their interests, to sell the resources of the country
legitimately on the international market. He calls this the international resource
privilege. And the similar ability of governments, regardless of their legitimacy, or
whether or not they represent the citizens, to take on debt in the form of loans from
wealthy-country financial institutions that the citizens of the country will be obliged to
repay, even when the loans went into the pockets of dictators or their foreign bank
accounts. He calls this the international borrowing privilege. These practises, as Pogge
argues, permit wealthy developed countries to benefit economically at the expense of
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some of the world’s worst off and are egregiously in violation of several of the principles
of justice in trade.22
The second large function of the regulatory branch would be enforcement. For a
stand-alone reform to international economic institutions, enforcement would be a
considerable challenge. In the case of the regulatory panel, the response to cases
brought before it that were determined to be infractions of the regulation, would be an
order a stop to whatever action caused the infraction, and where appropriate levy a fine
or damages. The authority to do so would derive from it being a result of the fair
democratic process, inclusive of all members through which the institution was
constituted. However, in many situations, where the power would come from to make
the authority effective, would need to be explained. In effect the only real power the
institution would possess would be the ability to expel members who violated its terms.
This would constitute an effective power only if it was actually the case that
membership provided greater benefits than those that could be acquired through
breaking its terms, and would likely prove true for individual countries in relation to
most issues. This requires a majority of members of global society to commit to the
project. For the wealthy powerful countries of the current world order, this
commitment cannot be completely self interested, but requires an actual desire to
address issues of global justice in trade. For the current regime clearly shows that it is
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possible, for wealthy and powerful countries to arrange global order and international
economic institutions in their favor if that is their goal.
It would be important to consider the process of adjudicating particular cases
that were brought before the regulatory panel. Several features would need to be
included. One crucial feature would be that the process be seen to be impartial. This
would not be unreasonable to achieve, but would require a panel of sufficiently diverse
adjudicators, selected in a manner that made it likely that the panel would not reflect a
particular bias of interests. Mistakes and/or dissatisfactions with results are bound to
occasionally occur, regardless of the efforts to ensure a fair process, so it will also be
important to ensure that there is an appeals process in place that is also designed with
fairness in mind. These panels would be subsets of the larger membership of the GTO,
the exact size of which could be negotiated, but would need to be limited so that they
could be relatively efficient, addressing cases in a reasonably timely process. The panels
of both would need to be selected through a transparent process, agreed upon
democratically by the representatives of global society participating in the Global Trade
Organization, and could rotate regularly. It might be worthwhile to include a
requirement that membership on the panels would always be composed of
representative mix of countries based on their economic position and perhaps region.
Another feature of the adjudication and appeals process that would be vital in
relation to the principles of justice would be that the process not be such, that
effectively representing one’s position required resources that were generally only
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available to the wealthier and more powerful countries. This is a concern about the
current process in the WTO, and is considered problematic even by some commentators
who generally support the current free trade model of international trade, and the
WTO’s focus on it. Issues in international economics can be complex and contentious, so
a just process of dispute resolution would almost certainly need to include a component
of support and capacity building for poorer and less powerful members of global
society, in effectively representing their interests.
Strategic Economic Development Branch
An important function of the proposed institution to support justice in
international economics is strategic economic development. This is not a feature of the
current WTO. The WTO is committed to a position that places the highest value on
removing barriers to trade in support of achieving as close to unrestricted free markets
in international trade as is reasonably possible. This position has long-standing support
among many economists, and particularly came to dominate economic thinking, with
important results for policy outputs, beginning in the 1980s. The focus on promoting
unrestricted free markets in international trade, because of a conception of their being
the most important factor in the successful development of economies that make use of
international trade to lift people out of poverty, has turned out to be unjustified when
the evidence is examined. The “Asian Tigers” are often cited as the defining example of
the success of free trade, but in fact, when their cases are examined, as we have seen,
they turn out to have actually been examples of strategic industrial development and
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careful protection of markets, up to the point when the chosen industries were no
longer benefiting from it.23 The actual evidence supports the idea that effective tradefocussed economic development that brings opportunities to people and diminishes
poverty tends to occur when it is in industries that produce increasing returns to
investment and technological improvement over the long term.24 The research also
shows that the trade environment is also an important feature. The success of Korea,
Japan and Taiwan appear to be not only because of a focus on development of
particular industries for export, but also a result of the Cold War climate, where these
countries received fairly open markets in the US and other developed western countries
because there was a strong desire that they succeed economically, and not be drawn
into the Soviet sphere.25 The strategic economic development branch of the Global
Trade Organization will have the role of assisting societies that wish to develop
particular industries that they see as desirable and sustainable pathways to economic
development.
This branch would function at a level between individual countries or societies
and the trade institutions that represent global society. It would consider proposals with
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development plans coming from individual countries or societies, and from the
perspective of global society consider if the plan seemed, feasible, reasonable and fair.
Because the panel reviewing proposals would be representative of as wide a cross
section of interests in global society as possible, and also would be committed at the
level of basic structure of the institution to equitable processes of decision-making,
most of the time the proposal would be fairly reviewed to evaluate whether it was likely
to be workable (which is always a guess, but would require a variety of economic
expertise), and whether it was likely to be in line with the principles of just trade.
Proposals for strategic economic development that were accepted would be analysed in
order to determine how they could be supported. In many cases, it would be possible to
arrange combinations of free access to important markets and protection at crucial
early stages, which would allow industries to develop in an environment similar to infant
industry protection, but without the barrier of reciprocal tariffs. This would be
negotiated according to the principles of justice, but also in the expectation that others
will assist you when necessary. The difference from infant industry protection as it was
practised by now-developed countries historically would be that it could be structured
as cooperation to assist everyone in enjoying the benefits of a vibrant economy in global
society. Currently reciprocal trade concessions are often extremely adversarial, in a
sense, acting as if international trade was a zero sum game (although most trade
economists take the position that it is not) and by necessity, if one wins (by getting a
concession in a trade agreement) the other loses. The conception of a fair, and
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transparently inclusive and effective democratic institution for international trade is
designed to create a structure where states can be sure they will not be unfairly taken
advantage of, for the unjust benefit of others.26 In some cases wealthier societies will be
asked to make concessions in terms of trade to poor societies that will make trade less
profitable than maximal. Obviously it must still be beneficial for both or it wouldn’t
occur, but again, following Rawls, the proposal for justice in trade assumes a disposition
to live in a just society.
In many cases there might also be a loose coordination concerning which
societies will choose to specialize in which industries. This would not be a tight planning
of exactly who will produce what, but it would involve discussions over what industries
were already highly competitive, (which isn’t necessarily bad) and which industries
presented strong future possibilities. Certain characteristics make for more attractive
industries, and those industries are the ones that everyone wants to be in, but the
institution would provide a forum for strategizing in this way, in a setting that would be
as non-adversarial as possible. Under these conditions, (and with some regulation of
international flows of investment capital), comparative advantage in some situations
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This situation, where no progress is made on important issues, which most agree should be addressed,
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many areas of international relations. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and UN
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(probably not all because of the concerns for reduction of absolute poverty and harmful
inequality) could be used to advantage.
In the case of very poor countries, the support for strategic economic
development ought to go further. It could be well worthwhile in long term benefit, for
there to be funding available for very poor countries to subsidize the development of
industries that have the potential to transform the economic situation of the country.
Development of technology, expertise, organizational capacity and a workforce
sufficiently skilled to be effective, are often barriers preventing the poorest, least
developed societies, from making the kinds of choices that pull them out of poverty.
Developing these things is a cost that societies that are very poor are not able to pay.
Borrowing money to support this development is problematic, for the poorer you are,
the more difficult it will be to pay the loan, and because of the risk, the higher the cost
of borrowing. High rates of interest can make servicing the debt crippling for
governments trying to put programs in place that will effectively support developing
industries, and in some situations conditionalities attached to the loans from
international institutions may worsen the situation, particularly in the short term.27
The proposal here is for funding to be made available, in the form of loans with
repayment conditions tied to ability to pay. In cases where ending extreme poverty for
the least well off in global society is involved, it would need to involve grants or loans
where repayment is a long term expectation, based on the society eventually being able
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to rise above extreme poverty, and assist in rebuilding the fund to aid others. In many
cases, it might also involve training and transfers of expertise or technology that build
capacity in less well-off societies.
The strategic economic development branch may in some ways seem like a
rehash of various institutions such as the World Bank and various UN agencies. 28
International agencies in the current world order may have a mandate to support
economic development in less developed countries, but their structure and perspective
is different. It is commonly pointed out that many foreign aid development projects fail,
are enormously inefficient, or even cause dependency or harm. The proposed strategic
economic development branch of the GTO has a structural difference that is designed to
address these issues. There are two structural features of the institution as a whole that
can work to make the proposed solution more successful than the current approach to
supporting economic development. The first of these is very specific: current institutions
in general, are either controlled by wealthy, powerful countries, who ensure that
policies and activities focus on serving their own interests, or, as in the case of many UN
agencies, pushed into the background in favor of institutions that more directly
represent wealthy country interests.29 The proposed institution would be democratic
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and inclusively representative of global society. Its interests would be varied, but they
would include those of the poor and those desperately in need of effective development
assistance. Those interests would be represented in administering the policies and
activities of the institution, in the strategic economic development branch, and in other
parts of the Global Trade Organization.
The other structural difference would be a result of the basic principles of justice
that motivate the creation of the Global Trade Organization. That is, that in a global
society, we are all in a sense “in it together,” and it is unjust that some should suffer
from terrible poverty when the resources are available to prevent it, even more so when
we are all inescapably connected in a myriad of ways to the international economic
interactions that bring immense wealth to some and leave others in desperate poverty.
The institution’s purpose is to provide a background framework that allows individuals
to interact and pursue their own interests in conditions which make those interactions
fair and just. The function of the GTO in global society is to take away the need for all
individuals to constantly check all their own actions against categorical imperatives or
make a utilitarian calculation each time they put an item in their shopping cart. Because
we are committed to sharing the benefits of economic activity in global society justly,
we accept that the worst off will be assisted. Successful economic development projects
in poor developing societies could mean lessened obligation to provide assistance and
more for everyone in the long term. Because of this, all members of global society have
an incentive to be sure that projects are well thought out, well organized and funds are
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used wisely. Failed projects wouldn’t just mean an endless income stream going to
western financial institutions from highly impoverished countries, servicing a debt load
they may never be able to pay off. In the context of the proposal, they would represent
a failed opportunity for all of society.
Non-Renewable Energy Resource Dividend
The revenue needed for the fund will be derived from a form of Thomas Pogge’s
proposal for a Global Resource Dividend and the Transfer Tax on Financial Capital.30 In
the former case, the dividend would be paid on the use or sale of non-renewable energy
resources.31 The dividend would be paid in recognition that the global store of nonrenewable energy resources is a finite pool in which all current and future persons have
a stake, and that the harmful effects of burning carbon-based energy sources affect all
members of the global society, regardless of their own use of the energy resources.
(These effects have disproportionately been felt by poor persons in developing
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countries.) Non-renewable energy resources seem the best choice for applying the
dividend, as coal, oil and gas are finite resources, of which the global store is
disproportionally used by wealthy developed countries, and the use of which produces
carbon emissions that are understood to be the main factor driving climate change. The
international community is in consensus that increasing levels of carbon in the
atmosphere are leading to climate change that will be harmful to ecosystems that
support human life. And there is also an international consensus that carbon emissions
from using non-renewable (carbon based) energy sources must be reduced. However,
there has been almost no effective progress towards reducing carbon emissions. Carbon
emissions are an open access commons problem, which cannot be resolved unilaterally,
as each individual country’s economic cost in reducing carbon based energy use will not
reliably be compensated by the lessening of harms from climate change, if it can’t be
assured that others will also reduce their emissions. The Non-Renewable Energy
Dividend, paid on use of non-renewable energy resources, is an effective way of
addressing this open access commons problem. The rate paid on the use of nonrenewable energy resources can be set high enough to strongly encourage conservation,
and stimulate research and investment in alternative technologies. Therefore, it seems
acceptable, in interests of fairness of process, to tax the use of energy resources
generally, rather than just in international trade. I argue that although it isn’t’t
necessarily a part of international trade, the use of non-renewable energy resources is

307

such an influential force in global economic interactions that it is drawn into the purview
of a proposal for justice in international trade.
Because the harms of unrestrained consumption of non-renewable energy
resources may be very high, we ought to apply the precautionary principle when we
consider what level of consumption of non-renewable energy resources would be an
appropriate target. In this situation the proponents of both environmental and
ecological economics could probably agree that the level should be quite high.32
Although even a rate that was too low to modify resource use behaviour quickly (and
energy use has proven relatively inelastic), would likely produce a large amount of
revenue. Setting the dividend at a high rate would have the benefit of beginning to
modify resource use behaviour very rapidly, but it would come with the cost of
economic impacts that could be quite powerful for countries that currently sustain their
economies with very high levels of oil, natural gas and coal use. There has been
considerable research on these economic costs. Before decisions were made on the
rates, more would likely be necessary.
A further argument for the Non-Renewable Energy Resource Dividend pertaining
to a proposal for a just trade regime, is the mechanism for ensuring compliance,
suggested by Pogge in his GRD proposal. He argues that the most effective way to
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ensure that countries were motivated to collect the dividend on resource use would be
to tie it to international trade. Countries that had signed onto the agreement but did not
pay the dividend would face tariff barriers to their exports, from countries that were
members of the Global Trade Organization. This could be an effective method of
ensuring compliance as long as the value of trade in the GDP of the country it was
applied against was much higher than the dividends that were owed on non-renewable
resource use. (Even a fairly high rate charged on non-renewable energy use would be
very low compared to the value of trade in developed country economies.) This method
would probably be reasonably effective for motivating compliance if the majority of
countries normally complied and were willing to implement the tariffs against those that
were not.
Structure of the Institutions
The structure of the proposed global institution or institutions for justice in trade
is a crucial question. What could a just institution look like in this context? I have
suggested that they would be democratic institutions that were inclusively
representative of global society, and I have also suggested that they would need to be
transparent.
One way that the institutions would be radically different than the current WTO
and other international economic institutions is that they would assume principles of
justice in trade as part of their basic charter and framework, making them the most
basic duties of the institution regardless of all other operating interests. This not to
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suggest that mistakes, crooked dealings, corruption, and simply self-interested
subversion of principles could not occur, but rather, that the basic expectation would be
working towards economic justice. And when individuals or groups were found to acting
in ways outside that expectation, action would be undertaken to hold them accountable
and correct any resulting wrongs. This is markedly different than current international
economic institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions
are administered by representatives of the governments of states, who are expected, by
the governments that appoint them, to make national interest a high priority. Although
the creation of these institutions reflects a belief in the benefits of cooperation in
international society, some of their activities and policies arguably reflect positions of
international relations realism.
What would the organizational and representative structure of an inclusively
democratic global institution for trade supporting a cosmopolitan conception of justice
look like? A cosmopolitan conception of justice is one in which obligations of justice
extend between all individual members of global society. Each individual has an
obligation to ensure that his/her behaviour and pursuit of his/her own interests are
consistent with permitting all others to do the same, regardless of cultural or political
boundaries. Because the proposal for a Global Trade Organization is to function in global
society as it actually exists, it must be structured to function effectively in the current
international order, but also to take a commitment to cosmopolitan obligations of
justice seriously. It is a daunting task, for there is no exact example of an institution that
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is realistically comparable, although there are at least several that can provide insight
into what would be required.
Institutions in general require several levels of decision making. There are First
Order decisions about policy or particular actions. These are the types of decisions
discussed in the previous section on functions. In this case they are the policies and
actions taken in relation to the principles of justice in trade. Second Order decisions are
those concerning who will make those decisions and under what conditions they will be
made. And Third Order decisions are those concerned with how to decide who and how
second order decisions will be made.33 Basically second-order decisions are the process
of putting people into place in the institutions, the electing or appointing of first-order
decision-makers, and third-order decisions are the process of deciding what process of
selecting those persons is the best option in the particular situation. Looking at some
examples of current international institutions and how the second- and third-order
decisions affect outputs is useful before attempting to explain choices in the proposed
model.
A first example is the current WTO. The World Trade Organization is designed to
be a democratic international institution, with the goal of supporting reduction of
barriers to international trade. The WTO is in some sense democratic. All member states
are allowed representation in decision-making regarding adoption of new protocols
resulting from trade negotiations, and the voting is based on consensus, with a
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requirement for unanimity. The representatives are appointed by the governments of
member states.34 The WTO includes a very large body of trade agreements that set
regulations and conditions for trade between member states, but this is largely the
result of the majority of the body of agreements that had been concluded under the
previous trade regime, GATT, being subsumed into the WTO on its creation in 1995. The
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was, in general, not focussed on poorer
developing countries, which had little involvement in most of the agreements. Wealthy
developed countries, in general, under the GATT process were able to establish
positions guaranteeing their ability to protect or subsidize particular industries, and
carry those into the WTO. Developing countries ascending to the WTO were for the
most part required to face new standards, both regulatory and then in the consensus
process, which has made it basically impossible to protect their interests in the same
way as was possible for developed countries, in earlier GATT negotiations.
The WTO, compared with the IMF and the World Bank, which are
administratively dominated by representatives from wealthy developed countries, has a
form of global democratic structure. Its democratic structure, however, has some
serious flaws, which, in the end, create a situation that is quite unjust. It uses a
consensus system of decision-making, which creates a situation where it is possible for a
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single member to block any decision that it sees as unfavorable to its interests. The
consensus model effectively gives all members a veto. In general that has resulted in
very little effective progress being made, either in new trade negotiations to create
conditions more favorable to developing countries or in reforming very problematic
agreements such as TRIPs and TRIM, in the fifteen years since 1999. (With the body of
agreements that came into the WTO with GATT 1994 being a reflection of the interests
of the wealthy developed countries, and agreements like TRIPS and TRIMs, which
resulted from the efforts of corporations, lobbying the governments of wealthy
developed countries, a form of governance that makes it very difficult to change the
status quo, seems quite unjust.)
Another concern for the effectiveness of the democratic model of the WTO is the
dispute settlement mechanism (appellate body). In a sense it is a democratic system, in
that it is possible for all members to bring a case before it. The concern is that in many
cases, because it is adversarial and both member states are allowed to present their
cases, poorer countries are heavily disadvantaged. It appears to be the case that
decisions of the appellate body of the WTO tend to reflect the ability of the state
presenting the case to afford a very well prepared case.35
The United Nations, created in 1944, is another example of an international
institution designed with some concern for a democratic structure. The General
Assembly of the United Nations is made up of appointed representatives of the
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government of member states. The United Nations General Assembly makes decisions
according to a majority system, where representatives of all member states have an
equal vote. The General Assembly is perceived by most to be fairly effectively
democratic in its decision-making, although to some extent it is hampered by a
combination of national interests and the realistic conception that most of its decisions
will not result in effective action. Wealthy powerful countries often operate around it,
and have a tendency to ignore the possibility of expending effort to build support for
most of their projects within the UN.
The structure of one-country, one-vote is democratic, in a sense, but is also
problematic from a cosmopolitan point of view. Accepting the position that there is
nothing about the status of a state that trumps other obligations of justice, makes the
orders of magnitude differences in representation seem unfair when it comes to
participating in decision-making in relation to factors that may have the potential to
make an individual or group much better or worse off. One vote representing 300,000
persons seems a very different type of representation than a vote which represents
more than 1,000,000,000 persons. (These are all large numbers but there is a very
serious difference between them.) A cosmopolitan position means taking obligations to
all individuals seriously, and so, particularly when there are huge numbers of people,
justice must involve fair institutional design. Although there are reasonable arguments
for efficiency on several levels of representation by state, in a truly global conception of
justice the ideal will need to be a form of representation based on population.
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The European Union is another example of a democratic international
institution. It is not a global institution, but it operates over a large number of national
borders, and in some situations, comes close to being a supranational institution. The
part of the EU that is most interesting in relation to our proposal is the manner in which
representatives are elected to the European Parliament. In the case of most
international institutions, representatives are appointed by the government of the
states they represent. In the European Union, however, representatives are elected
separately from the governments of representative states. They are representatives of
the state where they are elected, and of course act in their national interest, but they
will not always reflect the exact same interests as the government of that state. This can
be problematic but can also function to serve the interests of justice, in a similar way to
the separation of powers within modern democratic states.
Exactly how to structure representation in the GTO is a complex concern. As
noted, there is a tension between the demands of cosmopolitan obligations of justice
and the pragmatic concerns of a proposal that could reasonably be implemented in the
actually existing international society. The cosmopolitan position would seem to require
a representation based on population that would allow each individual to select a
representative with more or less equal power to represent her or him in relation to
other members of global society. The problem with this is that international society is
based on states as primary actors, and no proposal ignoring this would be viable. If even
the smallest state was to have a representative, and states with larger populations were
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to have additional representatives based on population, the number of representatives
would quickly become unmanageable. In interests of practicality, the GTO would likely
have to be similar to the WTO, with a single vote accorded to each member state.
There are of course problems with this. Indians or Chinese persons could feel
that their voice is tiny compared to the extent of their needs. With such an arrangement
it would be possible, if this was something that was a concern, to create a rotating panel
of members selected through a process that took population into account.36 The single
vote per state compromise is definitely a concern for fairness in a global institution, and
countries with large populations may have concerns.
At the WTO, the consensus requirement in decision-making, which is an effective
veto, at least nullifies some of the problem of fairness in representation by population,
or otherwise. No state has its interests outvoted and sacrificed to a majority. This is
actually a valuable feature, and in theory compatible with Rawls’ position on the
injustice of a utilitarian willingness to sacrifice some individuals interests for the benefit
of the majority. As discussed, this hasn’t turned out to be particularly fair in the WTO. 37
A strict majority- rules decision-making structure could also be unfair, although in some

36

The rotating panel could be selected through the UN. (The only reason for choosing the UN would be
that it is a reasonably democratic international institution that would be capable of establishing a process
for selecting representatives that members might agree to.) The rotating panel of population could be
fairly small, and still have effective power, if a fairly large super-majority was used for decision making.
37

It has meant that developing countries have been unable to make changes to agreements that came
into the WTO at its creation, that favor developed countries.
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ways it would be mitigated by integration of the principles of justice in trade, providing
a framework for interaction.
A compromise between a strict majority-rule format and the consensus model
could be a super-majority system, where a high percentage of votes would need to be in
agreement, to successfully pass a decision. This could be a fairly high percentage, 70% or
more, to limit the ability of a single bloc of countries to push through terms that were
unfair (The actual percentage required would need to be considered and evaluated.) A
possible safeguard would be to include the option, available to countries, to appeal a
decision to a separate panel that would judge only if the decision was valid in relation to
the principles of justice in trade.
Even allowing for a large super-majority, this structure will shift considerable
power away from wealthy developed countries, which currently dominate the
international institutional order, as they are a fairly small group of countries. This is a
fairly radical shift, and will likely incur powerful criticism. I believe, arguing from a
position of justice in global society that these claims hold up. The argument starts from
the same position as Rawls in A Theory of Justice: that accepting the proposal requires a
desire to live in a just society. The criticism will be that poor developing countries that
make up a large portion of the world’s countries will use their power to skew the
policies and actions of the institutions in their favor, or at least make poor decisions
through lack of knowledge and experience. In practise this may happen, but the
institution is designed to be transparent, and its framework of guiding principles is to be
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that of economic justice. In the current regime, as clearly and powerfully outlined by
Thomas Pogge, the wealthy powerful countries have arranged the structure of the
international economic order in their own interests and make little pretense to setting
the basic operating principles of the most powerful international economic institutions
to be fighting poverty and harmful inequality. In effect, many of the institutions are
already weighted towards increased representation based on wealth. (For the WTO this
is not meant to be the case but becomes so because of the costs involved in supporting
large and effective delegations for poor countries.)
This is also a concern that has arisen before in relation to representation and
democracy. A couple of hundred years ago almost the same concern was being voiced
by the elite of the today’s western democracies: what will happen if the poor,
uneducated masses, who have no experience managing property and assets, are allowed
democratic franchise? With their sheer numbers won’t they destroy effective
government, voting for short-sighted, self-interested, unworkable policies? In the US,
structures such as the Electoral College system are a reminder of this, in Great Britain
the House of Lords, in Canada, the Senate. In a just democratic system there will likely
be some weakening of the power held by wealthy, powerful countries in our current
institutions. Their capacity to skew most international economic interactions strongly in
their favor may diminish, as it ought to, but shifting the power in international economic
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institutions towards a greater equality of representation will probably, like extension of
universal electoral franchise in western democracies, lead to a more just society.38
Another concern might be, whether representatives would be appointed by
governments in power in member countries, or ought to be elected independently of
sitting governments. In terms of practicality it would seem that the system used by the
WTO of representation by sitting governments of member countries has much to
recommend it. A cosmopolitan approach could favor separate elections for
representation at the GTO, particularly if it meant that populations of countries with
heterogeneous interests could be more fairly represented. This is the situation of the
European Union, and it does sometimes allow for a variety of political views to be
represented, but it can also complicate relations between the EU parliament and the
individual governments of member countries, so the results are somewhat mixed.
However, with the practical consideration of limiting representation to a single
representative per member state, the possibilities for representation of a diversity of
interests through separate elections would be limited, in any event.
The proposal for the Global Trade Organization, up to this point has been
somewhat unclear on whether one institution is required or several. This is because
many of the functions could easily be separated out, and many of the functions would

38

The western democracies have their own problems with wealth and political equality. To a varying
degree all of the wealthy developed democracies, while officially having representative democracy based
on political equality of all citizens, the influence of wealth has crept into the systems and has been used to
shape the political culture, and social consciousness of the citizens, to the extent that policy outputs
generally represent the interests of the wealthiest sectors of society.
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still be worth implementing even if they were the only part of the project that was
considered. In the ideal situation, the proposal is for one larger institution, replacing the
WTO and adding several functions. The ideal proposal again would be divided into
branches or sections according to the main functions: a Regulatory Branch, a Financial
Capital Branch, an Intellectual Property Branch, and a Strategic Economic Development
Branch. It also seems like it is reasonable to separate the Energy Resources Dividend
Fund from the Strategic Economic Development Branch in interests of transparency.
How Would this New Institution for Global Economic Collaboration
Come into Existence?
The proposal for principles of justice in international trade and a global
democratic institution that would support them is something of an ideal conception of
the form a just regime of international trade could take. It can be understood as
something to aim for in reforming existing international economic institutions and
designing new ones. The principles guiding the proposal are considered to be what
could come out of a negotiation of a framework of a just system of international trade in
the Original Position, as Rawls suggests even in TLOP. The proposal is a conception of
what would happen if representatives of global society sat down to create a new
institution for trade in the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance, able to leave
personal and national interest aside and work out an international trade regime that
was in the best interests of all members of global society with a serious commitment to
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justice based on rational self

interest.39

Rectifying serious systemic economic injustice in

our actual global society would probably require sitting down to a “new Bretton Woods”
with a commitment to create new global economic institutions that were based on a
desire to live in a just society, rather than on simple self-interest.
The proposal however isn’t altogether lost if that doesn`t happen, as many of its
sections are also arguably good options for improving the international trade regime
even if they are implemented on their own. The financial capital transfer tax is a wellknown concept, and on its own could be implemented to increase the stability of capital
flows in many economies and reduce the “race to the bottom” pressure on wages that
extremely mobile financial capital exerts. It would be possible, though not easy to
implement a proposal similar to this in the context of the current international
economic institutions.
The Intellectual Property proposal is not a radical idea on its own either. Joseph
Stiglitz`s alternative for a development round of negotiations at the WTO contains part
of it. He has suggested that in some cases intellectual property does need to be treated
as a public good in the context of development.40 Radically reforming TRIPS in favor of

39

The results of the original Bretton Woods conference might also be understood to be much less unjust
than what they have evolved into in the last 60 years in any event. Bretton Woods was the conference
organized in 1944, as it became clear that the Allies would be victorious. It was a meeting of the Allied
countries (there were 40 but the US and Great Britain were the most influential). The goal of the
conference was to create a new framework for an international monetary system that would allow stable
and productive international trade.
40

Stiglitz, Joseph. Making globalization work. (New York: Norton and Company, 2007) 103-132.
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an intellectual property system that did not ignore the needs of developing countries
would be valuable even if no other reform was made.
The Strategic Economic Development proposal could also be adopted as a new
focus for a more just trade regime, even in the context of the WTO. All it would take
would be to back off from the combination of self-interest and ideological commitment
that has made free markets at any cost the focus. There is strong evidence that the most
effective trade for economic development is not always a completely free market.
Promoting cooperative strategic development as a value even if it wasn’t backed up by
an absolute commitment to poverty reduction, would constitute improvement over a
commitment to imposing free markets on developing countries in situations where they
possess little ability compete internationally, except in industries based on unskilled
labor and in low wage agriculture.
A new regulatory focus on penalizing practises that are harmful to the
environment or tend to cause social harm instead of making market liberalization a
trump value would also be of value in any context. There are many clear cases where
harms occur because there is no coordination of environmental and social regulations at
the global level. The WTO could begin to take some of this on without radically
reforming its structure or even its basic mission of promoting trade liberalization. Or it
could collaborate with existing UN expertise on this and simply be a forum for imposing
trade sanctions on those who are proven to be causing social or environmental harms.
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At the very least this would delegitimize those types of trade, even if it did not halt them
effectively.
Finally the WTO could be reformed to be more effectively democratic, which
could be as simple as rethinking the consensus veto in favor of some sort of super
majority. It would not solve all problems, but it would likely warm up stalled
negotiations. The proposal to create a fund and provide technical assistance to build
capacity among developing countries for both negotiating and implementation of
required regulatory measures would also be an extremely valuable reform.41

41

See chapter four.
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